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ABSTRACT
CLICK FRAUD: HOvV TO SPOT IT, HOW TO STOP IT?
Chamila Walgampaya
May 27th, 2011

Online search advertising is currently the greatest source of revenue for many Internet
giants such as Google™, Yahoo!TM, and Bing™. The increased number of specialized
websites and modern profiling techniques have all contributed to an explosion of the
income of ad brokers from online advertising. The single biggest threat to this growth
is however click fraud.

Trained botnets and even individuals are hired by click-fraud

specialists in order to maximize the revenue of certain users from the ads they publish on
their websites, or to launch an attack between competing businesses.
Most academics and consultants who study online advertising estimate that 15% to
35% of ads in pay per click(PPC) online advertising systems are not authentic. In the
first two quarters of 2010, US marketers alone spent $5.7 billion on PPC ads, where PPC
ads are between 45 and 50 percent of all online ad spending. On average about $1.5
billion is wasted due to click-fraud. These fraudulent clicks are believed to be initiated by
users in poor countries, or botnets, who are trained to click on specific ads. For example,
according to a 2010 study from Information Warfare Monitor, the operators of Koobface,
a program that installed malicious software to participate in click fraud, made over $2
million in just over a year. The process of making such illegitimate clicks to generate
revenue is called click-fraud.
Search engines claim they filter out most questionable clicks and either not charge
for them or reimburse advertisers that have been wrongly billed. However this is a hard
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task, despite the claims that brokers' efforts are satisfactory. In the simplest scenario, a
publisher continuously clicks on the ads displayed on his own website in order to make
revenue. In a more complicated scenario. a travel agent may hire a large, globally distributed, botnet to click on its competitor's ads, hence depleting their daily budget. We
analyzed those different types of click fraud methods and proposed new methodologies
to detect and prevent them real time. While traditional commercial approaches detect
only some specific types of click fraud, Collaborative Click Fraud Detection and Prevention (CCFDP) system, an architecture that we have implemented based on the proposed
methodologies, can detect and prevents all major types of click fraud.
The proposed solution analyzes the detailed user activities on both, the server side and
client side collaboratively to better describe the intention of the click. Data fusion techniques are developed to combine evidences from several data mining models and to obtain
a better estimation of the quality of the click traffic. Our ideas are experimented through
the development of the Collaborative Click Fraud Detection and Prevention (CCFDP)
system. Experimental results show that the CCFDP system is better than the existing
commercial click fraud solution in three major aspects: 1) detecting more click fraud
especially clicks generated by software; 2) providing prevention ability; 3) proposing the
concept of click quality score for click quality estimation.

In the CCFDP initial version, we analyzed the performances of the click fraud detection
and prediction model by using a rule base algorithm, which is similar to most of the
existing systems. We have assigned a quality score for each click instead of classifying the
click as fraud or genuine, because it is hard to get solid evidence of click fraud just based
on the data collected, and it is difficult to determine the real intention of users who make
the clicks.
Results from initial version revealed that the diversity of CF attack types makes it hard
for a single counter measure to prevent click fraud. Therefore, it is important to be able
to combine multiple measures capable of effective protection from click fraud. Therefore,
in the CCFDP improved version, we provide the traffic quality score as a combination of

VI

~-------------

evidence from several data mining algorithms.
We have tested the system with a data from an actual ad campaign in 2007 and 2008.
We have compared the results with Google Adwords reports for the same campaign.
Results show that a higher percentage of click fraud present even with the most popular
search engine.

The multiple model based CCFDP always estimated less valid traffic

compare to Google. Sometimes the difference is as high as 53%.
Detection of duplicates, fast and efficient, is one of the most important requirement in
any click fraud solution. Usually duplicate detection algorithms run in real time. In order
to provide real time results, solution providers should utilize data structures that can be
updated in real time. In addition, space requirement to hold data should be minimum.

In this dissertation, we also addressed the problem of detecting duplicate clicks in payper-click streams. We proposed a simple data structure, Temporal Stateful Bloom Filter
(TSI3F), an extension to the regular I3loom Filter and Counting Bloom Filter. The bit
vector in the Bloom Filter was replaced with a status vector. Duplicate detection results of
TSBF method is compared with Buffering, FPBuffering, and CBF methods. False positive
rate of TSBF is less than 1% and it does not have false negatives. Space requirement
of TSBF is minimal among other solutions. Even though Buffering does not have either
false positives or false negatives its space requirement increases exponentially with the
size of the stream data size. When the false positive rate of the FPBuffering is set to 1%
its false negative rate jumps to around 5%, which will not be tolerated by most of the
streaming data applications. We also compared the TSBF results with CBF. TSBF uses
only half the space or less than standard CI3F with the same false positive probability.
One of the biggest successes with CCFDP is the discovery of new mercantile click
bot, the Smart ClickBot. We presented a Bayesian approach for detecting the Smart
ClickBot type clicks. The system combines evidence extracted from web server sessions
to determine the final class of each click. Some of these evidences can be used alone, while
some can be used in combination with other features for the click bot detection. During
training and testing we also addressed the class imbalance problem. Our best classifier
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shows recall of 94%. and precision of 89%, with Fl measure calculated as 92%. The high
accuracy of our system proves the effectiveness of the proposed methodology. Since the
Smart ClickBot is a sophisticated click bot that manipulate every possible parameters to
go undetected, the techniques that we discussed here can lead to detection of other types
of software bots too.
Despite the enormous capabilities of modern machine learning and data mining techniques in modeling complicated problems, most of the available click fraud detection
systems are rule-based. Click fraud solution providers keep the rules as a secret weapon
and bargain with others to prove their superiority. We proposed validation framework
to acquire another model of the clicks data that is not rule dependent, a model that
learns the inherent statistical regularities of the data. Then the output of both models is
compared.
Due to the uniqueness of the CCFDP system architecture, it is better than current
commercial solution and search enginejISP solution. The system protects Pay-Per-Click
advertisers from click fraud and improves their Return on Investment (ROI). The system
can also provide an arbitration system for advertiser and PPC publisher whenever the
click fraud argument arises. Advertisers can gain their confidence on PPC advertisement
by having a channel to argue the traffic quality with big search engine publishers. The
results of this system will booster the internet economy by eliminating the shortcoming
of PPC business model. General consumer will gain their confidence on internet business
model by reducing fraudulent activities which are numerous in current virtual internet
world.
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CHAPTER 1
ONLINE ADVERTISING
1.1

Introduction

The Internet is probably the most important technological creation of our times. It is a
universally acknowledged truth that the world wide web has revolutionized our planet.
Today the web allows us to communicate with people nearly anywhere in the world and
indeed, with billions of people at once. It has changed the way we think, as well as the
way we do business. It provides many immensely useful services to the masses for free, including such essentials as web portals, web email and web search [Immorlica et al., 2005].
The web is not only a means of communication, it also contains a wealth of knowledge.
Since the rise of the search engines, huge amounts of information have become readily
accessible. Web search engines provide information access to millions of users per day. For
many people, Web search engines are now the primary method for finding information.
news, and products. According to a recent study 99% of Internet users utilize search,
while the known web alone spans several billion pages [iProspect, 2004]. In addition to
addressing information requests, modern web search engines are navigational tools that
take people to specific websites or are an aid in browsing. People also employ search
engines in new and increasingly diverse ways, and search engines are constantly trying to
improve the retrieval aspects of their services.
Most of the information and services on the web come at no cost to the user. The
publisher or webmaster, on the other hand, has to pay to provide them. In order to
profit from their complimentary services, webmasters rent out space on their websites to
advertisers. This is currently the main means of covering the costs of providing online
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services [Soubusta, 2008]. Advertising plays an important role for every company. Most
businesses operate with an advertising budget of 2 to 5 percent of their previous year's
gross sales. Since its inception, Internet advertising has grown rapidly and negatively
affected traditional mass media advertising like newspapers and television. Table 1.1
shows the variation of advertisement budget in for each media [TNS, 2010]. Spending
on Internet ads is growing faster than any other sector of the advertising industry and
is expected to surge from $12.5 billion in 2009 to $29 billion in 2010 in the US alone,
according to researcher el\Iarketer Inc.
Table 1.1: Advertising Expenditure of all Media

I Media Type

1 2008 Vs. 200712009 Vs. 20081

Internet

4.6%

7%

TV

0.1%

-12.1%

~Iagazine

-7.5%

-19.7%

Paper

-11.8%

-22.8%

Radio

-10.3%

-22.8%

Outdoor

-1.5%

-16.2%

As the Internet continues to grow, the Internet advertising industry flourishes as a
means of reaching the appropriate market segments.

Internet advertising is different

from conventional TV/Radio advertising, which tends to be expensive. broadcast-based,
and diluted. On the other hand, Internet advertisers are currently able to inexpensively
direct their campaigns to the appropriate audience. Because information flow through
cyberspace is electronic, online marketers can selectively advertise to consumers at high
volume with costs far below that of older media such as television and radio. Current
data management and Web programming technologies allow the classification of surfers
and thus allow the targeting of advertisements to the appropriate customer body on the
fly [Metwally et al., 2006].
Internet advertising comes in various forms. For example as a result of a search query,

2

banners , multimedia etc. Figure 1.1 shows the variation of revenue shared by advertising
format from year 2004 to 2009. It is obvious that "search query ads" are responsible for
the largest market share in Internet advertising and it is continuously growing [lAB , 2010] .
• 2004 • 2005 • 2006 . 2007 • 2008 • 2009
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Figure 1.1 : Variation of Revenue Shared by Advertising Format
Typical search engine queries are short and reveal a great deal of information about
user preferences. This gives search engine companies a unique opportunity to display
highly targeted ads to the user [Mehta et al. , 2007]. When a user types a query or search
keywords, major search engines offer at least two types of results on a search engine
results page. One set is composed of organic links that were determined using the search
engines matching algorithm. The other set is composed of paid links t hat appear because
a company purchased the keyword(s) used in the search query.
The first question comes into mind is, if we are able achieve the top organic positions
of the favorite (or most valued) keywords, we can eliminate or at least try to minimize
money paying for sponsored search. It sounds very tempting, and getting top organic
positions does have a huge incremental value. This is particularly true if t he page that
ranks well contains a clear offer leading to a good conversion rate and site stickiness.
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However, the ability to achieve top organic placement above any universal search element
is increasingly in doubt, except perhaps for a brand search. Also consider that search
engine results pages are no longer a "one size fits all" scenario. Therefore. sponsored
results playa vital role in advertising the business to the user [Lee, 2009].

1.2

Online Advertising Models, CPM, CPA, and PPC

In the past, online advertising used the Cost-Per-Impression(CPI or CPM) model to
charge for advertisements. An online advertisement impression is a single appearance of
an advertisement on a web page. Each time an advertisement loads onto a user's screen,
the ad server may count that loading as one impression. The cost per impression is often
measured in Cost-Per-Mille (CPM), that is, the cost of one thousand impressions of the
ad. This advertising model was based on traditional TV and print advertising, where the
advertiser is charged on the basis of the number of times that the ad is viewed. CostPer-Impression is the preferred model of publishers (webmasters), because they are paid
regardless of the effectiveness of an ad. Obviously, advertisers would prefer to pay only
for ads that lead to a conversion.
Successful conversions are interpreted differently by individual marketers, advertisers,
and content creators. To online retailers, for example, a successful conversion may constitute the sale of a product to a consumer whose interest in the item was initially sparked
by clicking a banner advertisement. To content creators, however, a successful conversion
may refer to a membership registration, newsletter subscription, software download, or
other activity that occurs due to a subtle or direct request from the content creator for
the visitor to take the action.
In internet marketing, conversion rate is the ratio of visitors who convert casual content views or website visits into desired actions based on subtle or direct requests from
marketers, advertisers, and content creators. The Conversion rate is defined as follows:

.
N umber of Goals achieved
C onver swn rate = - - - - - - - = - - - - - - - Total Visits
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(1.1 )

Casale Media™ , Burst Media™, Value Click™, and Tribal Fusion™ are the popular
advertising companies that provide CPM based advertising.
Advertisers have an advantageous position in the Cost Per Action model or CPA
(sometimes known as Pay Per Action or PPA). It is an online advertising pricing model,
where the advertiser pays for each specified action (a purchase, a form submission, and
so on) linked to the advertisement.

Publishers

Advertisers

CPM

PPC

CPA

Figure 1.2: CPM, CPA vs. PPC

1.3

Pay-Per-Click Model

Pay-Per-Click(PPC) model was developed by Google in 2004 as a balance between CPM

CPA methods. It has continued to attract more and more businesses and Figure 1.3
shows the growth of the PPC in the recent years.

In this type of arrangement, advertisers pay a certain amount of money to the publisher for every click on their ad (which leads to the advertiser's website). That is to say
costs are performance dependent . Consequently, the model is still favored by advertisers,
who get an interested visitor to their website for the money they pay. Sponsored search
owes much of its success to the pay-per-click performance advertising model. In traditional advertising, product advertisers target an audience and pay for each impression. In
sponsored search , advertisers target advertisements at search keywords, but only pay if a
user actually engages by clicking on the offered link. The close coupling between payment
and an easily measurable performance metric creates an unrivaled performance marketing
environment [Pedersen, 2008].
A typical PPC traffic model is depicted in Figure 1.4. An Advertiser can be a com-
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Figure 1.3: Growth of PPC model
pany or an individual who would like to display their advertisements in other websites.
Publishers are the websites t hat accept cont racts t hrough advert isers to display advertisements. The commissioner is an independent entity that has agreements wit h both t he
advertiser and t he publisher. It can be a search engine or other advertisement agent . The
commissioner keeps t rack of the advertisers' budgets so that t hey are not over-spent. Often , t he advert iser sit e does not administ er the advert isement pay-per-click model itself,
for example referred traffic by other sites, but rather employs a third party ad network,
here referred t o as the click fr aud det ection service, to administ er t he pay-per-click or
dick-through program on its behalf.
The web user can be a human or software, possibly t he source of click fraud t hat uses
services of t he Internet. A user click propagates through the model as described below.
1. First a Web user requests a web page in the publisher site . The requested page is
loaded along wit h t he advert isement on t he Web users' browser.
2. If the Web user clicks on an advertisement hypertext link (for example a banner ad
or logo) in t hat page, the publisher redirects the Web user request to commissioner 's
server. The commissioner logs the click for account ing purposes.
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Figure 1.4: PPC Traffic model
3. The commissioner then redirects the Web user's browser to the advertiser site.
The publishers are paid based on the click traffic they drive to the advertiser's web
site. The commissioner earns a percentage of this revenue. Sometimes these payments are
based on number of sales generated in the advertiser's website, rather than t he volume of
traffic driven by the publisher.
Pay-per-click metering is a popular payment model for advertising on the Internet.
The model involves and advertiser who contracts with a specialized entity, which we refer
to as a syndicator, to distribute textual or graphical banner advertisements to publishers
of content. These banner ads point to the advertiser's web site. When a user clicks on the
banner ad on the publisher's webpage, she is directed to the site to which it points. Search
engines such as Google and Yahoo are the most popular syndicators, and create the largest
portion of pay-per-clirk traffic on the Internet today. These sites display advertisements
on their own search pages in response to the search terms entered by users and charge
advertiser for clicks on these links (thereby acting as their own publishers) or, increasingly, outsource advertisements to third-party publishers. Advertisers pay syndicators per
referral , and the syndicators pass on a portion of the payments to the publishers.
The pay per click model comes in two forms. The first form is search engine advertismg. An example of Google ads is shown in Figure 1.5. To navigate the World Wide Web
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and find desired sites, users input keywords into search engmes like Google or Yahoo!.
The engines, which index millions of online websites, then look for pages whose content
matches that of the keywords. The best results are sent back to the user. In search engine
advertising, firms like Google auction keywords to advertisers, who bid by amount paid
per click. The ads of top bidders then appear alongside the search results for the auctioned keyword. By picking and choosing which keywords to couple ads with , advertisers
selectively target the types of users to market to .
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Figure 1.5: Search Engine Advertising
PPC 's second form is contextual advertising. Unlike search engine advertising where
ads are placed alongside website search results , contextual advertising places ads into
websites themselves. An example is shown in Figure 1.6. Sometimes, marketing firms
contact site publishers directly to host ads for a negotiated fee . More commonly, however ,
intermediaries called advertising networks will help publishers find ads to host . Advertising networks maintain ad inventories that include various graphics like banners and text
links . Ads within inventories are designed to match an advertiser 's message and are stored
on network servers. Advertising networks then provide publisher with bits of HTML code,
the markup language for creating webpages, to script into host sites. When a web user
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Figure 1.6: Contextual Advertising
visits the site , the code displays inventory ads from the network server for the user to
View. Revenues from per click ads are t hen shared between the advertising network and
publisher.
In every growing line of business PPC Internet advertising is getting more and more
popular mainly due to couple of reasons, First, search engines have eased t he setup of
this kind of a marketing account, Second, once setup it can generate traffic very quickly,
depending on the level of competition, Third , this type of marketing delivers ads to
users who are already searching for the product or services that an advertiser is offering,
meaning they are receiving mainly qualified traffic.
Increasing popularity of PPC inevitably increased the competition among advertisers
for popular keywords, thus increased the bid values for these keywords. As a result search
engines continue to make big profits. Figure 1. 7 shows the total revenue generated by
popular CPM (Casale Media™ , Burst Media ™

, Value Click™ , and Tribal Fusion™

) and PPC ((Google™ , Yahoo!TM , bing™ )) companies in t he recent years. It can be
seen that PPC model is growing its popularity compare to the CPM over the years.
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Figure 1.7: Internet Ad Revenue by Pricing Model
However , the enormous growth of PPC advertising helped a group of fraudsters to
profit from that growth. This became obvious when companies started to report that their
fraudulent traffic was more than 50% of total traffic, and losses were in the range of $5,000
to $300,000. These fraudsters were using the inherent drawback of the PPC advertising.
PPC financial model totally depends on exchange of HTTP requests from advertiser and
publisher. For a syndicator or publisher's server a "click" is simply a browser request for
a URL associated with a particular ad. The server has no way to determine if a human
initiated the action and, if a human was involved, whether she acted knowingly and
with honest intent. Fraudsters soon started to manipulate PPC adverts with artificially
generated clicks, a process which is known as click fraud [Juels et al., 2007].
The major companies treat pay per click fraud seriously. But the situation is a little
similar to the battle against viruses; as a signature for a virus is released , a new virus
or strain appears. In order to remain undetected , professional inflators of clicks closely
simulate real visitor behavior and visitor parameters. Obviously, click fraud is becoming
a significant threat to the rapid growth of on-line marketing sector, and as Google CFO
George Reyes stated recently, "it threatens their entire business model where the paidsearch has been the primary revenue generator" [Goodman, 2005] .
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1.4

Goals of the Dissertation

This research proposes new methodologies which can protect Pay-Per-Click advertisers
from click fraud and improve their Return on Investment (ROI). The proposed solutions
also provide an arbitration system for advertisers and PPC publishers whenever a click
fraud argument arises. Advertisers can gain their confidence on PPC advertisement by
having a channel to argue the traffic quality with big search engine publishers. General
consumer will gain their confidence on internet business model by reducing fraudulent
activities which are numerous in current virtual internet world.
In the fast growing Internet advertising industry, the pay-per-click business model, in
which advertisers pay for click-through to their website, is the dominant Internet advertising model. Click fraud becomes a serious problem as the pay-per-click (PPC) business
model gained its popularity. We developed novel data mining methodologies and tested
our proposed solutions with the implementation of Collaborative Click Fraud Detection
and Prevention (CCFDP) system to detect and prevent click fraud. This system uses
a unique two-step logging structure to authenticate every click. In contrast to most of
the existing click fraud solutions, which only use client side logging process, we match up
every click from both server and client side.
Our solutions predict click fraud by finding the abnormalities in a click considering its
short term and long term behavior. In some of the data mining modes a click is considered
as a point in a large feature space, while in some data mining models a group of clicks
arc analYJl:ecl together for iclentification of behavioral characteristics. At the same time, it
has the functionality of blocking suspicious clicks. The results of this system will booster
the internet economy by eliminating the shortcoming of PPC business model. General
consumer will gain their confidence on internet business model by reducing fraudulent
activities which are numerous in current virtual internet world.
vVe implemented two versions of the CCFDP system, which achieved different goals.
The initial version uses a rule based system to calculate overall click fraud score for each
click.

CCFDP improved version enhances the previous version by providing a traffic
11

quality score calculation method based on fusion of evidence from several data mining
models. Each data mining model generates a partial score for a click based on its analysis.
These partial scores are then combined to calculate the total quality score.
We accumulated large click data set, approximately 250,000 clicks from an actual ad
campaign. We compared different website contents, and different origins, e.g. Natural
Traffic (Non-paid traffic) and Pay-Per-Click traffic (Paid traffic), thus, finding the suspicious activities. We also compared the result of proposed solution with that of Google
Adwords reports.
Detecting duplicates in click data streams is an important task to fight against click
fraud. Therefore, in this dissertation we also considered the problem of detecting duplicates in click data streams. Our solution uses a modified version of the Counting
Bloom Filter. The Temporal Stateful Bloom Filter (TSBF) extends the standard Counting moom Filter by replacing the bit-vector with an array of counters of states. These
counters are dynamic and decay with time. We conducted a comprehensive set of experiments, using synthetic and real world data. Results are compared with Buffering
techniques used in the initial CCFDP system.
Nowadays, almost every task involving Web traversing and information retrieval depends on Web robots. \i\Teb robots are software programs that automatically traverse the
Webs hypertext structure. They proliferate rapidly aside with the growth of the Web
and are extremely valuable and important means not only for the large search engines,
but also for many specialized services such as investment portals, competitive intelligence
tools, etc. While many web robots serve useful purposes, recently, there have been cases
linked to click fraud committed by these Web robots. In this research we detail the architecture and functionality of the Smart ClickBot, a sophisticated software bot that is
designed to commit click fraud. It was first detected and reported by CCFDP improved
solution in March, 2010. We discuss the machine learning algorithms used to identify all
clicks exhibiting Smart ClickBot like patterns. We disclose the results of our investigation
of this bot to educate the security research community and provide information regarding
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the novelties of the attack.

1.5

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organil':ed as followings. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of click fraud
in online advertising. Chapter 3 compares and contrasts the current commercial solutions
for click fraud detection in advertising networks. Chapter 4 reviews the research in the
domain of click fraud detection, while Chapter 5 introduces the architecture and operation
processes of the Collaborative Click Fraud Detection and Prevention (CCFDP) System.
The improved version of the CCFDP system is introduced in Chapter 6. Methodologies for
Smart ClickBot detection and use of Temporal Stateful Bloom filters for fast detection of
duplicates are introduced in Chapter 7. Conclusions and future work are given in Chapter
8 and Chapter 9 respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
CLICK FRAUD IN ONLINE ADVERTISING
2.1

Introduction

Click fraud, is a by-product of the "pay per click" online advertising model. It is the
act of clicking ads with fraudulent or malicious intent to generate illegitimate revenue or
hurt competitors. Because fraudulent clicks do not represent genuine consumer interest,
they hold zero economic value [Kintana et al., 2009]. Advertisers are charged on a per
click basis, so an excessive number of bad clicks can severely inflate an organization's
advertising expenditure. Since online advertising networks act as brokers of multi-billion
dollar online advertising revenue streams, click fraud has become a major concern for
publishers too.
Recently click fraud has become a subject of some controversy and increasing litigation
due to the advertising networks being a key beneficiary of the fraud. On one hand, the
brokers do not wish to lose customers. On the other hand, they are not able to provide full
details of the clicks, their rates, and origin IP addresses to advertisers. Even worse, the
advertisers would wish to claim that all clicks are fraud, hence avoiding click charges. For
instance, broker loses money to undetected click fraud when it pays out to the publisher
(third party website), but it makes more money when it collects fees from the advertiser
[Haddadi, 2010]. Because of the spread between what the broker collects and what it pays
out, click fraud may directly profit the broker. This also provides an incentive for the
publishers to hire click fraud botnets or human teams to increase their revenue.
Estimates of click fraud prevalence range from 5-50% of all internet clicks, with values
from 15-35% quoted most often. Even low end estimates pose huge concerns for the
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rapidly expanding online advertising industry.
Click fraud benefits a fraudster in at least three ways. First, a firm may click numerous times on competitor ads to drain at profit margins and thus gain a market edge.
Competitor click fraud is not committed for any monetary gain, but rather in order to
harm one's competitor. A prerequisite for the fraud is that the competitor in question
has signed up as advertiser in a PPC scheme. The fraudster, knowing that every click on
the ads costs the competitor good money, clicks repeatedly on his ad to cause harm. He
might perform this task himself or use more sophisticated means, such as hiring a group
of people or using a software.
Second, ad space suppliers like search engines, advertising networks, and publishers
may make bad clicks to generate more revenues for themselves at the advertiser's expense.
Publishers can in principle derive financial benefit from click fraud in the short term, as
they receive revenue for whatever clicks they deem "valid". In the long term, however,
as customers become sensitive to losses, and syndicators rely on third party auditors to
lend credibility to their operations, click fraud can jeopardize syndicator advertiser relationships. Thus syndicators ultimately have a strong incentive to eliminated fraudulent
clicks. Today they employ a series of filters to week out suspicious clicks. These filters
are trade secrets of individual companies, as their disclosure might prompt new forms
of fraud. For example it is likely that syndicators use IP tracing to determine if an implausible number of clicks is originating from a single source. While heuristic filters are
fairly effective, they are of limited utility against sophisticated fraudsters) and subject to
degraded performance as fraudsters learn to defeat them [Juels et al., 2007].
Third, a fraudster can modify the ranking of advertisements by a combination of
impressions and clicks. An impression is the viewing of the banner. Impression fraud
occurs when fraudsters manipulate the number of page impressions for a given search term.
When an advertiser's relative click-through rate (CTR 1 ) decreases, his or her search term
lCTR is a way of measuring the success of an online advertising campaign. A CTR is obtained by
dividing the "number of users who clicked on an ad" on a web page by the "number of times the ad was
delivered" (impressions).
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can be suspended because of low CTR performance. This creates a window of opportunity
for other advertisers. By committing impression fraud, they are able to obtain higher
search rankings at lower costs due to the crippled competition.
Fraudsters take the advantage of the lack of verifiable human engagement in PPC
requests, in order to fabricate ad traffic. It can take a number of forms. One type of
click fraud relies on real clicks, whether intentional or not. An example of the former
is a so called click farm, which is a term denoting a group of low wage workers who
click for a living. Another example involves deceiving or convincing users to click on
advertisements. An example of an unintentional click is one generated by a malicious
cursor following script that places the banner right under the mouse cursor. This can be
done in a very small window to avoid detection. When the user clicks, the click would
be interpreted as a click on the banner, and cause revenue generation to the attacker.
A related abuse is manifested in an attack where publishers manipulate web pages such
that honest visitors inadvertently trigger clicks. This can be done for many common PPC
schemes, and simply relies on the inclusion of a javaScript component on the publisher's
webpage, where the script reads the banner and performs a get request that corresponds
to what would be performed if a user had initiated a click.

2.2

Types of Fraud

Based on the type of attack we can identify three broad categories in the realm of clicks
fraud. They are active human, active software and passive software click fraud. In the
following section we briefly discuss each of these types.

2.2.1

Active Human Click Fraud:

In this category clicks are generated by human activity and the entire web request process
is completed, which means that not only the web page is loaded, but also the images, flash,
javascipt code etc. are loaded. Human may have activity on the web page such as mouse
click, and scroll bar activities and the page view time is at least couple of seconds. This
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type of fraudulent clicks are generated mostly by people in developing countries who are
hired for a nominal wage.

2.2.2

Active Software Click Fraud:

In this kind, a software initiate the click fraud. In most of the cases, the web page request is
not complete and only the initial text web page is requested without the images, javascript
code or videos. No mouse or keyboard activities are followed and the page view time is
less than one second. A web page request to a server usually contains multiple follow up
requests. It first loads the texts in the web page followed by images, multimedia, etc. In
click agent software these requests are less likely to happen and such clues can be utilized
to identify software clicks. Although some smart click agent software can generate these
follow up requests, they are still different from the browser requests generated by real
users, such as mouse click, mouse movement, page view time etc.

2.2.3

Passive Software Click Fraud:

These frauds correspond to Adware and spyware run on the background of the client
computer without being known by the user. It hijacks browser sessions and sends out
web requests to multiple ad servers. These spyware or adware are installed on client computers without the consent of users. Such software might pops up an advertise window,
sometimes pops under, or might not pops up windows at all. The click fraud of this type
also committed by software of type 2. The difference is, in type 2, fraud is a user initiated
click and it is active. But in type 3 click fraud is originated from different client computers
and it is passive, which means the client user is not aware of any click fraud activities.
To differentiate if the clicks are of type 2 or 3 the pay per click provider should check if
the ad was actually placed on the referring page or the originating search. Because in
type 3 it is not necessary to have an advertisement displayed in the browser. Most of
the background click robots are programmed to send requests without being clicked on
an advertisement. So the pay per click provider should check if a real browser clicked
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the advertisement or not. This could be done by executing a java script code, or doing
redirects that do not occur every time. Another possibility to detect if the click is of type
2 or 3 is having log records. Advertisers can always check, are images being downloaded
in the requested webpage? Are any other pages clicked from the initial page? etc. The
recent addition to type 3 is click bots or botnet attacks.
The most novel characteristic of the click bot is that it is built to conduct a low noise
click fraud attack against syndicated search engines. In our research we are focusing on
detection and prevention of type 2 and type 3 click fraud with the emphasis on detecting
click bot attacks.
Besides committing click fraud bots are widely used in few other types fraudulent
activities:
1. Denial-of-service (DOS): Bots autonomously access an Internet system or service in
a way that appear legitimate, but much more frequently than normal use and cause
the system to become busy.
2. Spread Spyware: Spyware are used to send information to its creators about a user's
activities.
3. Harvest E-mail: E-mail spam are e-mail messages disguised as messages from people,
but are either annoying ads or malicious in nature.
4. Access number replacement: Access number replacements are where the botnet
operator replaces the access numbers of a group of dial-up bots to that of a victim's
phone number. Given enough bots partake in this attack. the victim is consistently
bombarded with phone calls attempting to connect to the internet. Having very little
to defend against this attack, most are forced into changing their phone numbers
(land line, cell phone, etc).
5. Fast flux: Fast flux is a Domanin Name System (DNS) technique used by botnets
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to hide phishing2 and malware delivery sites behind an ever-changing network of
compromised hosts acting as proxies.
Immaterial of the fraudulent activity (DOS, click fraud etc.) bots are built on common
infrastructures. Following discussion will only focus on bots used for committing click
fraud. Based on how they are built and which communication protocols they use, we can
classify click bots into three main categories.
• Internet Relay Chat (IRC) click bots
• Peer-to-Peer (P2P) click bots
• HTTP click bots

2.3

IRe click hots

The initial deployment of IRC bots, dated back in 1993. These computer bots were used
to assist the Internet Relay Chat channel management. Internet Relay Chat is a chat
system that provides one-to-one and one-to-many instant messaging over the Internet. It
is based on Client/Server architecture. Administrator can create a channcl3 and manage
its clients. Users can join a named channel on an IRC network and communicate with
groups of other users.
Internet community have slowly started experimenting these computer bots to use to
commit click fraud.
An IRC based click bot is controlled by a bot-master and there are many bots attached
to one bot-master. A bot-master can operate bots via command and control (C&C).
Command and control activity is defined as a platform for transmitting the commands of
a bot-master to all bots. A bot-master takes advantage of Internet Relay Chat because
2Phishing is the fraudulent process of attempting to acquire sensitive information such as usernames,
passwords and credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication.
3The basic means of communication in an established IRC session is a channel. Channels in a server
can be displayed using the IRC command LIST that lists all currently available channels.

19

this makes it easy to operate Command and Control.

A typical bot-master and bot

relationship is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: IRC Botmaster controlling several Clients
These are the most easy to build and most widely used click bots used by the fraudsters.
A typical formation of botnet can be described by the following steps, as shown in Figure
2.2.

1

/"

l,~"
2

Figure 2.2: Formation and Exploitation of Botnet

(i) A botnet operator (Administrator of the channel) sends out viruses or worms, infecting ordinary users' computers, whose payload is a malicious application of the
bot (its clients).
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(ii) The bot on the infected PC, logs into a particular channel in the Command and
Control server specified during installation.
(iii) A fraudster purchases access to the botnet from the operator.
(iv) The fraudster sends instructions via the IRC server to the infected PCs, causmg
them to click on specific advertisements.
IRC bots are susceptible to center point failure. If a malware detection program finds
the Bot master and removes it the whole network will be shut down.

2.4

P2P click bots

A peer-to-peer network is a network in which any node in the network can act as both
a client and a server (see Figure 2.3). P2P bots are developed to minimize the hazard
of center point failure in IRC bots. Peer-to-peer botnets are distinctive from centralized

C&C botnets in that they focus on resiliency through the uses of a peer-to-peer network.
However, peer-to-peer botnets are similar to centralized botnets in most other aspects.

Figure 2.3: Peer-to-Peer Botnet
Both IRe Bots and P2P Bots use IRC as the channel of communication. Figure 2.4
shows how a Dot master interacts with its clients in an actual chat window. Steps involve
in the process is as follows.
1. Botmaster connects to an IRC Channel with a nick name.
nickname @Frogworm
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In Figure

2.4 the

2. All clients connect to the same channel through different nick names (known to the
botnet). In Figure 2.4 nicknames B-XDCC-C02 , B-XDCC-COl , B-XDCC-C03.
3. Communicate using natural language words
4. Clients carry out commands
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Figure 2.4: Bots communication in IRC channel

2.4.1

HTTP click bots

HTTP click bots are the newest type of botnet. HTTP botnets use HTTP requests to
receive and import commands instead of a persistent IRC or P2P connection. It also
follows the common Server/Client structure, where the server(bot master) broadcasts the
commands and clients(bots) carry out the commands. Formation of the botnet is similar
to IRC and P2P where, a botnet operator sends out viruses or worms, infecting ordinary
users ' computers. It is still in its evolving process and soon we will have many varieties
of it.
The code base for the HTTP Bot uses an HTTP post that contains information describing the bot. It simply docs a GET request and receives back similar series of commands from its bot master. It is a single request that (a) identifies itself (b) receives the
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command from bot master and (c) reply.It then sort of goes quiet or launches an attack.
The point here is that it is not a persistent connection that is necessary for P2P and
IRC-based botnets. That means the HTTP botnet goes stealth, making it harder to find.

2.5

clickbot.A

In this section we discuss the implementation and functionality of clickbot.A.
The Clickbot.A client, or bot, is an Internet Explorer (IE) Browser Helper Object
(BH04). Similar to other browser helper objects, it runs within the process space of
the browser, and is capable of accessing the entire DOM (document object model) of a
web page. The Document Object Model is a cross-platform and language-independent
convention for representing and interacting with objects in HTML, XHTML and XML
documents. Clickbot.A was most probably written as a EHO so that its HTTP requests
would mimic those generated by legitimate IE clients, and the work of accessing and
parsing web pages would automatically be handled for the bot master. HTTP seems
like a reasonable choice for fraudsters to build botnets for click fraud. The bots need
to communicate using HTTP to click on ads, so why support an additional protocol if
HTTP can be reused for command and control anyhow? If one was to attempt to use
an IRC-based botnet to conduct click fraud, for example, the bot binary may have to
support two protocols (HTTP and IRC). The binary for the bot may be smaller if it only
has to support one communication protocol, and HTTP has the additional advantage
that fire walls typically let HTTP traffic pass through freely, whereas some firewalls might
restrict IRC traffic [Daswani and Stoppelman, 2007].
Once the bot is successfully installed it goes through the following three step process.
l. Contact its botmaster to register in botmaster server. The Clickbot.A botmaster
4A

Browser Helper Object (BHO) is a DLL module designed as a plugin for Microsoft's Internet

Explorer web browser to provide added functionality. The Adobe Acrobat plugin that allows Internet
Explorer users to read PDF files within their browser is a BHO. Alexa Toolbar that provides a list of
web sites related to the one you are currently browsing, or the Google Toolbar that adds a tool bar with
a Google search box to the browser user interface are examples of some more BHOs.
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was implemented as an HTTP based web application written using PHP, and used
a MySQL database.
The bot registers with the botmaster using an URL such as
http://example.php ? action=registerf3 ver=O.007f3 id=GUID.

Xote that the action parameter specifies the operation that the client requests (in
this case to "register" with the botmaster). In addition to the action parameter , the
client always reports its version via the ver parameter (ver=O.007), and a globally
unique identifier via the GUID parameter to the botmaster server. So the botmaster
can uniquely identifies each bot. Once a bot is successfully registered with the
botmaster a raw will appear in botmaster 's MySQL database as in Figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5: Botmaster Administration Console. Note that entries in the IP address and
country columns have been sanitized for privacy purposes.

2. Learn about doorway site: A doorway site is a web site set up by the bot operator (who is a human), to funetion similar to a seareh engine. Doorway pages are
Web pages designed and built specifically to draw search engine visitors to a website. They are standalone pages designed only to act as an entry point to a site. In
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Figure 2.6 doorway sites 1,2, and 3 designed only to redirect traffic to service 1,
service 2, and service 3 pages.
In clickbot.A, each doorway page is especially tuned to a particular keyword search.
When an internet user does a search, the doorway pages will show up and lead them
directly to the main site (or target website). This is a proven and effective way to
increase traffic to the website. Doorway pages are typically very "light" pages, in
that they contain little or nothing in the way of pretty form atting, colors , tables,
Javascript, images, etc. Instead , the HTML code is optimized to be search engine
friendly.
Doorway to
Ser1Iices 1
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Services 3

Customer
Service
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Figure 2.6: Example of doorway sites.
The bot runs an infinite loop in which it requests a doorway site and keyword ,
accesses the doorway site, and chooses a candidate link to click on from the doorway
site. The bot repeats this loop for specified number of iterations which was set by
t he botmaster.
3. Place the HTTP request: The bot places a HTTP query to a doorway site. It will
then receive search results containing clickable links. After communicating with t he
botmaster t he bot issues a click. The doorway site in one version acts as a legitimate
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search engine when applying to become a partner with a syndicator and serves as a
location from which a bot can access URLs to click on and commit direct click fraud.
In the other version the doorway site appears as a site that refers traffic to other
websites and make a referrcr deal. In the later version clickbot.A uses redirectors 5
Had the doorway sites not used redirectors, the web sites from which the bot operator would derive revenue could notice how many clicks were originating from the
doorway sites, and could more easily investigate those sites based on information
in their web logs. ·While one might expect that HTTP requests that do not specify
referrers might be considered suspicious, there are many legitimate reasons that a
referrer might not appear in an HTTP request. For instance, HTTP proxies that
are used to conduct anonymous web browsing typically do not include referrers.
Click fraud is not difficult to commit and, consequently, it could threaten the existence
of companies like Google™. Therefore, researchers in both academia and industry have
proposed a series of models to detect it.

5Redirector is a customizable program, which returns a new URL replacing Client's original request.
Redirectors allowed the attacker to strip the Referer fields in HTTP requests issued by Internet Explorer.
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CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL CLICK FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEMS
The disagreement about the click fraud traffic between publishers and advertisers has
grown and resulted in class action law suits against big search companies [Goldman, 2007].
Recently most of the search companies have started to take click fraud seriously and
came up with solutions that kept as secrets until today. But law suits against search
companies have not stopped. In most of search engine solutions advertisers are placed
in a disadvantage position to those big publishers. Advertisers can neither control the
quantity and quality of traffic, nor negotiate the payment to big publishers if they suspect
the authenticity of the traffic. Due to this reason third party click fraud solutions also
started to bloom.

).iost of the advertisers who lost their trust on the search engine

companies turn to these third party clients who manage their pay per click advertisement
campaigns. Many of these third party companies developed click fraud detection services
using their own matrics and offer them on the market. Xon of them reveal the techniques
use to detect fraudulent traffic and, they too, keep solutions as trade secrets. This created
one additional problems. Which solution is correct? Is it the one that estimates a lot of
click fraud? How should results from two different companies compared?
Many third party click fraud auditing firms often significantly overestimate the number
of detected click fraud activities, reporting so called "fictitious" clicks, clicks which were
never made on search engine ads. That causes a series of on going battles between search
engines such as Google and small third party click fraud auditing firms.
So until today there is no universally accepted click fraud detection method.

~!Iost

of the commercial solutions available are still not mature and do not discover most of
the click fraud activities, and mainly they are reporting tools without mechanisms in
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preventing click fraud functionality.
Several commercial solutions, e.g. Clicklab, LLC, Web Traffic Intelligence, Inc. etc.,
are available for click fraud detection. They all use similar technology by adding a sampler
or collecting javascript or iframe code on a page to track all activities. The code will run
on the client computer when pages are viewed. Whenever the javascript or iframe is
executed on client browser, it sends back information to the logging server. The most
common client side parameters include client IP, client user agent, client browser settings,
client computer settings, link-out click, user activity etc. Figure 3.1 shows the typical
process of commercial click fraud solutions. These solutions include the following steps:

Monitored web
server

1
Web

2
Web Response
with tracking code

~

_ _--+~-D
3
Tracking code send
client information back

Figure 3.1: The tracking code is an essential component of all commercial click fraud
detection systems

1. A tracking javascript or iframe code was added on each tracked page's bottom.
2. A client computer requests a web page. (Figure 3.1 message 1)
3. The web server response the web page with tracking code. (Figure 3.1 message 2)
4. The tracking code executes on client computer and sends the detailed tracking
information back to log server. (Figure 3.1 message 3)
Those companies provide web reports as well as paper reports to their subscribers.
The reports normally include the statistics on traffic origin IP, traffic user agents, page
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view time, heuristic fraud score, etc. All these information are used for detection of click
fraud activities, and they can be classified in to two levels:
First Level: Static client parameters such as IP origin, user agent, monitor display
setting, web browser setting, java and javascript enabled, web page title etc.
Second Level: Dynamic client parameters such as mouse clicks, mouse location, key
stroll, scroll bar clicks, page view times, even client side clip board message etc.
The difference between these two classes of parameters may be recognized

III

the

message 3 given in Figure 3.1. If the tracking code just sends back once to the logging
server, this is static client parameters collecting. While the tracking code keeps sending
back user's activities, the logging server will have dynamic client parameters.
Figure 3.2 lists the top ten most popular click fraud commercial solutions as of March,
2010.

A significant problem of most of these existing commercial solutions, is that they do
not have a way to prevent click fraud dynamically. The javascript or iframe code can not
block the page being loaded. Then those solutions are just click fraud reporting system not
real click fraud detection and prevention system. There are some other problem exist in
the commercial solutions. For example, the www.whosclickingwho.com. and Click Defense
Corporate do not have real time user activity information, such as mouse movement, key
stroke etc., which is very important to detect post user activities after a click occurs.
There is an ongoing industry-wide effort to develop tools that will effectively detect
and block many common click fraud attacks. Most of attacks discovered and reported so
far have been malware-based attacks that rely on automated scripts, individuals hired by
competitors or proxy servers used to generate clicks for paid advertisements.
These commercial solutions are third-party add-on click fraud solutions. The search
engine companies, such as Google, Yahoo, implements their own click quality control
system. For example: Goolge's Click Quality team tries to control the click quality in two
ways:
Prevention: Discouraging invalid clicking activities on its Network by making life for
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unethical users more difficult and less rewarding
Detection: Detecting and removing invalid clicks and the perpetrators.

In addition to launching an extensive effort to detect and remove invalid clicks, Google
also tries to build other mechanisms for preventing invalid clicking that reduce inappropriate activities on the Google Network even before invalid clicks are made.
Some of these preventive activities include:
(a) Making hard to create duplicate accounts and open new accounts after the old ones
are terminated, (b) Making hard to register using false identities, and (c) Development of
certain mechanisms that automatically discount fraudulent activities, i.e., advertisers pay
less for invalid clicks since certain invalid clicking patterns would automatically reduce
costs that advertisers pay for these clicks etc.
However. due to the nature inherent weakness of Google's (or any other search engine),
which does not have enough data on post-click user activities, it is hard or even impossible
to determine the true intent of a click. There are some other weaknesses in these online
procedure: (a) lack of deployment of data mining methods, (b) lack of online real time
solutions, (c) lack of using the conversion data and lack of more advanced types of filters,
(d) use only one aspect of the click information which is the server side click information.
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CHAPTER 4
REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN DOMAIN OF CLICK FRAUD DETECTION
Research activities in click fraud detection can be divided into two groups. One group
proposes alternative business models for Pay-Per-Click model, while the other group tries
to find solutions for click fraud in the Pay-Per-Click payment model.

4.1

Alternatives for Pay-Per-Click model

4.1.1

Cost-Per-Action (CPA)

In the Cost-Per-Action model, advertisers do not pay for clicks, but rather for specific actions that are performed on the advertisers page after the click. These actions include, for
example, Generating email opt-ins, Producing product sales, and Signing up subscriptions
etc. Therefore, we can define Completed Actions as:

Completed Actions = Total Number of Generating email opt - ins +
Producing product sales + Signing up subscriptions

(4.1)

These actions produce measurable outcomes for a company. Ideally, the actions, which
are being measured are those most closely tied to the growth of the business; therefore
product or service sales are the most common actions tracked. These outcomes are usually
known as conversions.
Website conversion is a process of turning website visitors into prospects and customers.

The conversions or conversion rate evaluates: (1) the quality of the visitors

attracted by the advertising strategies and (2) how satisfied the visitors are interacting
with the website.
conversion rate is calculated as follows:
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·
Converswn Rate

Completed Actions

= T ota l N um ber 0 f V·~s~tor
. s

(4.2)

It is important to use the same time range when gathering the completed actions and

the total number of website visitors.
For example, if in the last month 1,000 visitors visited the website and 10 have purchased a product, the "sales" conversion rate is 1.0%. i.e. for every 100 visitors to the
website, 1% is satisfied.
CPA or "cost per action" is the advertising cost somebody pays for one completed
action. As with the conversion rate, an action may be generating an email opt-in, producing a product sale or downloading a white paper. For example, if in the last month a
company spent $1,000 on advertising to generate 2,000 visitors and 20 of them subscribed
to a newsletter, the cost per action for a newsletter subscription is, $1,000 ad cost per 20
subscriptions, i.e. $50.00 Cost per Action.

Advertising Cost
·
C ost per A ctwn = - - - - - - - - - Total Completed Actions

(4.3)

Although CPA does prevent publisher and competitor click fraud, it leaves room for
advertiser fraud. Since the publisher (and the commissioner, if he exists) have no way to
confirm whether or not a specific action has taken place they depend on the advertiser
to report the customers action truthfully. Additionally, the publisher has to rely on the
advertisers ability to produce both efficient advertisements and if the action in question is
making a purchase worthwhile products on the target side in order to make a profit. This
means that the publisher does not profit directly from the advertising space and traffic
he/she provides anymore. Furthermore, a user might click on an ad on the publishers
website without making a purchase on the target site, only to return to the target site
and make the purchase later thus robbing the publisher of his well-deserved commission.
For the advertiser. on the other hand, the CPA model is very advantageous: since he only
has to pay when he actually does make a sale, there is virtually no risk on his side.
However, it is still a model that is based on trust. The only difference being that, this
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time, it is the other party that has to trust, and as such it is a model that publishers
might be wary of adopting.

4.1.2

Pay-Per-Impression

An alternative to the PPC model of advertising is the old Pay-Per-Imprcssion(PPI) model.

It is also know as Cost-Per-.Mille(CPM). It remains popular on major Internet portals,
such as Yahoo.com, msn.com, and aol.com [Edelman et al., 2007].

Cost per .Mille is

slightly different than PPC. Much like traditional advertising, the display of an ad (impression) is nothing more than a single appearance of an ad. Viewers are not required to
take action, for example click the ad, in order for payment to be due. Banners or other advertisements are placed, according to the terms of a contract. Payment is typically based
on a predetermined number of impressions, generally set at 1000, thus naming it Cost per
Mille(thousand). While advertisers are paying for each instance of the advertisement, it
is generally less expensive than Cost per Click.
The dollar figure of "Cost per Thousand" is used to evaluate the cost to reach a
thousand persons in a media buy. PPIs are calculated by multiplying the cost of an ad
by 1,000, then dividing that number by the total audience.

CPM = Cost * 1,000
Total Audience

(4.4)

Advertisers are drawn towards CPM because of the enormous amount of visibility it
can bring; the ad is seen often even when the ad itself is not clicked. It is strongly believed
that the ad is still read and that exposure counts over the long run. If the ad is attractive
and grabs attention, the Click Through Rate (CTR) will be higher, thus generating even
better results.
Unfortunately, Pay-Per-Impression is not fraud resistant either. The technical methods
that make click fraud possible can be easily adapted to so-called impression fraud. Instead
of simulating a click, though, the script repeatedly requests the website on which the ad
is displayed and consequently artificially increases the number of impressions.
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4.1.3

Pay-Per-Percentage of Impressions

Pay-Per-Percentage of Impressions is an alternative to Pay-Per-Click that was suggested
by Goodman [Goodman, 2005]. In his paper he describes this model as follows. In this
system, an advertiser picks a keyword, e.g. "cameras" and purchases, perhaps through
bidding, a certain percentage of all impressions for that keyword. For instance, an advertiser might pay $1.00 to Bing Search. In return, the advertiser might receive 10% of all
impressions for "camera" for 1 week. What does this mean? It means that for 1 week,
one out of ten times that someone searches for the word "camera", they will see the ad.
The costs of advertising are thus fixed and do not depend on whether or not the ad is
clicked. They do not even depend on the number of impressions. If there are R real
impressions over the week. and Fake impressions, that the advertiser will receive 0.1 x

R real impressions and 0.1 x F fake ones. Consequently, this system is not susceptible
to competitor fraud of any kind (neither click nor impression fraud). However,evaluating
how much a certain percentage of impressions on a specific website is worth remains problematic. If such an evaluation is based on the average number of impressions of a site
it remains vulnerable to impression fraud. Goodman himself admits that "the pay-perpercentage model is not appropriate for all kinds of affiliate advertising; in particular,
it is most appropriate for high volume sites". He recommends using a rating company
to estimate the traffic on these sites, basing the cost-per-percentage on the estimates.
For the publisher, this model is just as advantageous as Pay-Per-Impression, since his
payment depends solely on the services he/she provides. Although the advertiser is safe
from competitor fraud, this scheme leaves him susceptible to publisher Impression fraud
if he/she does not advertise on a trustworthy site. Furthermore, the model is worse for
him/her than Pay-Per-Click because the price is not based on the effectiveness of the ad.
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4.2

Related research for click fraud detection in PPC model

4.2.1

Duplicate Detection

Metwallys group at UCSB proposed a solution, based on Bloom Filters, to detect duplicates in data streams[Metwally et al., 2005b].

1

Their technique could be utilized

in various web-based applications including click fraud detection. Assuming that these
streams could be click activities, duplicates represent one type of a click fraud in advertisement networks. A comprehensive set of experiments, using both real and synthetic
click streams, showed high detection rate of duplicates, and very low error rate.
In the proposed method they start by allocating M bits, where M is O(N), and N is
the estimated size of the processed window. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, using d

= 17

independent hash functions, they test every new element on the Bloom Filter structure
of the previously observed elements, and then insert it into the Bloom Filter structure.
Before setting any of the d cells to 1, the cell is tested whether it has been set before to
1, or not. The element is not counted as a duplicate if at least 1 bit was switched from

o to

1, and is considered to be a duplicate otherwise. Both M and d can be determined

according to the required error rate, and the expected window size.
10
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Figure 4.1: The Classical Bloom Filter
The original moom Filters use one hash space and hashes all the clements onto it.
However, when the authors developed the proposed solution, independently of Bloom
1A

Bloom Filter is a data structure that was proposed to detect approximate membership of elements.

Given two sets X, and Y, the Bloom Filter algorithm would loop on every element in set X, to check if
it belongs to set Y.
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Filters, they used separate space for different hash functions, as sketched in Figure 4.2.
10
I IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIJJIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

Figure 4.2: The Classical Bloom Filter
In order to differentiate between authentic and fraudulent clicks, the advertising
commissioner "tracks individual customers by setting cookies. Duplicate clicks within
a short period of time, a day for example, raise suspicion on the commissioners side"
[Metwally et al., 2005bj. Duplicate detection can, no doubt, detect amateur click fraud,
where the fraudster operates from one or a handful of computers. However, it is clearly
inadequate when it comes to detecting distributed click fraud, where millions of computers
simulate clicks on an advertisement from all over the world, since it relies on cookies (text
files which the commissioner stores and accesses on the users computer) for detection. In
the case of distributed click fraud, every computer in the attackers vast network will have
its own individual cookie. Moreover, an attacker who knows what he/she is doing will
just delete the cookies after each "click", leaving no duplicates to be detected.

4.2.2

Association Rules

Metwally, Agrawal and Abbadi have also proposed a solution to the referrer click fraud.
They propose encouraging ISPs (Internet Service Providers) to provide the data stream
necessary to detect this kind of click fraud. This data stream would contain the HTTP requests to page P, which might or might not be fraudulent. They would devise an algorithm
to detect associations between one or more sites that refer to P very frequently, and clicks
on an ad on P. If strong associations are found, it is very probable that P is using one or
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more "decoi' websites in order to commit undetected click fraud [Metwally et al., 2005a].
In [Metwally et al., 2005b] the same authors extend the ideas of streaming data analysis, and they established schemas that would detect fraud attacks of many classes based
on their classification of click fraud. Special attention is given to the problem of detecting automated click fraud activities. They develop the algorithm called Streaming Rules
which reports association rules, using limited processing per clement and minimal space.
The algorithm has a possibility to detect more sophisticated attacks such as the one identified by Anupam et al. [AnupamL et al., 1999]. The system is tested with synthetic data
but also with ISP logs from an anonymous ISP where some suspicious relationships are
detected. The focus in their research is on the commissioner part of the click fraud detection process, and it is very specific because commissioners are optional in the Internet
advertising network and many advertisers directly put advertisements on publishers' sites.
In another paper [Metwally et al., 2007] the authors are analyzing coalition hit inflation
attacks. Still, they agree that the area is open for other classifications of hit inflation
attacks, for new techniques to detect automated behavior, and more effective real world
solutions.

4.2.3

Classification of URLs

Malicious \iVeb sites are a cornerstone of Internet criminal activities. Referrer click fraud
is one form of URL related fraud. As a result, there has been broad interest in developing
systems to prevent the end user from visiting such sites. Researchers have address the
problem of URL classification, using statistical methods to discover the tell-tale lexical
and host-based properties of malicious Web site URLs.
Justin Ma et al. have described an approach for classifying URLs automatically as
either malicious or benign based on supervised learning across both lexical and hostbased features [Ma et al., 2009]. They argue that this approach is complementary to
both blacklisting, which cannot predict the status of previously unseen URLs and systems
based on evaluating site content and behavior, which require visiting potentially dangerous
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sites. Further, they show that with appropriate classifiers, it is feasible to automatically
sift through comprehensive feature sets (i.e., without requiring domain expertise) and
identify the most predictive features for classification.
The work by Garera ct al. use logistic regression over 18 hand-selected features to
classify phishing URLs [Garera ct al., 2007]. The features include the presence red flag key
words in the URL, features based on Google's Page Rank and Google's Web page quality
guidelines. In their experiments they achieved a classification accuracy of 97.3% over a set
of 2,500 URLs. McGrath and Gupta do not construct a classifier but nevertheless perform
a comparative analysis of phishing and non-phishing URLs [McGrath and Gupta, 2008].
The features they analyze include IP addresses,WHOIS records (containing date and
registrar-provided information only), geographic information, and lexical features of the
URL (length, character distribution, and presence of pre-defined brand names).
Provos et al. perform a study of drive-by exploit URLs and use a patented machine
learning algorithm as a pre-filter for VM-based analysis [Provos ct al., 2008]. They extract
content-based features from the page, including whether IFrames are "out of place," the
presence of obfuscated javascript, and whether IFrames point to known exploit sites.
CANTINA classifies phishing URLs by thresholding a weighted sum of 8 features (4
content-related, 3 lexical, and 1 WHOIS related) [Zhang et al., 2007]. Among the lexical
features, it looks at dots in the URL, whether certain characters are present, and whether
the URL contains an IP address. The WHO IS-related feature CANTINA examines the
age of the domain.

4.2.4

Non standard approaches for click fraud detection in PPC model

There are a number of other solutions proposed in the literature for avoiding click fraud
in PPC advertisement model. One suggestion is to charge based on user's actions, i.e.,
the publisher gets a premium only after the successful conversion of the ad, meaning the
user's visit to the advertiser website and performing an action such as buying an item
or signing up for a service. There are a number of basic attempts. Such as by means
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of tracking cookies, however these efforts make up a negligible portion of the current
advertising revenue on the Internet. Immorlica et al. [Immorlica et al., 2005] analyze
the click fraud learning algorithms to compute the estimated click-through rate. They
focus on a situation in which there is just one ad slot, and show that fraudulent clicks
can not increase the expected payment per impression by more than O( 1) in a clickbased algorithm. However the complexity of the inferred algorithm and the need for
click-through rate estimation would make it impractical as it also deviates from the pay
per click model, to pay per view model, which is the least desired model in the modern
advertisement world where bidding for space is of critical importance.
Gandhi et al. [Gandhi et al. , 2006] from Indiana University at Bloomington proposed
a new type of camouflaged click fraud attack on the advertising infrastructure so called
"badvertisement". This stealthy attack can be thought of as a threatening mutation of
spam and phishing attacks. The target of this attack is the unwitting advertiser and
it could be very serious with significant revenue potential for its perpetrators. The attack was experimentally verified by corrupting the JavaScript file that is required to be
downloaded and executed by a clients web browser to publish sponsored advertisements.
The Jacobsons paper [Jakobsson et al., 1999] discusses the measures for the visibility
and degree of success of an ad. It had be found that traditional methods perform very
poorly in an Internet setting, due to lack of trust, lack or reliable metering methods,
and a lack of direct feedback. Therefore, they introduce the concept of e-coupons. Ecoupons can be viewed as the electronic counterpart of traditional coupons in mailboxes
or newspapers. In order to benefit from e-coupon, a customer needs to interact with
the merchant, which allows checking the validity of the e-coupon and represents direct
feedback of the impact of the ad campaign. The authors argue that the proposed scheme
is safe and meets the strongest security requirements.
Another solution, proposed by Juels et al., tries to authenticate valid clicks.

In

[Juels et al., 2007], they proposed a credential-based approach to identify premium clicks
(i.e. good clicks) instead of excluding invalid clicks. If a user has committed legitimate
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behaviors (e.g. purchases), the clicks from his/her browser are marked as premium clicks
and cryptographic credentials are stored in the browsing cache for authentication. This
approach, however, is still subject to the attack presented in this paper, where click fraud
may be committed in a browser used by a legitimate user, If credentials have been stored
due to the legitimate behaviors from that user, fraudulent clicks will also be identified as
premium clicks.
Haddadi et al. presented a simple detection strategy, what they called as using Bluff
ads [Haddadi, 2010]. These are sets of irrelevant ads displayed amongst user's targeted
ads, which should never be clicked on. Together with threshold detection, IP address
monitoring and profile matching techniques, bluff ads can be used to make it more complicated for the bot net owners to train their software, or a human operator, The bluff ads
also may have a comfort factor of decreasing the user's negative perceptions by reducing
the number of accurately targeted ads.
Important discussion about a click fraud concept and its interpretation are also given
1Il

[Thzhilin, 2006]. Thuzilin claims that between the obviously clear cases of valid and

invalid clicks, lies the whole spectrum of highly complicated cases when the clicking intent
is far from clear and depends on a the range of factors, including the parameter values
of the click. This intent cannot be operationalized and detected by technological means
with any reasonable measure of certainty. Therefore, the invalid click detection methods
need to be developed without a proper formal specification of invalid clicks. The standard
commercial methodologies, which are measuring mainly the true rate of invalid clicks, are
only guesstimates at best.
Many researchers [Banerjee and Ghosh, 2001]' [Buchner et al., 1999] have been carrying out similar research for web usage and user behavior analysis. Web usage characteristics could be indicators for click fraud detection, especially for software clicks. Web
usage mining is the application of data mining techniques to discover usage patterns from
Web data, in order to understand and better serve the needs of Web-based applications
[Cooleyet al., 1999]. In the same paper, the Web usage mining is parsed into three dis-
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tinctive phases: preprocessmg, pattern discovery, and pattern analysis. It also clarified
the research sub direction of the Web usage mining, which facilitates the researchers to
focus on each individual process with different applications and techniques.

4.3

Summary of Current Industrial and Research Solutions

We briefly categorize the commercial solutions and research activities in three categories
based on the data they use:
1. Server side approaches such as Metwally et al.[Metwally et al.. 2005b], Mahdian
et al. [Mahdian, 2006], Banerjee et al. [Banerjee and Ghosh, 2001], Google etc. They
are using the data direct from server without caring much about the users activities.
These methods analyze the IP, double clicks, or web pages from the server side or
ISP side.
2. Client side approaches such as Gandhi [Gandhi et al., 2006], Whosclickingwho.com,
and Anupam [AnupamL et al., 1999] etc. They study the client side user activities
to propose solutions for the click fraud problem.
3. Non standard approaches such as Jacobson [Jakobsson et al., 1999] and Goodman
[Goodman, 2005] etc. proposed different approaches to the existing problem. However, these solutions are not standard and not widely accepted by the existing internet industry.
Limitations and drawbacks of existing solutions, fall in to each category stated above, are
discussed below.
Even though commercial solutions and research trends exist, there are unaddressed
threats to the pay-per-click model. For example, most of the commercial solutions can not
detect software click fraud. If click traffic is generated by robotic software, the software
may not execute the javaScript or may not load iframe tags. Since, there are no user
activities, category 2 solutions will not have any information about sources of such clicks.
Since category 1 solutions do not collect client side data, they will not know whether click
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has user activities or not. Then the detecting hosts in both category 1 and 2 solutions
will have partial evidence about any of these traffic; thus, will not report any kind of
fraudulent click.
Software click bots provide the largest threat to the PPC advertising model. Despite a
few early efforts towards identifying special classes of click-bot attacks such as clickbot.A
and Bahama bot, there has been a little work on studying bot-generated click traffic. A
number of challenges make this task difficult. First, the amount of data to process is
often huge, on the order of terabytes per day. Thus any method that mines the data
for identifying bot traffic has to be both efficient and scalable. Secondly, most of these
data are not disclosed due to privacy, security and business policy issues. Furthermore,
with many bot-net hosts available, attacks are getting increasingly stealthy with each host
submitting only a few clicks to evade detection. Therefore, click bot detection methods
cannot just focus on aggressive patterns, such as in Bahama bot, but also need to examine
the low rate patterns that arc mixed with normal traffic. Third, attackers can constantly
craft new attacks to make them appear different and legitimate; thus we cannot use the
training-based approaches that derive patterns from historical attacks. Finally, with the
lack of ground truth, evaluating detection results is non trivial and requires different
methodology and metrics than the detection methods.
Most of the existing solutions do not collect real time user activity information, such
as mouse movement, keyboard pressed etc., which is very important in detecting adware,
malware, and simulated clicks. When a user session is observed, if there are user activities
reported, they provide positive evidence for the existence of a human user. Such evidence
can be used instead of asking a user to verify a "CAPTCHA", which more and more
websites find annoy the actual human user.
Another significant problem of the existing commercial solutions is that they do not
have a way to prevent click fraud dynamically. Since most of these solutions are merely
click fraud reporting solutions they provide reports at the end of the day, at the end of
the week or sometimes at the end of the month. By the time they found out about the
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fraud it may be too late to take necessary actions against the fraudulent sources because
fraudsters will change their method of attack to go undetected.
Most PPC service providers currently approach the problem of click fraud by attempting to automatically recognize fraudulent clicks and discount them. Fraudulent clicks are
recogni~ed

by machine learning algorithms, which use information regarding the navi-

gational behavior of users to try and distinguish between human and robot generated
clicks. Such algorithms are mainly built using rule based techniques and most of them
are classification systems, even though a few score based systems are also reported.
Most of the click fraud solution providers, including search engines and third party
solution providers, claim their rule-based expert system is the best among the others
taking the advantage of keeping "rules" as a secret weapon. They do not disclose information about the set of rules due to fear of competition. This situation even led to
multi-million dollar settlements in recent years. Due to the lack of verifiability of click
fraud solutions, it is inevitable that the trust between service providers and advertisers is degraded. Since real-world click fraud solutions are usually kept secret for fear of
competition, it is practically impossible to study many of them in a single context. If
a mechanism for the modeling of knowledge and validation (KV) for rule based expert
systems exists, solution providers will be able to use it to verify their systems without
revealing the implementation details of the rule base.
We tried to address these issues in the Pay Per Click advertising model. Chapter 5
and 6 we introduce our proposed methodologies.
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CHAPTER 5
COLLABORATIVE CLICK FRAUD DETECTION AND PREVENTION
Sometimes it is hard to get solid evidence of the existence of click fraud based on the data
collected. In some cases the true intent of a click can be identified only after examining
deep psychological processes. For example, a person might have clicked on an ad, looked at
it, went somewhere else but then decided to have another look at the ad shortly thereafter
to make sure that he/she got all the necessary information from the ad. It is hard to say
the second dick is dick fraud. However, we can evaluate the second click as less valuable
than the first click, or give less quality score for any multiple clicks for a single user.
Initial phase of our research is based on the CCFDP system that was developed by
Dr. Li Ge[Ge and Kantardzic, 2006]. In this research we do not try to determine the
real intention of the web users and classify as binary (fraud and not fraud). We assign
each click with a score value which estimates the quality of user activities, and also
measures the difference between characteristics of a given click and averages collected
through time in the click database. The CCFDP system integrates raw user activity data
with the derived factors to determine the quality of each click. Preliminary list of factors,
which describe user behavior and intentions, includes: Software clicks, No User Activities,
Repeat Visitors, Suspicious User Agent Keyword, History Count, Blacklist Referrer,

~o

Cookie or JavaScript allowed, IP and Permanent Cookie inconsistency, Web users location
and IP location mismatch. IP location analysis, Page Activity Analysis, and Referrer Rate
analysis. The CCFDP system establishes an arbitration system to evaluate the quality of
every click referred from publishers, thus protecting advertiser from click fraud.
The CCFDP system takes collaborative approach to determine click quality by analyzing detailed user activities, matching the client and server side logs (Figure 5.1).
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Since the CCFDP system logs both, we collect the data about the detailed activities of
individual web user, which enable us analyzing web users behavior and estimate a quality
score based on their activities. Recorded users activities on a web page can indicate their
interests, browsing habit, and most important, estimating their intention. We use quality
score to estimate the users intention instead of labeling clicks as fraud/not-fraud. After
applying data mining method in the collected database, we analyze and quantify twelve
factors for click score calculation. Three analyzes, History Factor Analysis, Individual
Factor Analysis and Sequence Factor Analysis are implemented in the system for quality
score calculation. The history click database for a site is used to build baselines to help
determine the quality for new clicks while sequence factor analysis focuses on the relations
between clicks. We study the user activities also by comparing baselines in databases for
different website contents and different origins, e.g.

~atural

Traffic (Non-paid traffic) and

Pay-Per-Click traffic (Paid traffic), thus, finding the suspicious activities.
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Figure 5.1: Initial version of the CCFDP system
The core part of this system is the Global Fraudulent Database (GFD), which stores
the real-time server side log, client side log, and computed fraud score for the given click.
The fraud score is not based only on a single click characteristics; it is based on the time
and space context of the click event. When a web user visits the monitored web site, both
the server side log and client side log data are stored in the Global Fraudulent Database.
A quality score for each click is computed and normalized from 0 to 1, and it is used to
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indicate the quality of a click. A score of 0 means valid click and a score of 1 means click
fraud. The click score is usually a fractional value between 0 and 1 representing ambiguity
in classification (fraud/not-fraud) of a current click. Summation of scores for all clicks on
the current site gives the integrated score for the quality of click traffic on the site.
In the Section 5.1 we detail the hardware architecture of the CCFDP system, while
Section 5.2 is dedicated to the operation architecture of the system. Section 5.3 explains
the data collection process and Section 5.4 describes the actual click scoring process.

5.1

Net Mosaics Hardware architecture

The Netl'vlosaics hardware is currently implemented at NetMosaics.com Louisville data
center.

It is implemented as a dedicated Windows@server and follows most current

industrial standards for web server hosting. Figure 5.2 shows the logical network diagram
of the Net Mosaics.

5.1.1

Reading the Net Mosaics hardware diagram

1. Network Subnet:
The network subnet is 65.182.201.0/28. A subnetwork, or subnet, is a logically
visible, distinctly addressed part of a single Internet Protocol network. The process
of subnetting is the division of a computer network into groups of computers that
have a common, designated IP address routing prefix. Subnetting breaks a network
into smaller rcalms that may use existing address space more efficiently, and, when
physically separated, may prevent excessive rates of Ethernet packet collision in a
larger network.
2. HSRP Redundant Network Core:
HSRP stands for Host Standby Router Protocol. It is a Cisco proprietary redundancy protocol for establishing a fault-tolerant default gateway, and has been described in detail in RFC 2281.
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Figure 5.2: NetMosaics logical network architecture
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3. Multi layer switch:
A multilayer switch (MLS) is a computer networking device that switches on OS1
layer 2 like an ordinary network switch and provides extra functions on higher OS1
layers.
4. Cisco catalyst switch:
The 13-slot Cisco Catalyst 6513 Switch chassis is ideally suited for high performance.
high port density Fast Ethernet and Gigabit Ethernet aggregation in all parts of the
network, including the access, distribution, and backbone layers as well as the server
farm and data center environments. With up to 12 payload slots available, the 13slot chassis offers industry-leading 10/100/1000 Gigabit Ethernet and 10 Gigabit
Ethernet port densities while providing high levels of network resilience.
5. ASA 5505 Firewall:
Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Provides intelligent threat defense and
secure communications services.
6. Virtual LAN:
A virtual LAN, commonly known as a VLAN, is a group of hosts with a common set
of requirements that communicate as if they were attached to the same Broadcast
domain. regardless of their physical location. In Net Mosaics setup we have three
virtual LANs.
• EthernetO/1 (VLAN1 - WEB): Not publicly accessible. Use NAT table
• EthernetO/2 (VLAN2 - SQL) : Not publicly accessible. Use NAT table
• EthernetO/3 (VLA~3 DMZ): Publicly accessible. DMZ, or demilitarized zone
is a physical or logical subnetwork that contains and exposes an organization's
external services to a larger untrusted network, usually the Internet.
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5.2

The operational architecture of the CCFDP system

The operational architecture of the CCFDP system is given in Figure 5.3.

(4)
~- --------------------

Receiver at

Port 10500

(1) HTIP request

Client Web Server

(3)

.--+-__

Optional
Buffer

(2) HTIP send

115 Server running
NetMosaics Solution

Figure 5.3: CCFDP operational architecture
The three main components in the CCFDP are:
1. The NetMosaics SQL server or the Global Fraudulent Database (GFD).

2. Monitored site which is a web server.
3. Client computer which could be normal user, click fraud user or software user.
We will explain each component in detail below.
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5.2.1

Global Fraudulent Database (GFD)

GFD stores the server side log, client log, and fraud score report data. The database
contains three main tables. They are serverlog, clientlog, and serverclienttracking tables.
Tables "serverlogx" and "historyserverlogx" store server-side of click information and
"clicktracking" and "historyclicktracking" store client-side of click information including
the post click event data. The server side log and the client side log are matched by
trackingID. In server side log, IP, User Agent and Referrer are three important parameters
to detect and predict fraud. Other parameters include the logging time and the site name.
Field "ID" is the primary key for serverlog table and its structure is shown in Table 5.l.
Table 5.1: Structure of the server side log table

I Field Narne I Field Type I Allow Kulls I
ID

bigint

No

TrackingID

varchar(50)

Yes

IP

varchar(20)

Yes

Referrer

varchar(255)

Yes

UserAgent

varchar( 255)

Yes

Location

varchar(512)

Yes

Site

varchar(50)

Yes

WebServerIP

varchar(20)

Yes

insertDate

datetime

Yes

The client side log includes client computer settings, such as screen width, screen
height etc.; client activities inside the pages, such as mouse click. keyboard click, mouse
over etc.; client browser setting, such as, javascript enabled and java enabled, allowing
cookie etc. The IP Location table is the IP geographic location, which includes the owner
of the IP, postal code, and latitude and longitude information. Field "ID" is the primary
key for clientlog table and its structure is shown Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Structure of the client side log table
I Field Name

I Field Type

I Allow

ld

lnt (4)

No

Html

Varchar(lOOO)

Yes

Html before

Varchar (1000)

Yes

Html after

Varchar( 1000)

Yes

Mouse x

Int (4)

Yes

Mouse y

Int (4)

Yes

Clickitem x

Int (4)

Yes

Clickitem y

lnt (4)

Yes

Size x

lnt (4)

Yes

Size y

lnt (4)

Yes

Event type

Varchar(20)

Yes

Time to click

Bigint(8)

Yes

trackingID

Varchar(50)

Yes

Keystrobecount

Int (4)

Yes

insertDate

datetime

Yes

Nulls

I

In fraud detection process, the location is an important indicator of a click fraud.
Therefore Some additional tables were used in calculation of the originating country for
a given IP. These tables are: GeoIPCity, GeoIPCityBlocks, GeoIPCityLocation. For the
purpose of finding the country only GeoIPCity table was used. Its structure is shown in
Table 5.3.
The IPScore, ReferrerScore, CountryScore, and UserAgentScore tables dynamically
update the activity scores based on the client side IP, Referrer, Country and User Agent
parameters. The ReferrerScoreSoftClick, IPScoreSoftClick and UserAgentScoreSoftClick
tables are software click fraud score based on the existence of server side log, and its
match with client side. Figure 5.4 is the detailed diagram of the GFD.
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Table 5.3: Structure of the GeoPICity table

I Field Name I Field Type

5.2.2

I Allow Nulls I

startIpNum

Varchar(20)

Yes

endIpNum

Varchar(20)

Yes

Country

Varchar(lOO)

Yes

Region

Varchar(lOO)

Yes

City

Varchar(lOO)

Yes

postalCode

Varchar(20)

Yes

Latitude

Float(8)

Yes

Longitude

Float(8)

Yes

dmaCode

Varchar(lO)

Yes

areaCode

Varchar(lO)

Yes

intStartIP

Bigint(8)

Yes

intEndIP

Bigint(8)

Yes

Monitored site

CCFDP data collection works in 2 connected parts, server and client. They are separate
software and may be run on separate servers, but they are coordinated by one central
element. The central element that binds everything together is a server module that must
be inserted into the website that is being tracked.
Currently, this module is developed in C#.~ET that runs on IIS 7.0 (WindowsTM
Server 2008) or later versions and C++ .NET that runs on IIS 6.5 and earlier versions.
Both implementations are discussed later in this section.

This module intercepts all

incoming requests to a webpage, generates a unique ID for this user session, and attach a
line of java script code into the outgoing webpage.
Notice that this way the original webpage never needs to be modified or updated. The
server module takes care of all that behind the scene. In fact, the original webpage file
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Relational Database Schema
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Figure 5.4: GFD detailed diagram
will never be changed, only the user of the webpage will see the javaScript code attached.
The author of the webpage will never be aware of the javaScript code being attached.
After installing the NetMosaics module at the end of the source file, a javaScript line
at the bottom of the file can be seen as similar to what is shown in Figure 5.5 .
C/body>
C/htm.l>
<script l a n g u age=" javascr1pc" sIc=" hc tp: // 65.1S2.2 01 . 9 8/ activicytrackLng.asp?
cb=6015be 3 656d84551a 235 ef95 1e8d12cO&s ite=VDW55716SSWEB3! D: \Webs i te5 \thebestmusic3itesorg">c/ script>

Figure 5.5: javaScript executed on client 's webpage

The Net Mosaics Module
When a user opens a browser and navigates to a website, he/she sends out an http request
to a web server , as is defined in RFC 2616. The HTTP protocol is an application level
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protocol, which is above TCP /IP protocol. Figure 5.6 is a sample HTTP request sent
out from the client computer.
GET /mypclbrowserinfo/
HTIP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash,
applicationlvnd.ms-excel, applicationlvnd.ms
Referer: http://www.internelfrog.com
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; )
Host: www.internelfrog.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: AreCookiesEnabled=476558864; permCookies=972049659; ASPSESSIONI=BFPFAEKAKIOELDK

Figure 5.6: Sample HTTP request
In Figure 5.6, t.he sample HTTP request contains most server side log parameters,
except IP, which is a network layer parameter. Besides the server side parameters, we
are interested in, some other parameters sent to the web server. They include HTTP
version, accept file format, language, encoding, connection status, and cookies etc. Those
parameters are defined in RFC 2626.
As the client computer sends the request to the web server (for example IIS), the
server generates the page and forwards it to the client computer. We created an ISAPI
filter(managed module in IIS 7) to record such requests and this process is displayed in
Appendix A.
We are only concerned about the successfully generated pages, with HTTP success
code 200 (From the example presented in Figure 5.7, we can find the response status code,
which is HTTP/1.1 200 OK). At the same time, we only process requests for text/html.
Other contents, such as image, css, video clip etc are supplementary and will be sent to the
client computer directly. If the major text/html page is blocked, there should not be any
requests for image. css, and video clip etc. The system sends logs to Global Fraudulent
Database (GFD), and queries for the fraud score before the response is sent back to client
computer. If the fraud score is higher than the threshold, a warning page will be sent to
client computer instead. Otherwise, a unique 128-bit number, Globally Unique Identifier
(GUID) will be added to the tracking javascript code at the bottom of the page. This
tracking id is introduced in Hardware Architecture.
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HTTP!1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 1804:35 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS!6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: texUhtml
Set-Cookie: BrowserMirrorPersistent=9%2F27%2F2005+2%3A04%3A35+PM; expires=Wed, 27-Sep-2006 18:04:34 GMT; path=!
Set-Cookie: BrowserMirrorSession=9%2F27%2F2005+2%3A04%3A35+PM; path=!
Cache-control: private

Figure 5.7: HTTP Response header

UDPServer application
The UDPServcr is an application that can receive local UDP packets and queue them in
a buffer. This software is installed on the client's web server and set to receive packets
from that web server's XetMosaics module. The packets are written to a database locally
on the server, and then they are sent off to the main NetMosaics receiving server (client
side database setup is discussed later in this section). This helps ensure no click data is
lost if the NetMosaics server is unreachable or busy but does have the downside of having
to install a local version of the Net Mosaics database.
This application's second major task is to run a loop internally that checks if buffer
database contains any entries, if there are entries, the application creates UDP packets
from database entries, and sends those UDP packets to the network address and port
specified at the bottom of GUI in Figure 5.8 (the port should be open).
Once "Start Server" button is pressed, the application is listening to any incoming
UDP packets on the port that you have specified the UDP server to listen to. Once a
packet arrives, the application reads the packet to see if it's server or a client packet. The
application then copies the information of the packet into the "buffer" database. And
goes back to waiting for more packets.

5.3

Data Collection process in CCFDP

The data collection is a five step process. Each of the five steps is shown in Figure 5.9
and described in detail below.

56

Servt'f

Configuration

Http

Opod<.. _..d
FUlan POIt . 101Xl0

SondlolP' 117001

POll

10500

Figure 5.8: NetMosaics UDP Server
Monitored site with
software

,/,/ ~.~~

Web
Request

,/,/

,/
,/,/

4

3

Response
with tracking code

so' '""'.' ' ':'
,/

Fraud
Score

Tracking code sends
client information back.
Global
Fraudulent
Database

Figure 5.9: Data Collection Process in CCFDP
1. A public internet user requests a webpage from client 's website.

The server side data collection starts at this moment . The server module (that waits
on IIS) performs t hree primary tasks.
• Intercepts user web page requests.
• Collects server information using various API from IIS and Windows Server
2008 , then creates a UDP packet from this information , and finally sends the
packet over to UDP Net Mosaics Data Collection Server using UDP protocol
(discussed in detail in step 3).
• Attach client side tracking code.

57

2. The NefMosaics module executes on the IIS server, generates a permanent and a
temporary tracking code and writes a JavaScript to the webpage. The server DLL
module attaches a short string to outgoing HTML reply to the user. This module
does not actually insert any final JavaScript code. (That would be inefficient and
unscalable.) Instead, the module adds a reference to a JavaScript file. Thus, when
the HTML page arrives to the users web browser the first thing that will happen is
that web browser is going to download the reference and insert that reference into
the HTML page, and only then the user sees the final page and JavaScript code
that NetMosaics inserted finally runs. If the user looks at the source page of the
received webpage, there should be a JavaScript that looks similar to the Figure 5.5.
The attached javaScript code tells the web browser that before displaying a page
to the user, the browser must go to the above address, load and insert that java
script file into HTML code that the web user will finally see. The java script code
and setup will be discussed later. This code will later record and send all client
interactions with the webpage. Thus, anytime a user clicks or closes the page, a
JavaScript event will occur, which will run Ket Mosaics JavaScript code and send
over a UDP packet that will contain the information about the event (for example,
the location of the click).
;\fIost of the parameters in step 2 are defined in Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP /1.1
(RFC 2616 [(IETF), 1999]). ·We added two extra cookies and a tracking ID besides
the RFC header for tracing purpose. A permanent cookie is the cookie we implant
to client computer with the expiration date of 1 year and a session cookie will be
expired whenever the client closes the connection session. We use those two cookies
to identify client computers. Whenever the client computer connects to the same
web site, the client permanent cookie will be sent to web server as part of the web
request. A tracking ID will be added to the javascript code and sent to the client.
The tracking code inside every page is presented in Figure 5.10.
The number 52lf5c9939d4463d886a905c2a2af8e9 in Figure 5.10 is the tracking ID.
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<script language='Javascript" src= ..http://www.clickfraudresearch.comlactivity.js?site=mysite&trackingid=
521f5c9939d4463d886a905c2a2af8e9"><lscript>
<noscript><img src= ..http://www.clickfraudresearch.comIUserAct.js?site= mysite &js=false& trackingid =
521f5c9939d4463d886a905c2a2af8e9" height=O width=O><lnoscript>

Figure 5.10: javaScript code added to each web page
The purpose of this tracking id is to match the client side log with its corresponding
server side log. In step 5 of the logging process, when the javaScript code executes
on client side, it will collect the client side setting and log to the GFD.
Let us illustrate how the logging process works with an example. Suppose user A
opens a browser and navigates to site www.mysite.com. the web browser sends the
web request define in HTTP 1.1 to site www.mysite.com. Site www.mysite.com
sends the web request parameters along with serialized tracking ID to GFD. GFD
returns a fraud score S for a given click back to site www.mysite.com. If the fraud
score S is less than a threshold value, site www.mysite.com sends the requested page
and the tracking code to above client's browser. The client browser will display the
page. and at the same time the above tracking code will execute on user As browser
and report As activity to GFD. Since the same tracing ID appears in the two logs,
it reveals the two log entries are connected.
3. The initial HTTP request packet (shown in a dashed arrow from process (1) to
process (3) in Figure 5.9) and tracking ids are sent to port 10500 ofthe Net Mosaics
web server. This process is managed by the DLL modules. This can be achieved in
two ways .
• With a buffer database .
• Without using a buffer database.
(a) Data sent with a buffer database

This is shown as the optional buffer in Figure 5.S. A buffer database is simply
a mirror image of the final database. It is used to store the data until the
data can be moved over to the final database server. in case the final server
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is experiencing slow performance or some network lag. Remember that this
database is completely optional. This database is created on the client's web
server.
(b) Data sent without a buffer database
The NetMosaics module installed inside the client 's web server intercepts user
web page requests, collects server information using various API from IIS and
Windows Server operating system, then creates a UDP packet from this information , sends it over to UDP port 10500 of the NetMosaics data collection
server through port 10000 of the local web server. As noted before, DLL modules create UDP packets and send them over network to the address and port
you have specified (Figure 5.11).
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Figure 5.11: NetMosaics Data Storage Server

4. All packets are written to the NetMosaics SQL server.
DBTransfer Application: DBTransfer application runs on the NetMosaics hardware.
The DBTransfer application receives UDP packets from servers all over the Internet
running the NetMosaics Module. Packets are sent over port 10500 from the clients'
web server module and are received on the port 10500 of the NetMosaics hardware.
After they are received , they are written to the database so the algorithms can be
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run on the new rows.
5. The JavaScript executes on the user's browser and keep sending user activities to
the

5.4

~etMosaics

web server.

Click Fraud Detection Model: Initial Version

The main characteristics of this system were,
(i) Integrates server side and client side activities to better detect click fraud activities.
(ii) Use more data from server and client compared to other available system, with the
assumption that more data gives better analysis/results.
(iii) Introduce a fraud score between 0-1 instead of classifying clicks into valid/invalid.
Figure 5.3 shows the data sources used by the CCFDP initial version. Those sources
can be divided into two categories as shown below. The logical structure of the click
record is shown in Figure 5.12.
1. Direct sources which includes
(a) Server computer
(b) Client computer
(c) Clicktracking
2. History data
(a) Fraudulent Database
(b) Blocking Database

61

....ttlttl

C\
OJ

....ttlttl
C\
OJ

"0

"0

"OJ

Vi
....c

OJ
VI

o

Vi

~

.!!!

Figure 5.12: Logical Structure of the click record

5.5

Click Fraud vs. Click Quality

Sometimes it is hard to get solid evidence of click fraud just based on the data collected.
The click fraud is about the intention of the web users, who has no objective of buying
the products or services advertised.
In other words, classification of clicks as valid or invalid is either impossible or not
accurate. Just like Google, who does not like the concept of "fraudulent" click, and uses
the term "invalid" click instead, we also found sometime it is difficult to determine the
real intention of the clicks. The example from Dr. Thzhilins [Thzhilin, 2006] explains the
difficulties in determining the intention of clicks: a person might have clicked on an ad,
looked at it, went somewhere else but then decided to have another look at the ad shortly
thereafter to make sure that he/she got all the necessary information from the ad. Is
this second click invalid? To make things even more complicated, the second click may
not be strictly necessary since the person remembers the content of the ad reasonably
well (hence there is no real need for the second click). However, the person may not
really like or care about the advertiser and decides to make this second click anyway (to
make sure that he/she did not miss anything in the ad and his/her information is indeed
correct) without any concerns that the advertiser may end up paying for this second
dick (since the person really docs not care about the advertiser and his/her own interests
of not missing anything in the ad overweigh the concerns of hurting the advertiser).
Therefore, in some cases the true intent of a click can be identified only after examining
deep psychological processes, subtle nuances of human behavior and other considerations
in the mind of the clicking person. Moreover, to mark such clicks as valid or invalid,
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these deep psychological processes and subtle nuances of human behavior need to be
operationalized and identified through various technological means, including software
filters. Therefore, it is simply impossible to identify true clicking intent for certain types
of clicking activities and, therefore, classify these clicks as valid or invalid.
Therefore, in the CCFDP initial version, we do not try to determine the real intention
of the web users. We give each click a score which measure the difference between each
click and average users activities. For example, the average user makes 5 clicks during
the stay on a site, a user make no click on this site means the low quality of this visit.
Web users activities on a web page can indicate their interests, browsing habit, and
most important, estimating their intention. Because of lack of recorded user activities,
the searching engines, ads commissioners, and other advertisement agent have difficulty
in detecting many kinds of suspicious clicks. Since the CCFDP system logs both client
and server side logs, we have a reeord about each click with detailed activities. Analyzing
web users activities CCFDP system gives a quality score.
We study the user activities in detail by comparing different website contents, and
different origins, e.g. Natural Traffic (Non-paid traffic) and Pay-Per-Click traffic (Paid
traffic), thus, finding the suspicious activities. To define precise score for each click, we
analyze large number of potential factors which define suspicious activates and potential
click fraud.
Based on this analysis, we selected and formalized set of factors which determine the
quality of clicks. The factors are defined as follows:
l. Software clicks

Software click means that a click has a server side entry without corresponding
client side entry. If software requests a web page, there will be a server side log
entry. However, the software neither request the following javascript code nor run
the javascript code. There should be no corresponding client side log entry for this
request. We exclude the search engine crawler traffic from click fraud detection
although the search engine traffic is a form of software click. The software click rate
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is defined as:
Rsoftware click

= 1-

L: CZient side Zog
L: Server sz·de Zog

(5.1)

If the client user closes the browser or press the "Stop" before the web page is

fully executed, there will be no client side log too. In normal situation for any site,
this exception rate is low. If there is jump of Software Click Rate, the traffic is
SUSpICIOUS.

2. No User Activities
The normal web page user will perform certain amount of activities during the
viewing period. These activities could be mouse over, mouse click, keyboard input,
scroll bar move, etc. If there are no activities inside a page, the click will likely be
click fraud. The no activities rate for a site is defined as:
R

. ..

_

No acttvttws -

_

1

L:

No existing activities
~
CZ·zen t sz·de Zog
Lt

(5.2)

In some cases, the user closes the web browser before he makes any mouse or keyboard movements. In normal situation for any site, this exception rate is low, if
there is jump in "No activities" rate, the traffic is suspicious.
3. Repeated Visitors
There are two ways to count repeated visitors. Since we implemented a permanent
cookie on the client computer. if the same user repeatedly visits the monitored web
site, their permanent cookie will be recorded in our database. It is unlikely the two
new assigned permanent cookies are identical. If the client browser does not accept
cookies, the users' IP address can be an alternative way to identify repeated visitors.
If the user keeps deleting cookies while visiting the website, factor (8) can be used.

Sometimes. the AOL users or large intranet users may share the same gateway IP
addresses when connecting to the internet. We may miscalculate the repeat visitor
count for shared IP. In that case, IP and permanent cookies are complementary
for repeat visitor detection. In some situations, the repeat visitors come from the
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same class "C" network (with net mask xxx.xxx.255.255) if they use a big proxy
pool for outbound connection. For those visitors, we can detect them by IP location
analysis.

It is normal for a user to repeatedly visit a site during a period of time. However, if
the repeat count is substantially greater than the average repeat visitor count, we
will flag the visitor as suspicious.
4. Suspicious User Agent Keyword
Every normal web request carries a User Agent field. A lot of click fraud from
adware or spyware uses suspicious keywords inside their User Agent field. We can
immediately identify this kind of click fraud from the field. Some fraud includes
well-known keywords such as Google, Yahoo, or Bing in their User Agent field, to
give the impression that the traffic is from those sources. However, the IP is not
from those companies based on the IP location match database.
5. History Count
Javascript can report how many other web pages the current browser visited before
visiting this page, although Javascript docs not report the details of the visited web
sites, this count is useful for detecting click fraud.
First, if a site is referred by a search engine or other advertisement agent, the history
count should not be O. This is because the current browser must have the search
engine or advertiser agent in its history. The conclusion is based on the fact the
advertisement link docs not bring up a new pop up browser. The condition is easy to
be satisfied for many search engines, such as google.com, because neither google.com
nor its Adsense program use pop up browser for their advertisement link.
6. No Cookie and JavaScript allowed
Through our research, we find that for normal users, the rate to allow JavaScript and
Cookie is very high for any site, from 95% to 99%. For some Per-Per-Click traffic,
the setting is significantly different compared to normal traffic. The Per-Per-Click
65

traffic may allow JavaScript and Cookie in 50% of the visitors. If the traffic does
not allow Cookie and JavaScript, we will have a reason to suspect the intention of
the user.
7. IP and Permanent Cookie inconsistency
This criterion is directly linked to case (3) of repeated visitors. In normal cases, the

IP and permanent cookie for a web user should be consistent. That means if a user
revisits a website, the IP a.ddress and his permanent cookie should be a fixed pair. If
a user cleans his cookies every time before visiting a monitored web site, we will log
a new permanent cookie for each repeated visit. This will create an inconsistency
between the IP and permanent cookie.
There is still another case for IP and permanent cookie inconsistency, which is, a
web user connects to the monitored site with the same permanent cookie, while his

IP address is changing for every visit. "Most likely the web user is changing proxy
server for different visit. This IP and permanent cookie inconsistency should be
flagged as suspicious.
8. Web users location and IP location mismatch

In CCFDP system, Three location related parameters are logged, IP, web users local
time, and time zone. The location indicated by those three parameters should be
consistent by any web visitor. The web visitors location is calculated in three ways.

=

Location!?
LocationTime zone

Longitude!?

= Time

zoneJava script

LocationLocal time = H our(Log server time - java script local time

(5.3)

(5.4)
5) (5.5)

If we find the IP time zone and Javascript time zone are significantly different, we

can suspect the visitor uses a proxy server to connect to the web server. In the
system, we set the time wne threshold difference to be +/-2 to accommodate for
the day light saving time and other mobile situations.
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9. IP location analysis

IP country analysis is a very important method to detect click fraud, especially for
those making advertisements world wide. The IP country distribution is relatively
fixed for a web site. If we observe a substantial shift of the IP country distribution
from its history distribution, the traffic is suspicious.
10. Page Activity Analysis
For the page activity analysis, we focus on three parameters: Click Count, Page
Depth and Page View Time. The average value for these three parameters over a
period of time is calculated. The Click Count is the number of clicks during a web
visitors staying on the web site. The average of Click Count for a web site over a
period of time is defined as:

.
_ L~=l L~:::l Clicks from the nth visitor on the mth page
R Average clzck connt ,\,N

L..m=l MN

(5.6)

The Page Depth is the number of unique pages a visitor viewed for a web site. The
average of Page Depth for a web site over a period of time is defined as:

R Average page depth

_ L~=l page depth for the nth visitor
N

-

(5.7)

The Page View Time is the staying time on web page by a visitor. The average of
Page View Time is defined as:

R Average page view time

_ L~=l L~;;:l Page view for the nth visitor on the mth page
-

,\,N

L.,..n=l MN

(5.8)

We constantly monitor the average click count for a web site. A dramatic change in
any of the average values will indicate the change of activities and some suspicious
event on a web site.
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11. Referrer Rate analysis
If a web site makes an advertisement with an advertisement agent, the time rate re-

ferred by a location is relatively fixed. For example, we observed the incoming traffic
referred from ..www.domainsponsor.com.• was 12.3 per hour. The advertisement was
with Google.com for "Music download" keywords and ··www.domainsponsor.com..
is Google.coms search partner. The definition of the referrer rate is:

RRejerrer rate jor website A

=

2::Traf fie referred by site A
T·
. d
zme perw

(5.9)

The rate referred from a particular site is relatively fixed based on the facts that
every site has its own visitor base. If we see a dramatic increase in referrer rate, the
traffic is suspicious.
The total quality score is the weighted summation of all the scores for factors and it
is normalized to range [0, 1].

5.6

Disadvantages of the CCFDP Initial Version

Despite the better performance compare to other commercial solutions. CCFDP initial
version also has considerable drawbacks.
(i) Similar to existing commercial solutions, CCFDP initial version was run offline. As
t he amount of pay-per-c lick traffic grows over the years the demand for an online/real
solution was apparent.
(ii) CCFDP initial solution did not usc baselines that analyze trends and outliers in the
history of traffic. Fraudsters came up with low noise click fraud attempts which
then required analyze of traffic in the history.
(iii) Software clicks were treated generally in the initial version but sophisticated click
bots came into action, which required special solutions.
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(iv) Initial version did not have a traffic visualization methods. For example "geographic
distribution of traffic" etc. It also did not have a reporting tool that generates
automatic reports for a click campaign.
(v) Since the CCFDP was not launched online client cannot register or manage their
click campaigns online.

5.7

Can the model be improved with context data?

As new technologies evolve to combat click fraud, fraudsters find new ways to achieve
their targets. By taking the advantage of advances in malware, they try to profit from
click fraud, while making it harder to detect. As the botnets get more sophisticated, they
are able to perpetrate more click fraud. They are discovering new ways to distribute and
this can be seen in the data we have being collecting continuously.
The current situation requires the use of proactive technologies, which can detect
unknown threats by examining their behavior. Click bot detection methods cannot just
focus on aggressive patterns, such as in Bahama bot, but also need to examine the low
rate patterns that are mixed with normal traffic. Also, attackers can constantly craft new
attacks to make them appear different and legitimate; thus we cannot use the trainingbased approaches that derive patterns from historical attacks. Therefore, with the lack of
ground truth, evaluating detection results is non trivial and requires different methodology
and metrics than the detection methods.
We continue to craft more and more ideas to detect new types of click fraud. We
develop data mining methodologies and tested them through the CCFDP system. Some
of these solutions are inspired by the recent research conducted in the area of click fraud
detection and prevention.

These new ideas are reflected in the second phase of this

research. The main goal of the second phase of research activities is to provide our initial
CCFDP system with additional functionality.
The improved CCFDP, which we discuss in the next chapter, will include automatic
scoring of click traffic with extended set of context-based parameters which are not in69

cluded in our initial version. These parameters are derived attributes showing significant
differences or outliers from baselines empirical distributions. The robust, online methodology for modeling and comparison of web click distributions will be developed. New
extended descriptions of web clicks (context-based) will enhance the quality of a click
score value by better describing characteristics of each click and intentions of the user.
It will be calculated automatically in the CCFDP extended version using the technique

known as incremental, semi-supervised support vector machines (SSVM).
Also, new algorithms are proposed and developed that improve the time and space
performances because the CCFDP improved version should support online prevention
capabilities. The suspicious clicks will be blocked from reaching the advertised site based
only on server data and dynamically, online maintained variety of "black lists". This
proactive emphasis on the prevention of fraud clicks will reduce significantly the number
of highly suspicious clicks, and directly produce financial benefits for advertisers. We
believe that prevention mechanisms as an addition to existing but improved detection
mechanisms are key to success of the CCFDP system.
The new version will efficiently and seamlessly meet the demanding requirements of a
growing Internet advertising business by qualifying users elicks on advertising web sites,
and discovering and documenting click fraud events in real time. We will show that using our CCFDP (Collaborative Click Fraud Detection and Prevention) model will give
advertisers, publishers, and advertisement networks powerful analytical tools to improve
the performance and quality of their revenue generating models, increase the satisfaction level of their customers and affiliates, and most importantly, raise the individual
consumers level of trust and confidence in the integrity of conducting business and purchasing transactions online.
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CHAPTER 6
CLICK FRAUD DETECTION WITH EXTENDED CONTEXT DATA
Most of Current research and industrial solutions for click fraud detection use only either
client side or server side data. In the previous chapter we have shown that use of both
client side and server side data enhance the click fraud detection probability. In this
chapter we further consider the ways to extend the data about each click. Two main
goals in this chapter are:
1. Formalizing new approaches in click fraud analysis by defining new concepts such
as:
• click context, click baselines and fusion of click data.
• applying some theories to formalize these concepts and build new architecture
to detect previously undetected activities.
2. Based on introduced new theoretical concepts and appropriate formalisms we extended and enhanced our CCFDP architecture. We proved using real world data
set that click fraud detection with extended click context improves the detection
capabilities.

6.1

Context of the click

We assume that use of more context data about the click may help to better estimate its
quality. Among the data we collect is spatial in nature while some is temporal in nature.
Therefore, we define the context of the click record considering both spatial and temporal
properties of the click.
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Spacial data is also known as geo-spatial data or geographic information. It is t he
data t hat ident ifies t he geographic location of features and boundaries.

For example

Figured 6. 1 shows t he geographical location of two cities(Louisville and Frankfort ) in t he
state of Kent ucky. IP addresses are usually assigned based on t he geographical location .
T herefore, in Figure 6.1 t he IP can be a representative of the city. It is also possible to
use Referrer and Count ry as spatial information providers in the click context.

Figure 6.1: Relationship between IP address and location
On the other hand , temporal domain data encodes t ime aspects. More specifically the
t emporal aspects of data is usually associated wit h a valid-time. Valid t ime denotes t he
t ime period during which a fact is t rue with respect to t he real world. For example "click
insert t ime", which is the time a click is recorded in t he database, provides t emporal
information (See Figure 6. 2).

A double click which measures with respect to IP or

"t racking id" can also be considered as temporal information.
When a click is considered separat ely, its spatial and temporal dat a may not provide much useful information. But when t he click is considered wit h ot her clicks in t he
neighborhood it can provide much meaningful information. For example, the concept of
"double click" is not defined for a single click. Therefore, particularly for t he click fr aud
detection, ··context of t he click" means the spatial and temporal characteristics of clicks
t hat occur before or after t he current click which is being observed. If we are considering
the current click as the most recent click (Figure 6.3 left) t he context of t he current
click includes all t he clicks occurred before t hat . Vie will stick to this definit ion in all t he
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Figure 6.2: Records in a database
algorithms that run in realt ime. But for offline processes, t he current click can be any
click in t he click stream (Figure 6. 3 right), the context of t he current click will be clicks
occurred before and after it.

( Click n )
( Click n-l )
( Click n-2 )

f,-

Click n
Click n-l
•

••

•
•
•

Current Click
Current Click

I

Click 2

Figure 6.3: Context of the click

6.1.1

Local and Global context of a click

"T he easiest way to go undetected while commit ting click fraud is t o execute t he actions
in long t ime intervals. For example, clicking an ad once a day. Even if it is clicked once,
t he associated parameters such as IP, referrer and country should be changed if possible."
T his is advice given in a website t hat promotes click fraud. The vital information m
this message is that click fraud may be committed wit hin a short time interval (such as
10 clicks within a minute) or within a long interval as described above. T herefore, it is
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important to include mechanisms to detect both of these types of attacks.
We define local and global context of the click using the concepts of temporal and
spatial data mining. Temporal data mining deals with the harvesting of useful information
from tcmporal data, whilc spatial data mining is the process of discovering intcrcsting
and previously unknown, but potentially useful patterns, from large spatial datascts.
Extracting interesting and useful patterns from spatial datasets is more difficult than
extracting the corresponding patterns from traditional numeric and categorical data due
to the complexity of spatial data types.

Local/Short term context
For data mining algorithms that work online, we define a short context. A short context
can be the analysis of behavior of the 10 most recent clicks received by the system. For
example if we receive 20 clicks from the same IP continuously, we can detect it by observing
only the most recent clicks.

Global context
Global context of the click is defined as analyzing behavior of long term data such as clicks
in the past 24 hours. Offline modules in our system use long context of data because the
time restriction is minimal. For example a traffic from a certain country (India) may
be significant today compare to yesterday or last week. We cannot detect this kind of
variation using local context. It has to be analyzed considering all the traffic as a batch.

6.2

Mechanisms developed to detect click fraud in local context

Performance of any online solution largely depends on the amount of data it analyze or
process in a given time. The amount of data that can be processed depends on how
fast the results are required. For example, if the results should be available within a
second, the amount of data that can be processed is lower than if the results are required
within five seconds. Also, in such applications time consuming databases accesses should
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be eliminated or at least minimized. Therefore, complex algorithms are not appropriate
for online solutions. Usually we have to depend on simple algorithms in the form of
if-then-else rules.
The local context in CCFDP strict its neighborhood to most recent 10 clicks. Behavior
of the clicks in this local context is done using a rule based system. Rules are designed
utilizing standard industry heuristics for detecting click fraud and new concepts that we
have developed. Each rule is triggered whenever a new anomaly record matches patterns
given in the rule. A suspicious score is assigned for each such rule, based on the predefined
threshold values. Details of the rule based system follows next.

6.2.1

Fraudulent traffic scoring using improved rule based module

In the CCFDP improved version we incorporate an improved rule base that detects suspicious clicks. Scoring the level of fraudulent activities in the given click requires:
(i) Partially scoring some characteristics of the fused click record
(ii) Combining these partial scores into final integrated score S
The current rule base consists of over 25 rules. Score values are normalized on [0, 1]
intervaL where S = 0 represents valid clicks, S = 1 is a fraud click, and 0 < S < 1 values
are interpreted as suspicious clicks. Sum of all scores for the clicks in the given campaign,
normalized by the total number of clicks, represents a percentage of invalid click traffic.
When the new clicks are coming, the scoring process includes:
(i) Collecting the values for partial scores

Ti

from GFD database for IP, UserAgent and

Rcferrer (at the beginning they are not in database, so
(ii) Computing score values

Ti

Ti

values are 0)

for all other parameters (using corresponding heuristic

"rules" )
(iii) Combining all score values for the final score S for the given click. If partial scores
are

Tl, T2,· .. Tn

for a given click, then the final integrated score is expressed as
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(6.1 )
(iv) If click score in (iii) is 5

= 0, do not include any new records in GFD database (for

IPs. User Agents or Rcferrers)
(v) If click score in (3) is 5 > 0, and there is no previous records for key click attributes
(IP, UserAgent or Referrer), create these new records with corresponding 5 values
(and increase the count of the number of clicks for a given attribute)
(vi) If some attributes of the click with 5 > 0 already exist in the GFD database, then
adjust their historic scores by weighted averaging 5 for each attribute separately
(IP, UserAgent, Referrer, etc.)
(vii) Based on values in fraudulent database GFD for each key attribute, dynamically
are modified "blocked lists" in the blocking database BD. Specific predictor is going
in the "blocked list" if its score value in GFD database is above the given threshold

T (not necessarily T

=

1, the threshold may be T = 0.9)

In the following section we explain in detail the rules that are used in the CCFDP
system. These rules are designed utilizing standard industry heuristics for detecting click
fraud and new concepts that we have developed. All the rules follow a simple IF-THENELSE structure.
1. Server side IP and Client side IP mismatch
The click fraud detection system assigns a unique identifier for each session between
the web user and the web server. This identifier is known as the tracking id and
it is saved in a form of a cookie. XetMosaics combines the client side record and
server side record based on this tracking id value which should be the same for each
session. In some situations, NetMosaics has found the server side and client side
IPs do not match, indicating software-driven click fraud. An example is shown in
Figure 6.4.

76

client side ip

server side ip

196.25.255.246

tracltingid( server side) and tempcookie (client side)

198.54.202.194

42A3A1C9B02D468D9DCB3B8E6598B331
42A3A1C9B02D468D9DCB3B8E6598B331

198.54.202.226

198.54.202.194

OB68BC304AB74F9FB790EB1AS5BBE458
OB68BC304AB74F9FB790EB1AS5BSE45S
C93CEA47754D4AB1B9A65 B1 OBCEBB074

210 .24S. 31. 16

C93CEA47754D4AB7B9A65B10BCEBB074

Figure 6.4: Server side IP and Client side IP mismatch
The rule for this detection compares the server and client IP addresses to ensure
that they are the same. The rule also checks that the client IP is not nulL

Fraud score:
IF the server side IP and client side IP match
IF the server side IP and client side IP do not match

=0
1

2. Empty userAgent
A user agent is a text sequence that a browser reports to a web site containing
information such as the brand, version, plug-ins, and toolbars installed on a browser.
"-

Usually it looks like "l\lozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1;
.:\'"ET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)." The basic information is this browser
is Ylicrosoft Internet Explorer version 6.0 and it is running on a Windows NT 5.1
platform. This information helps web sites to determine what capabilities a browser
has, and helps the web site provide pages that cater to the browser. In addition
to normal web users, robots, spiders, and bots that browse the Internet also report
a user agent to web sites.

Bots are automated software that browse web sites

looking for information. Popular bots include Coogle bot, Bing bot, and Yahoo!
Slurp. These bots crawl the Internet to find about content to include in their search
engines. These user agents are stored and updated in the CCFDP. Fraudulent bots
usually do not report their user agent. Therefore, the algorithm takes an empty
user agent into consideration, making a null user agent score higher.
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partial Fraud Score:
IF user agent is not empty
IF user agent is empty

=0

=1

3. Server side entries with no client side entries (Software click)
In our system a software click is defined as a click with server side entries without
corresponding client side entries. This is similar to what is shown in Figure 6.5.
In this figure, SIP, strackingid, and suseragent are server side parameters and CIP,
cuseragent and clientside parameters that do not exist.
sop

S'tra.ck.inqid

"::[-'

cusera.qents·",rr

!IlJser agent

OSFF34COC<BO~ 466A!iE92CEro3eB96~O

Mozilla./4_0 icam.patible; MSIE €.O; ifl.ndows NI 5.1; SV'"1)
NllIJ.

2 C·; .Uf. ;;:41 103

88FOE7CCBC0340EBB5AllB€D04S34543S

Mozilla/4.0 (canpa.tl.ble; HSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; S"vl; SIMBAR Enabled; SIMBAR={64BSF237C60C-44fa-ACS 4-62DDE1:5t5F4C4}; Fun1iebProducts}
NllIJ.

BS8€F~ge.

alE4EEAlI08D11AEAOFlFEAFF

Mozilla/4 .. 0 (compalable; MSIE S.C'; 1fl..ndows 98; DiqE:xe; Bellas On Line)

NULL

Figure 6.5: Software Click

If the user is a human, for each request there will be a server side log and a client
side log entry.

However, if its a software, there will be no corresponding client

side entries. There is one exception for search engine crawlers. Search engines use
software bots to index their web pages; known as search engine crawlers that perform
software clicks. In our research we have filtered out the search engine crawlers before
processing of click traffic.

Partial Fraud Score:
Server side and matching client side entry exist

=0

Server side and matching client side entry do not exist
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4. No user activities
A normal user will perform certain amount activities during the period that the web
page is viewed. These activities could be mouse over some text, clicking a link or
image, typing, scrolling up or down, etc. If there are no activities on the page, the
click will likely be generated by a bot and it is click fraud. We consider the behavior
of natural traffic without user activities to decide on a score for traffic. We allow
the same percentage of traffic without user activities in natural traffic to exist in
paid traffic.
To calculate a score we have considered the average click fraud percentage found in
pay per click traffic in search engines including Google AdSense and Yahoo Publisher
~etwork was 28.1 % in 3rd quarter of 2007. We take this value as the total fraudulent

traffic to calculate other corresponding score values.

Partial Fraud Score:
Total fraudulent traffic

= 28%

No activities in natural traffic
No activities in paid traffic

= 4%

= 30%

Score for paid traffic without user activities

= 28%*(30% - 4%)
= 0.07

5. Suspicious keywords in the user agent
A user agent is a text sequence that a browser reports to a web site containing
information such as the brand, version, plug-ins, and toolbars installed on a browser.
Usually it looks like
.~ET

is

"Mo~illa/4.0

(compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1;

CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)." The basic information is: the browser

~licrosoft

Internet Explorer version 6.0 and it is running on a Windows NT 5.1

platform. This information helps web sites to determine what capabilities a browser
has, and helps the web site provide pages that cater to the browser. In addition
to normal web users, robots, spiders, and bots that browse the Internet also report
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a user agent to web sites.

Bots are automated software that browse web sites

looking for information. Popular bots include Google bot, Bing bot, and Yahoo!
Slurp. These bots crawl the Internet to find about content to include in their search
engines and usually they carry keywords such as "Google I3ot," or "Yahoo! Slurp"
in the user agent.
A lot of click fraud from adware or spyware uses suspicious keywords inside their user
agent field. For example Figure 6.6 is extracted with the keyword "FunWebProducts" in the user agent field. After processing these records we have found that they
are all fraudulent clicks.

213.55.89.84
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts)
121.247.221.209 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
125.99.244.44
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
NT 5.0; FunWebProducts)
24.132.32.13
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
NT 5.1; ciIENL; FunWebProducts)
125.60.240.205
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts)

6.0; Windows
6.0; Windows
6.0; Windows
6.0; Windows
6.0; Windows

Figure 6.6: Suspicious keywords in user Agent

In rare situations even normal traffic has such keywords. We have found out this
rate in normal traffic and the same rate is allowed in the paid traffic.
To calculate a score we have considered the average click fraud percentage found in
pay per click traffic in search engines including Google AdSense and Yahoo Publisher
~etwork was 28.1 % in 3rd quarter of 2007. We take this value as the total fraudulent

traffic to calculate other corresponding score values.

Partial Fraud Score:
Total fraudulent traffic = 28%
Suspicious keywords in natural traffic = 0.94%
Suspicious keywords in paid traffic = 11%
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Score for paid traffic with Suspicious keywords = 28%*(11% - 0.94%)
0.028

6. Repeated visits
Duplicate detection algorithm that we developed detect repeat visitors in two ways.
The system implements a permanent cookie on the client computer for every new
visitor. This permanent cookie is designed to use as a 128 bit globally unique identification number. Chances are highly unlikely that an assigned permanent cookies
written to different client computers are the same. If the same user repeatedly visits
the monitored web site, their permanent cookie will be recorded in the database. If
the number of visits is beyond the allowed threshold value the click is suspicious. If
the client browser does not accept cookies then its IP can be used as an alternative
to detect multiple visits.

09
08
07

06
0.5

04
0.3

02
01
0'~--~----~--~4----~----~--~

number of cKcks

Figure 6.7: Repeated Visits scoring
At the beginning of the algorithm a table is pulled from the database that indexes
the last 10 clicks to the system. If a click to a page and IP match within five seconds,
they are added the match array. One match is a double click, two is a triple click,
four matches is an invalid as are any matches after that. When four or more clicks
occurs, the complete group of clicks is tagged as invalid. This means that the user
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has clicked in a session at least four times and is classified as suspicious activity.
When five group Invalids take place, the IP is blacklisted. The score calculation is
shown in Figure 6.7.
7. History count
If the client computer permits Java script to be run in its web browser, our algorithm

can find how many web pages the current browser visited before visiting the current
website. Although Java script does not report the details of the visited web sites,
this count is useful for detecting click fraud provided that the client computer uses
Internet Explorer as the web browser. If Mozilla or FireFox is used, sometimes these
browsers ignore the previous visits and set the history count to zero.
If a site is referred by a search engine or other advertisement agent. the history

count should not be O. This is because the current browser must have the search
engine or advertiser agent in its history. This conclusion is based on the fact that the
advertisement link does not bring up a new pop up browser. The condition is easy
to be satisfied for many search engines, such as Google because neither google.com
nor its Adsense program use a pop up browser for their advertisements. Yahoo and
the Yahoo partner network program do not use a pop up browser link either.
We check to see if the user is using Internet Explorer using the browser field, then
we also check that the history length field is not null. If there is a history length,
we check that there was a referrer, to ensure that the history length is valid.
In rare situations even normal traffic reports history count as 0, while using Internet
Explorer and being referred by a website. We have found out this rate in normal
traffic and the same rate is allowed in the paid traffic.
To calculate a score we have considered the average click fraud percentage found in
pay per click traffic in search engines including Google AdSense and Yahoo Publisher
Xetwork was 28.1 % in 3rd quarter of 2007. We take this value as the total fraudulent
traffic to calculate other corresponding score values.
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Partial Fraud Score:
Total fraudulent traffic = 28%
Zero history count in natural traffic
Zero history count in paid traffic

0.074%

= 7%

Score for zero history count = 28%*(7% - 0.074%) = 0.019

8. Cookie and Javascript are not allowed
Through our research, we have found that 95% to 99% of normal users allow
J avaScript and cookies in their web browsers. Most of the commercially available
click fraud solutions use Java script and cookies to collect information about the
client user. Traffic generated by fraudulent computers usually show as Java script
and cookie disabled. We have seen in pay per click traffic the percentage that allow
Java script and cookie is around 50%. Therefore, if the traffic does not allow cookies
and Java script, the traffic is suspicious. Within the algorithm we check to see if the
CCFDP previously set cookies are read and if the Java script generated text was
recorded with the click.
To calculate a score we have considered the average click fraud percentage found in
pay per click traffic in search engines including Google AdSense and Yahoo Publisher
Xetwork was 28.1 % in 3rd quarter of 2007. We take this value as the total fraudulent
traffic to calculate other corresponding score values.

Partial Fraud Score:
Total fraudulent traffic = 28%
Percentage of natural traffic that does not allow cookie and
Java script

5%

Percentage of paid traffic that does not allow cookie and
Java script = 14%
Score for cookie and Javascript not allowed =28%*(14%-5%) = 0.02
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9. IP and permanent cookie inconsistency
The cookie that our algorithm installs in a client computer in its first visit is a
globally unique identification number for a client computer. This id is part of a the
information that is sent to the web server by a client computer when a request is
made. If the client user has not visited the web site previously the client's computer
will be assigned a new cookie. Therefore, usually IP and permanent cookie for a
client computer should be consistent. That means if a user revisits a web site, the
IP address and its permanent cookie should be a fixed pair. If a cookie is deleted,
the system will assign a new permanent cookie. This will create an inconsistency
between the IP and permanent cookie. There is still another case for IP and permanent cookie inconsistency in which a web user connects to the monitored site with
the same permanent cookie while their IP address is changing for every visit. Most
likely the web user is changing a proxy server for different visits.
In certain situations even normal traffic reports inconsistencies between cookie and
IP. We have found out this rate in normal traffic and the same rate is allowed in
the paid traffic.
To calculate a score we have considered the average click fraud percentage found in
pay per click traffic in search engines including Google AdSense and Yahoo Publisher
Xetwork was 28.1 % in 3rd quarter of 2007. We take this value as the total fraudulent
traffic to calculate other corresponding score values.

Partial Fraud Score:
Total fraudulent traffic = 28%
Percentage of natural traffic with IP and cookie inconsistency = 10%
Percentage of paid traffic with IP and cookie inconsistency = 40%
Score for IP and cookie inconsistency =28%*(40%-10%) = 0.08

10. Page activity analysis
User or page activities that we track include mouse over text, clicks on text or
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image, use of browser scroll bar, and use of keyboard. Existence of at least once
of these activities gives positives evidence towards a genuine click. But in some
situations we have observed user activities are not reported in actual user sessions.
This percentage is about 4.5%. Therefore, in paid traffic page activity analysis is
considered suspicious only when its rate increases beyond 4.5%.
To calculate a score we have considered the average click fraud percentage found in
pay per click traffic in search engines including Google AdSense and Yahoo Publisher
Xetwork was 28.1 % in 3Td quarter of 2007. We take this value as the total fraudulent
traffic to calculate other corresponding score values.

Partial Fraud Score:
Total fraudulent traffic = 28%
Percentage of natural traffic without user activity = 4.5%
Percentage of paid traffic without user activity

= 43%

Score of percentage of users without user activity = 28%(43%-4.5%)
=0.108

11. IP time zone and Javascript time zone mismatch
In our data there are three location related parameters. IP, web users local time, and
time zone. The location indicated by those three parameters should be consistent
by any web visitor. Our location verification algorithms check that the timezone
and click time are valid.
In rare situations even normal traffic reports inconsistencies between IP and actual
time wne, which is about 3.09%. We have excluded this percentage in the paid
traffic.
To calculate a score we have considered the average click fraud percentage found in
pay per click traffic in search engines including Google AdSense and Yahoo Publisher
:\etwork was 28.1 % ill 3Td quarter of 2007. We take this value as the total fraudulent
traffic to calculate other corresponding score values.
85

Partial Fraud Score:
Total fraudulent traffic = 28%
Percentage of natural traffic with location mismatch = 3%
Percentage of paid traffic with location mismatch

= 5\%

Score for IP time zone and Javascript time zone mismatch

= 28%*(5\%-3\%) = 0.006
12. Traffic is too dense

If the administrator is familiar with the traffic flow to a web server, for example 100
requests per minute from a particular referrer. and all of a sudden if the server gets
100 requests within 10 seconds it is suspicious. I3ased on the variable think time for
humans, their click flaw does not follow a pattern and there is a maximum number
of clicks per given time period that they can make. For example there is no reason
for a human to click 20 times on the same link within 10 second time interval. If
the click count is high for a given time period it may be due to robotic activity that
generates artificial clicks.

Partial Fraud score:
IF (page view time) is between 0 and 1 seconds
IF (click count) $>$ 10)
Score for dense traffic

0.7

13. Mouse click location analysis
We collect information about the location of the user clicked on the page, through a
Java script. This click location information tells where user clicked in the browser.
There are two ways of displaying advertisements in a web browser, either as a text
link or as an image. If this click landed on either of these the click will generate a
request for the target web page. But if it generates a request with a click without
a mouse move, the click must have been originated by a click bot. Because, a click
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bot does not necessarily have to click on an advertisement to request a web page.
Our algorithm checks the running click count and mouse movement count to see if
the mouse has moved and if this is the first click. A higher score is given when no
movement is detected.

Partial Fraud score:
IF (mouse move count)$<$O
IF (click count)$>$O
Score for mouse click location analysis

= 0.007

14. Blacklists
Blacklists are lists of IP addresses, domain names, email addresses or content of the
headers or the body, or some combination of these different types, that can be used
to help identify fraudulent traffic. A special subset of IP address and domain name
lists exist which can be queried using DNS, which are called DNS Blackhole.
If we identify that the traffic is referred from certain source that has a high per-

centage of click fraud in the history this referrer will be added to the blacklist. For
example according to the data in fraudulent database, we can easily identify that
the traffic from some referrer sites has very low mouse activities and high software
click rate. Those sites are added to blacklist referrer, and this list is maintained
dynamically where IPs are added and removed considering the baselines of traffic
they generate.

Partial Fraud score:
Score for blacklisted IP/referrer/country/etc.

6.3

=1

Mechanisms developed to detect click fraud in global context

Global context of click traffic is defined using behavior of the data in the past. Specifically
we define global context for each click parameter such as IP, referrer, country, ISP, etc. We
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compile counts or histograms of these attribute-value distributions over time to determine
"normal"" activity for a particular attribute-value pair. We then compare the aggregation
of previous data with an aggregation of a current data. Observed behavior is flagged as a
potential fraud if it deviates significantly from expected behavior, which we rcferrer here
onwards as "outliers".

6.3.1

Dynamic baselines

A number of definitions have been given to the term "outlier" depending upon the task
at hand. For example Hawkins [Hawkins, 1980] defines outliers by the following: "an
outlier is an observation that deviates so much from other observations as to arouse
suspicions that it was generated by a different mechanism." This description points out
two important points for our task. First. that an outlier should be considered suspicious.
The deviation from "normal" data gives rise to suspicion, suspicion that some unusual
mechanism has generated this data point. Second, what is considered normal must be
modeled in such a way that points that deviate from what is considered normal can be
detected and separated from the rest of the data. This section will describe how we model
normal data, or in our case normal click traffic.
Each click record is made up of a number of attributes such as browser, operating
system, IP, referrer, etc. We model each attribute separately. We will determine normal
behavior for referrer separate from all other attributes and browser separate from other
attributes and so on. For each attribute we create histograms which maintain counts for
the most common values in each attribute. These histograms are called baselines. An
example of such a histogram can be seen in Figure 6.8 (left). In Figure 6.8 (left) one can
see the number of clicks for each of four values of the referrer attribute. These histograms
are then used to calculate the percentages for each value.
In addition to absolute counts being maintained in the baseline, we also measure
variance. Over time certain values were found to vary greatly in the percentage of traffic
with a given value. For example traffic with Google as the referrer varied through out
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Figure 6.8: (left) Global baseline for four referrers as of 1/ 22/08. (center) Aggregated
window for 1/ 22/08. (right) Counts and thresholds for referrer on 1/22/08. Thresholds
are dark gray and counts in light gray.
time from nearly 100% to less than 50% of traffic in a given day. This variance made
comparisons with the baseline difficult . Variance is calculated using the formula to follow.

(J

=

t

Pi

(Xt _ p,)

(6.2)

2

Ci,

i=l

This formulation of variance takes into consideration time periods varying in number
of clicks. In the above formula each time period within the baseline is given by i. The
Xi

is the count within that time period for the attribute-value pair. The

number of clicks within the time period. The value

Ci

is the total

p, is the percentage of clicks for the

current attribute-value pair throughout the entire baseline. Lastly, Pi gives the percentage
of clicks in the baseline from the current time period.
Our baselines are used to identify outliers in incoming traffic among the attributes.
Since we are identifying outliers based on context, we must necessarily accumulate clicks
for a comparison of short term context with past context. These short term accumulations
of clicks are called aggregated windows.

An aggregated window is also treated as a

histogram. An example of the comparison of an aggregated window to a baseline can be
seen in Figure 6.8 (left and center) .
We assume that percentages for a given attribute-value pair are distributed normally
through time.

An outlier is detected when a count for an attribute-value pair in an

aggregated window is found in the upper 5% tail of the normal distribution, or is 1.645

89

standard deviations above the mean as shown in Figure 6.9. We calculate the threshold in
terms of number of clicks using the following formula to ensure whole number thresholds:

threshold = [( f.l + 1.645 * 0")

* windowsize]

(6.3)

where f.l is the percentage of the baseline made up by the attribute-value pair and 0"
is the standard deviation of that percentage in the baseline. Additionally, window size
refers to the number of clicks in the current aggregated window. If the number of clicks in
the aggregated window for a particular attribute-value pair is greater than the threshold,
then it is considered an outlier. An example of calculated thresholds can be seen in Figure
6.8 (right ).
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Figure 6.9: Gaussian (Normal) distribution with the top 5% highlighted
Outliers are detected for each attribute in a given aggregated window. The results are
then applied to the following context fields for each record: referrer, browser, operating
system, country, ISP, and IP. If a record has an outlying referrer for the current aggregated
window, it is reflected in the referrer context field . An example of an extended record can
be seen in Table 6.1. Baselines are then recalculated adding in the current aggregated
window to keep baselines up to date and for comparison to future aggregated windows.
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Table 6.1: Example record after outlier detection preprocessing. Record now contains
server side data, client side data and context based on a number of attributes
Click data
Server side
2

6.3.2

3

Context fields
Client side
401

Referrer

Browser

OS

Country

ISP

IP

0.18

0.12

0.03

0.13

0.02

0
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Fraudulent Traffic Scoring

The CCFD P system scores each incoming click. The score will be a value in the range
[0,1]' where a :lero represents no evidence of fraudulent behavior, and a one represents
100% confidence in the click being fraudulent. Within the CCFDP system, the outlier
detection module provides relevant context to each attribute for scoring each click. Each
click is provided a partial score for each attribute based on the variation of that click
within the current context from normal behavior. Zero signifies that no evidence was
found of suspicious activity for the given attribute-value pair in the current context.
We will discuss two approaches for scoring an attribute-value pair when the count
exceeds the calculated threshold. The first approach to scoring attach a context score
to a click record which conveys the extent to which a count has exceeded its threshold
or the degree of suspicion for that particular count. Take for example referrer X. In the
case where referrer X's calculated threshold is 2, it would seem logical to give a higher
partial context score if the actual count were 38 compared to 3. A different partial score
is given to counts that far exceed their threshold, compared to counts that barely exceed
their threshold. This provides more information to the overall scoring algorithm. This
could allow for more refined overall scoring by providing a range of values for suspicious
activity.
This approach to scoring uses the difference between the attribute-value pair count in
an aggregated window and the corresponding threshold. Then take that as a percentage
of the total number of clicks in the aggregated window. A score in this first approach is
given by the following formula:
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partial context score Ai

=

counti - threshold i
. d
.
wzn owszze

(6.4)

This type of scoring will be referred to as "variable scoring" by later sections. The
closer to one the score gets, the more certainty given by the outlier detection system that
something suspicious is happening. When the score is close to zero, then little evidence
for suspicion is available. The second approach is to simply give a constant score to all
attribute-value pairs exceeding their thresholds. Click fraud is perpetrated in a large
number of ways, some approaches [Daswani and Stoppelman, 2007] expect that a large
number of clicks over a short period of time raises suspicions, and attempt a "low-noise
click fraud attack" .

6.4

Fusion of Data

We initiated this research with an assumption that more data about each click collected
from different sources will result in better estimation of the click quality.
Our data sources can be classified into three categories:
(i) Direct sources which include server computer, client computer with clicktracking
information.
(ii) Indirect sources real time buffer and fraudulent database GFD (data are generated
in extended real time).
(iii) History data baselines and Blocking Database (BD).
Data belonging to direct sources are collected in real-time and stored as a record of
the click without any preprocessing. Indirect sources define some derived click attributes
which require a significant amount of preprocessing. These transformations take place in a
real-time for buffer data (recent server data about clicks), and require extended real-time
for detection and recording outliers in the current time window compared with various
baselines.
Data fusion from these sources includes the following activities:
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(a) Server and client side data are fused based on identical tracking ID. If IDs are not
the same, the equivalence of IPs is used as an alternative criterion for fusion of
partial records.
(b) Fusion of clicktracking data with client data is much more complex because of
their l:n relation: for each record in client side there may be more several user
activities recorded in clicktracking. Because we are performing data fusion in real
time we don't have possibility to "wait" for all click tracking data, and we make
"temporarily" integration based on pre-specified window of clciktracking records.
(c) Characteristics of the clicks are not only "static" based on server and client information. There are also "dynamic" data about each click describing the context
which depends on clicks before and after the current one. For example, a single
click for a given IP may not be suspicious, but hundred of consecutive clicks from
the same IP will make this IP highly suspicious. Similar analysis can be performed
with other parameters registered at server side such as referrer or country. We are
using real time buffer (recent server click records) to detect these outliers online and
to transform them into additional context based characteristics of clicks.
(d) Collection of data about clicks is extended real-time that gives information about
clicks when comparing with standard baselines for key parameters.
(e) Each IP, referrer, etc. (key parameters) may have some history on the given site.
These characteristics are included in the record about current click. For example, if
the current click is based on referrer which has history of suspicious clicks, this fact
will be included in the record and computation of a click score.
(f) Blocking database describes highly suspicious clicks from some IPs, referrers, or
countries.

Our implementation of blocking database allows online changes and

therefore more efficient blocking process comparing with traditional commercial solutions.

93

Previous steps are only illustrative examples of a data fusion process, while the details
are given in the CCFDP documentation[~etMosaics, 2009]. The integrated structure of
a click record which includes all context information is shown in Figure 6.10.

Clknt
<- "'mpmcr

S~r\er

Computer

Real-tilllc fraudulent
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---..0
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Figure 6.10: Integrated structure of the click

6.4.1

Why Data Fusion?

Data fusion is "a process dealing with the association, correlation, and combination of
data and information from single and multiple sources to achieve refined position and
identity estimates, and complete and timely assessments of situations and threats, and
their significance" [Lambert, 2009]. The resulting information is more satisfactory to the
user when fusion is performed than simply delivering the raw data [\Vald, 2001]. Waltz
and Llinas have described important features related to the development of data fusion
architecture essential also for any click fraud analysis system.
They include:
1.

Robustness and reliability: The system is operational even if one or several sources
are missing or malfunctioning.

11.

Extended coverage in space and time.
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Ill.

Increased dimensionality of the data space: It increases the quality of the deduced
information while reducing vulnerability of the system.

IV.

Reduced ambiguity: More complete information provides better discrimination between available hypotheses.

v. Solution to information explosion [Waltz and Llinas, 1990].
Data fusion techniques arc widely used for target identification and tracking, situation awareness [Fusheng and Feng, 2008], threat assessment [Jane~ et al., 2000], military
[Tian et al., 2005] and public security applications [Zeng and Xu, 2008, Yukun et al., 2009].

In most of these applications the fusion model has been selected mainly considering the
practical application since there is still not a universal fusion model available. In this
paper, specific fusion process architecture has been introduced to our application based
on the Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) model [DOD, 1991] and we differentiate
between the following levels of abstraction:
1.

Data/Observation level fusion: Measurements which can be univariate, multivariate, and/ or multidimensional, measurements may also exhibit temporal, spatial
properties etc. are fused at this level.

11.

Variable level fusion: A variable is derived from data using a data analysis algorithm.
Transformed domain variables are fused at this level.

lll.

Decision Level: When the results of the high level fusion are available, variables
can be interpreted for decision making. The final result is obtained at the decision module by fusing the local decisions of the system to get a more precise and
comprehensive understanding to the system's situation.

Different fusion methods are used in different fusion levels, such as statistical estimation
[Durrant-Whyte, 1987, Hager et aL 1993], Kalman filter [Yukun et al.. 2007], fuzzy integration [Solaiman et al., 1999], neutral networks [Dai and Khorram, 1999], D-S evidence
theory [Wu et al., 2002] and so on. Of these fusion methods, D-S evidence theory is widely
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known for better handling uncertainties. Moreover, it provides flexible information processing and can deal with asynchronous information [Ouyang et al., 2008].

6.5

Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory

The Dempster-Shafer theory, also known as the theory of belief functions, is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability. Whereas the Bayesian theory
requires probabilities for each question of interest, belief functions allow us to base degrees
of belief for one question on probabilities for a related question. These degrees of belief
mayor may not have the mathematical properties of probabilities; how much they differ
from probabilities will depend on how closely the two questions are related.
The Dempster-Shafer theory owes its name to work by A. P. Dempster (1968) and
Glenn Shafer (1976), but the kind of reasoning the theory uses can be found as far back
as the seventeenth century. The theory came to the attention of AI researchers in the early
1980s, when they were trying to adapt probability theory to expert systems. DempsterShafer degrees of belief resemble the certainty factors in MYCIN, and this resemblance
suggested that they might combine the rigor of probability theory with the flexibility of
rule-based systems. Subsequent work has made clear that the management of uncertainty
inherently requires more structure than is available in simple rule-based systems, but the
Dempster-Shafer theory remains attractive because of its relative flexibility.
In the following section, terminology of theory of evidence [Shafer, 1976] and the notation used in this paper are defined.
1.

Frame of discernment: If 8 denotes the set of ON (ON E 8) corresponding to N

identifiable objects, let 8 = 01 , O2 , ... ON be a frame of discernment. The power set
of 8 is the set containing all 2N possible subsets of 8, represented by P(8):

P( 8 )={ <I> , {0 1 }, {02} ,... {ON}, {0 1 ,02} ,{ 01 ,03},' .. 8}
where <I> denotes the null set.
11.

Basic Probability Assignment function (BPA) : The BPA is a primitive of evidence

theory. The BPA, represented by m, defines a mapping of the power set to the
96

interval between 0 and 1, where the BPA of the null set is 0 and the summation of
the BPA's of all the subsets of the power set is 1. The value of the BPA for a given
set A, represented as m(A), expresses the proportion of all relevant and available
evidence that supports the claim that a particular clement of 8 belongs to the set

A but to no particular subset of A. The elements of P(8) that have

none-~ero

mass

are called focal elements. Formally, this description of m can be represented with
the following three equations:
m: P(8)

I:

'* [0,1]

(6.5)

m(A) = 1

(6.6)

=0

(6.7)

AEP(8)

m(<1»
lll.

Belief function Bel(A) : Given a BPA m, a belief function Bel is defined as:
Bel(A) =

I: m(B)

(6.8)

B~A

The belief function Bel(A) measures the total amount of probability that must be
distributed among the elements of A.
IV.

Combination of rule of evidence m(C) : Supposed

mI

and

m2

are two mass functions

formed based on information obtained from two different information sources in the
same frame of discernment; according to Dempster's orthogonal rule we define m( C)

= (ml

1)

m2)(C)

if (C=<1»

else

(6.9)
Where K represents basic probability mass associated with conflict defined as:

K =

I:

ml(A)m2(B) < 1

AnB-lip
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(6.10)

In our system, evidence supports a click to either be valid or invalid. Therefore
it becomes a two class problem. Accordingly we have modified the calculation of
m( C) for the CCFDP system [NenIosaics. 2009]. For a two class problem, we can
simplify the equation for combination of evidence to:

(6.11)
where ri is the output from each model and n is the number of models.

6.6

Fusion of Evidences of Click Fraud in the CCFDP System

The collaborative click fraud detection and prevention (CCFDP) system was developed to
collect data about each click, involving the data fusion between client side log and server
side log [Ge and Kantard~ic, 2006]. In CCFDP there are three modules that contribute
to the process of finding fraudulent clicks. They are rule based module, click map module,
and outlier detection module. In each of these modules, output is a probabilistic measure
of evidence for the click being fraudulent. Authors have discussed the functionality of
each of these modules in detail before [Kantardzic et al., 2008, Kantardzic et al., 2009].
In addition, CCFDP maintains an online fraudulent database of suspicious sources of
clicks in terms of IP, referrer, country etc. When the score of an IP or a country etc.
reaches a predefine threshold value the CCFDP system moves it to the online fraudulent
database and inform the service providers with the instructions to block future traffic
originating from these sources. Scores for each parameter are updated after a click found
suspicious based on the combined evidences of the modules that we mentioned above. In
the following section we differentiate between an event and an evidence.

6.6.1

Event vs. evidence

Incoming click is the event we consider in the CCFDP system. The evidence provides
support information for this event's past and present activities. For example consider the
following four pieces of evidence of CF.
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1.

Evidence A: IP associated with the click generates software clicks (Software clicks
are generated by automatic agents such as click Bots).

11.

Ill.

Evidence B: Search engine crawler is associated with some clicks.
Evidence C: The referrer for these clicks is associated with fraudulent clicks detected
in the past.

IV.

Evidence D: Click does not have user activities.

............... :~~~~.:.......

"
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,

\

-------Figure 6.11: Event Vs. Evidence

A piece of evidence can be associated with multiple possible events (click i and i - I )
unlike traditional probability t heory where evidence is associated with only one event. For
example the click event i in Figure 6.11 is associated with evidences A, C, and D. Click
event i - I is only associated with evidence D. The two events share event D. Evidences
can overlap (A and C), one evidence can be a specific case of more general evidence (A
and B) etc. In CCFDP we try to maximize the detection of evidence associated with an
event. We achieve this by using extended context of the click, rule based module, baseline
module and click map module.
1.

Evidence in the rule based module
In the rule based module evidence about CF is represented as rules. Each rule
has a value between 0 and 1. This module extensively analyzes the context of the
incoming click. Final score of this module is obtained by fusing these individual
scores. Fusion is done in data level using the D-S evidence theory.
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11.

Evidence in the outlier detection module
The outlier detection module defines outliers based on baselines for each click parameter (IP, referrer, country etc.) considering the data collected in the past. We
maintain two sets of outliers, Local and Global. Local outliers are based on one set
of click parameters and Global outliers are defined using another set of click parameters. Baselines are compared with the variations in the current context of the click
to detect suspicious patterns in the data. The variation (evidence) in each parameter is represented as a probabilistic score. A variable level fusion is performed to
combine the individual pieces of evidence using D-S evidence theory.

111.

Evidence in the click map module
The "click map" tracks the current activities being performed by the user while the
user's session is active. "Click map" assigns a score for each click based on click's
location relative to the positions of the advertisements in the webpage the user is
viewing. In the current version click map module works as a classifier. It filters out
clicks recorded away from the actual advertisement area.

6.6.2

Assumption of Click Orthogonality

The Dempster-Shafer theory requires evidence to be orthogonal to perform its sum of orthogonality. Therefore any method of proof should be first used to verify this assumption.
In our system we will be using Pearson's correlation.

6.6.3

Model-driven fusion process

CCFDP combines the past and present evidence for each click to better understand its
current and future behavior. If the click is found fraudulent (combined score greater than a
threshold), the associated sources of the click will be moved to a suspicious database, which
will be immediately used by modules discussed above, to score the next new incoming
click.
The model-driven fusion process of CCFDP is depicted in Figure 6.12. Real-time data
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Figure 6.12: Model-driven fusion process of CCFDP
feeds from three sources (k=3): server side, client side, and extended context of the click
(51 ,52 ,53 ), This is represented by sensors in Figure 6.12. In the data preprocessing
stage we standardize (align) the input data [Waltz, 1998]. The concept of alignment is an
integral part of the fusion process, and assumes "common language" between the inputs
and includes the standardization of measurement units. The scores from the rules based
module (DM model 1), outlier detection module (DM model 2), and click map module
(DM model 3) are then combined using D-S evidence theory at the decision level (m=3).
The combination of scores will be used to dynamically adjust advertising profiles in such
a way that low quality sources of traffic will no longer be shown advertisements.

6.6.4

A case study

In this section, we demonstrate the application of D-S evidence theory to combine evidences of sources.
Evidence 1: Repeated clicks from IP during past minute detected by the rule based
module.
Evidence 2: Java Script is allowed in the browser detected by the rule based module.
Evidence 3: Country Morocco is detected suspicious by outlier module.
Our task is to use these evidences to show a click to either be fraud or non-fraud. Therefore
it becomes a two class problem. Fraud is represented by F, and non-Fraud is represented
by N.
Let 8 = {F, N}, We define the power set P(8)={<I>.{F}.{N}}. Assuming local suspicious
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scores based on evidences, we define:
m1(<1»=0, m1({F})=0.6, m1{N}=0.4
m2(<1»=0, m2( {F} )=0.5, m2{N}=0.5
m3(<1»=0. m3( {F} )=0.7, m3{N}=0.3

Calculation of M1 EEl M2
For the convenience we use the fusion tables, introduced by Shafer [Shafer, 1976], to show
the calculations. Fusion tables are given in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3.
.. Fusion of Evidence 1 and Evidence 2
Table 62'

(M1 EEl M 2) {F}0.5

Using equation 6: K =0.5*0.6
m( {F}) =

ml

{F}0.6

{F}0.3

{N}0.4

<1>0.2

+ 0.4*0.5

{N}0.5
<1>0.3
{N}0.2

= 0.5

{?~;2{F} = ~:~ = 0.6

New belief function
Belmltflm2( {F}) = l:B<:;:{F} m(B)=O

+ 0.6 =

0.6

Calculation of M1 EEl M2 EEl M3 using equation 6:
Table 6.3: Fusion of Evidences 1,2 and Evidence 3

K=0.09

(M1 EEl M2 EEl M3)

{F}0.7

{N}0.3

{F}0.3

{F}0.21

<1>0.09

<1>0.3

<1>0.21

<1>0.09

<1>0.2

<1>0.14

<1>0.06

{N}0.2

<1>0.14

{N}0.06

+ 0.21 + 0.09 + 0.14 + 0.06 + 0.14 =

m({F}) = ml{F}*m2{F}*m3{F} = 0.21 = 0 78
1-K

0.27'
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0.78

New belief function
BelmlQlm2Qlm3({F})=2::B~{F}

m(B)=O

+ 0.78 =

0.78

In this example we considered the local suspicious scores of 0.6,0.5, and 0.7. D-S evidence
theory is used to find the final evidence. The belief value that the dick is fraudulent is
0.78.

6.7
~re

Experimental Results and Discussion
developed the CCFDP improved version based on the its initial version developed by

Dr. Li Ge [Ge and Kantardzic. 2006]. The real time version of CCFDP is now available
online at http://www.netmosaics.com. All of our experiments use click data from Hosting.com and thebestmusicsites.org websites. The process was started on January 7th.
2007 and is still in collecting data. As of March 30th, 2011 we have collected around
1,400,000 natural and 25,000 paid click data.
Initial version of CCFDP was designed using only a rule based system. The new
CCFDP has outlier module and the click map module in addition to an improved rule
based system with additional click context information. Experiments are performed on
both old and new versions of CCFDP. Experiments are performed under five categories.
They are:
1.

11.

Verification of Click Orthogonality
Comparison of results for change in score of IP, Referrer, Country etc.
versions of CCFDP

lll.

Comparison of distribution of final score

IV.

Comparison of improvements in quality of traffic

v. Comparison of results with Google Adwords
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in two

6.7.1

Calculation of Click Orthogonality

We have calculated the Pearson Correlation coefficient between the results of the outlier
module and the rule based module. It is 0.0071. Based on the results, safely assume the
evidences are orthogonal and perform the Dempster-Shafer orthogonal summation.

6.7.2

Comparison of results for change in score of IP, Referrer, Country etc.
in two versions of CCFDP

After all paid click data has been processed we have selected the top 10 IPs, countries,
and referrers with the highest fraudulent scores to see if the fusion process has any effect
on updating individual scores of these parameters. Tables 6.4, and 6.5 list the IPs,
countries, and referrers that have the highest fraudulent scores respectively. The results
are slightly modified to protect privacy of some publisher websites. For example the actual
domain names and referrer names are replaced with dummy identifiers.
Table 6.4: Top IP and Countrv Counts
"

Top IP Count

Top Country Count

IP

Count

Country

Count

71.235.26.170

122

US

19784

68.88.239.191

112

IN

1278

136.165.67.74

94

CA

856

199.231.146.254

86

GB

666

89.139.234.179

82

NULL

574

203.162.3.146

80

MX

544

170.20.96.116

80

AU

534

71.193.114.12

72

TR

518

74.133.47.66

68

BR

506

74.192.144.103

68

PH

456

In Figure 6.13 (left) the variation of scores for IPs are depicted. Except for one
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Table 6.5: Top Referrer Counts

I

Referrer

I Count I

No referrer (NULL)

8800

http://www.r1.com/

4568

http://www.r2.com/

2192

http://www.r3.com/

604

http://www.r4.com/

546

http)/www.r5.com/

538

http://www.r6.com/

510

http://www.r7.com/

450

http://www.r8.com/

420

http://www.r9.com/

414

IP address (136.165.67.74) all others have higher fraudulent scores after combining the
evidences from all the modules. In the rule based system, evidence is collected by considering only the changes detected in a limited neighborhood

1.

For example with only the

rule based system, it will be difficult to detect a Bot associated to a particular IP which
sends http requests in the time intervals greater than 15 minutes. But with the outlier
detection module that covers larger neighborhood 1 of the clicks, the pattern becomes observable. Once a suspicious activity is detected this evidence will contribute to increase
of corresponding partial scores in the CCFDP system. IP address with higher scores have
increased probability of being blacklisted sooner. Once the IP addresses are on the blacklist the search provider will be notified to eliminate future traffic from the corresponding
sources. This will improve the quality of the traffic redirected to the advertiser's website.
One of the biggest advantages of using a multi-model system in CCFDP is its ability
1A

neighborhood is a window of clicks. It can be defined as fix amount of most recent clicks or

clicks arrived in a fix time interval. In the CCFDP system, rule based module uses a small (limited)
neighborhood of 10 most recent clicks. The outlier detection module uses a large neighborhood which is
all clicks received in the past 24 hours.
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Figure 6. 13: Variation of IP Score (left), Country Score (center), and Rcferrer Score
(right)
to cover wider area in the t ime domain. While the rule based module deals with events
within couple of minutes of each other the outlier detection module handles events in a
24 hour window. Figure 6.13 (center ) shows the final scores of top 10 countries from
which we have received most of the traffic. With the rule based module alone we were
unable to detect patterns and variations in the time axis. Therefore almost all count ries
have a score less than 0.1, which implies clicks from these countries are not suspicious at
all. But with t he outlier module, which keeps track of t raffic for extended period of time,
we were able to detect abnormal traffic from most of the countries. For example some of
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these countries send traffic only during certain hours of the day.
A similar behavior is observed with the top referrers of traffic to hosting. com site.
Figure 6.13 (right) shows the variation of scores of top 10 referrers. All these referrers
appear normal when they are evaluated only with the rule based system. But when t hey
are evaluated together with click map module and the outlier detection module referrer
scores were drastically increased. Some of these referrers are from outside the US . When
the countries suspicion score increases so does the scores of associated referrers.

For

example we mentioned in the above example that certain countries send traffic only in
certain hours of the day. When we include the click context it is observed that most of
these referrers are associated with those countries. This behavior will be very hard to
detect if we are using only the rule based score.
In traditional system (rule based) country and referrer did not influence on the score
almost at all. Inclusion of addit ional modules make country score and referrer score
become much more sensitive. For example the new system include country parameter in
73% of clicks from US in the final score.
• ••• •• Rulebase module score

outlier module score -

final score

1.2 . , . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Figure 6.14: Variation of score for a blacklisted IP

We have mentioned that highly suspicious members of IP, referrer , country, etc. are
blacklisted once they are detected by the CCFDP system. Figure 6.14 shows the variation
of scores for such a blacklisted IP. In this graph 0 corresponds to a valid click and 1 is
assigned for an invalid click. Even a valid IP can have many Is recorded as its final
score due to situations like double clicks. We usually do not penalize users for double
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clicking on an advertisement since the user may be accustomed to Microsoft's default
way of choosing something on the screen. This can be clearly observed in Figure 6.14
where there are clicks for the same user that hit the score 1 even before it gets blacklisted.
The situation changes if the clicks are repeated more than 2 times during a given time
interval. Once enough suspicious activities are detected the IP is finally moved to the
blacklisted database and the search providers are notified. For example In Figure 6.14
this IP is moved into the fraudulent database aft er 59 clicks. With the support from
search providers our system will block future traffic generated from this particular IP
reaching a client's website.

6.7.3

Comparison of distribution of final score
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Figure 6.15: Score distribution
Figure 6.15 shows the distribution of final scores for all the clicks with two versions of
CCFDP. The lighter graph (L) corresponds to the first version of CCFDP where only rule
based module was used. The darker one (D) is the new version with multiple modules.
Area I represents most of the valid clicks. This corresponds to the records with attributes
which do not have presence in t he fraudulent database and all key attributes satisfies the
requirements defined in the algorithm to be a legitimate click. The percentage of traffic
present in Area I with system L is much higher than that of system D. With the inclusion
of multiple models the suspiciousness of clicks has increased and the graph is shifted to
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the Area II with the system D, which is still in the safer region. Area III shows the
suspected clicks. These are records with the attributes present in the fraudulent database
or attributes that exceed certain threshold values. It can be clearly seen in the graph how
t he scores have increased after fusing multiple pieces of evidence from different modules.
Area IV includes invalid clicks. Blocked traffic is identified as clicks with highly suspicious
scores usually greater than 0.9. As shown in Table 6.6 with the t raditional system (rule
based system) we were able to block only 520 fr audulent clicks but with the muti model
system it was 643 , which is about 24% additional clicks. We believe that advertisers
should not be billed for any of these clicks.
Table 6.6: Distribution of clicks in each region in Figure 6.15

I

II

I III I

IV

Rule based system

12198

1

3

520

Multi-model system

4197

4650

3817

643
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Figure 6.16: Percentage Participation
Figure 6.16 shows the percentage participation of each module in the final score
calculation. Remember t hat the click map module is already used as a screening module
to filt er invalid clicks, where mouse clicks are recorded off-positioned to the advertisement .
Light area of Figure 6.16 represents the rule based module participation and dark area
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represents t he outlier detection module participation .
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Figure 6. 17: Improvement of quality of t raffic

6.7.4

Comparison of improvements in quality of traffic

We looked at t he changes in quality of t raffic aft er implement ing t he mult i-model based
CCFD P system. A summarized version is depicted in Figure 6. 17. The dataset was used
in t he rule based module alone and found t hat the average 53% of t raffic is suspicious
[Kantardzic et al. , 2008]. \iVhen running t he out lier detection module alone on t he dataset
we discovered t hat about 34.6% of all clicks had one or more attributes t hat were found
to have an outlying attribute-value pair count [Kantardzic et al. , 2009]. Clicks found to
have an out lier will contrib ute evidence effecting part ial scores. T he CCFDP system will
compute t he fin al score measuring suspicion for each click. And with t he multi-model
system classified about 64% of paid t raffic as fr audulent . In addit ion we have observed
t he changes in t he online fr audulent database. In t he t raditional system , only wit h rule
base , t he fraudulent database has recorded 71 IPs as fraudulent . The multi-model system
recorded 283 IPs as fraudulent wit h the same data set, which is nearly 4 t imes more t han
t he t radit ional system. T his is a greater improvement in terms of prevention of fraudulent
traffic. As we discussed in Figure 6. 13, the t radit ional system has very lit tle effect on
count ry score and referrer score when calculating the tot al score. But wit h t he mult imodcl system scores for countries such as India, Morocco, Mexico have shown enough
SusplclOn. Clicks came from t hese count ries received a higher fr audulent score but t he
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system did not have enough suspicious clicks to block any of the countries completely. A
similar results are observed for referrers.
We defined the quality of traffic as (1 - score). Using only the rule based module
and the outlier module we have about 47% and 65% quality scores respectively. With
the combined model we were able to get much better traffic with about 36% of quality.
With these results we can see that the multi-model based CCFDP system is capable of
improving the detection of fraudulent traffic at least by 10% compared to same models
working alone.
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Figure 6.18: Click traffic in second and eighth months of 2007
Additionally, we looked at the number of suspicious clicks in the Hosting. com advertising traffic during two different periods, where we had considerably more clicks. Figures
6.18 (a) and 6.18 (b) show advertising traffic during these periods (second month and
eighth month). In these time periods outlier detection module has found increasing number of suspicious alarms 2 . The multi-model system found 10740 clicks (out of 24528 total
clicks) to be fraudulent, while the rule based system only detected 6990(not shown in the
figure). In addition we analyzed the volume of total clicks from Google and its partner
network during these two periods of time.
Figure

6.19 shows the total and invalid traffics from Google and Google partner

networks for the second month and the eighth month. First thing to observe is there is
2A

closer inspection of the data shows that a number of factors contributed to this higher rate of

outlier detection. One such factor was that there was a major shift in the keywords used in the Google
advertising campaign for the website.
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Figure 6.19: Traffic analysis for Google
much higher volume of traffic in the eighth month compared to the second month. Second
thing to observe is that traffic from Google partner networks in the eighth month is almost
negligible. In the second month out of 307 direct Google referrals 71 are observed invalid,
while 138 of 583 Google partner network referrals are detected invalid. In the eighth
month total Google only traffic is 2444 and nearly 50% (1036) of that traffic is found to
be invalid.
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Figure 6.20: Referrer analysis with Google Publisher ID

We also looked at the top referrers in the Google partner network during the second
month. Figure 6.20 shows these referrers identified by their Google publisher ID. These
statistics are generated using the extended context of click data. We looked at the top five
countries, other than the US , present in the invalid Google only traffic. They are depicted
in Figure 6.2l. Both India (IN) and TUrkey (TR) remained as a common candidate in
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both lists. It is the outlier detection module that detected traffic from these countries
becoming suspicious. These evidence is added to the overall system for the purpose of
detecting fraud.
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Figure 6.21: Top 5 country lists for invalid Google only traffic

6.7.5

Comparison with Google Adwords

In the previous section we have shown the comparative study between the initial and
the improved version of the CCFDP system. In this section we discuss the comparative
analysis that we have carried out with Google Adwords program. We have partnered
with hosting.com.

All of our experiments use click data from Hosting.coms website.

Hosting.com is a global company which provides hosting solutions to "business critical
data assets" as explained on their website. The data which will be used for the experiments
to follow comes from the paid traffic of their advertising campaign. Figure 6.22 shows
the list of advertisements that we have used in the Google Adwords campaign.
In the year 2007 data collected during the period from 01-18-2007 to 12-31-2007 and
in the year 2008 data collected during the period from 01-01-2008 to 07-15-2008. During
analysis we have found out that data are not continuous and changes are made in search
advertising networks. Even though the company made available all the data to us, the
official Google Adword reports are available only for 3 months of the year 2008. Therefore
for the year 2007 we did not do any comparisons.
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Figure 6.22: Ad Groups used in the campaign

(a) Monthly Click Traffic Distribution
Table 6.7 and Figure 6.23 summarize the CCFDP results for each month of the year 2007
for traffic from Google and Google partner network. During this period we have analyzed
total of 17586 clicks and CCFDP has determined 12258 of 17586 as valid clicks. i.e.
about estimated click fraud of 30.3%. Blocked traffic are the clicks that were invalidated
immediately from the CCFDP system because t.hey were found fraudulent in previous
analysis and were recorded in the blacklisted dat.abase. For example in the month of
January, 528 clicks from 9 different IP addresses were immediately invalidated. Rest of
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the clicks are further analyzed and 1623 of them are found to be invalid.
,
Table 6 ..
7' CCFDP Traffic Analysis for Hosting .com
in 2007

CCFDP
Month

Total traffic

Blocked traffic

Blacklisted IPs

Invalid clicks

Valid clicks

January

9230

528

9

1623

7080

February

4316

84

0

818

3414

August

447

2

1

183

50

September

1380

64

3

878

478

October

1434

72

2

1336

26

November

547

11

0

377

159

December

232

5

0
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Figure 6.23: Comparison of Valid vs. Invalid Clicks
Table 6.8 and Figure 6.24 summarize the CCFDP results for each month of the
year 2007 for traffic from Google and Google partner network. During this period we
have analyzed total of 8167 clicks and CCFDP has determined 4042 of 8167 as valid
clicks. Blocked traffic are the clicks that were invalidated immediately from the CCFDP
system because they are found fraudulent in previous analysis and were recorded in the
blacklisted database. For example in the month of January, 7 clicks from an IP addresses
were immediately invalidated. Rest of the clicks are further analyzed and 4042 of them
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are found to be invalid.

.. CCFDP Traffic Analysis for Hosting com in 2008
Table 68'
CCFDP
Month

Total traffic

Blocked traffic

Blacklisted IPs

Invalid clicks

Valid clicks

January

787

7

1

282

498

February

1617

8

0

744

865

March

1473

37

3

498

938

1Iay

611

3

2

400

208

June

3679

135

6

2201

1343
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Figure 6.24: Comparison of Valid vs. Invalid Clicks

Table 6.9 summarizes the Google Adsense reports for each month of the year 2008
for traffic from Google and Google partner network. In YIarch Google has reported 1247
valid clicks and they have charge $2.67 on average per click. Similarly for the months of
May and June total ad expenditure is $15,562 and $9,624 respectively. At the end of the
campaign Hosting.com paid $28,516.
Figure 6.25 shows the comparison of CCFDP and Google Adsense analysis for three
months of the same campaign. In the months of 11 arch , May, and June CCFD reported
to have received 1473, 611, and 3679 paid clicks. Among those it has invalidated 498,
400. and 2201 clicks as fraudulent in the corresponding months. This resulted total valid
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Table 6.9: Google Adsense Traffic Analysis for Hosting.com in 2008
Google Adsense
Month

Valid clicks

Avg.cost per click

Total cost

March

1247

$2.67

$3330

May

3304

$4.71

$15562

June

2839

$3.39

$9624

traffic of 938, 208, and 1343 for the months of March, May, and June respectively. One
thing to notice here, that there was a problem in the data collection in the month of May
and because of that total traffic does not represent the traffic of the entire month.
We requested the Google Adwords reports for the same duration. They have reported
1247, 3304, and 2839 of valid clicks in the months of March, May, and June. In all 3
months CCFDP has deterrnined more invalid traffic compare to Google. If we stick to
the same average cost per click, this analysis suggest that Hosting.com could have saved
more than $20,480 during this period.
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Figure 6.25: Comparison of valid traffic in CCFDP and Google Adwords in 2008
Current version of the CCFDP system provides better results compared to its first
version. This is mainly due to the use of extended click context to analyze and estimate
the quality of a click. There are further improvements to be done to make it much more
robust and reliable to detect robot clicks, which are clicks generated by software programs
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known as clickbots. These clickbots click on ads and issue HTTP requests for advertiser
web pages. There are many types of clickbots used on the Internet. Some are "forsale" clickbots, while others are malware. For-sale clickbots such as the Lote Clicking
Agent, I-Faker, FakeZilla, and Clickmaster can be purchased online. They typically use
anonymous proxies to generate traffic with different IP addresses. An anonymous proxy
server generally attempt to anonymize web surfing. However IP diversity usually is not
enough to hide click fraud attacks conducted by such software, and traffic generated
by them is identifiable. Malware type clickbots infect machines in order to achieve IP
diversity, and their traffic may or may not be as easily identifiable as that generated
by for-sale clickbots. In order to detect and remove robots, we need to have a better
characterization of the distribution of click behavior. Current version of the CCFDP
system detects some types of clickbots. but improvements are necessary especially with
a wide variety of new clickbots occurring on Internet. In Chapter 7 we detail the new
improvements to the CCFDP which we have made in its development phase 3.
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CHAPTER 7
EXTENDED ANALYSIS OF CLICK BOTS IN CCFDP
One of the most significant threats to the Internet advertising today is the threat of click
bots, which are networks of compromised machines under the control of an attacker. It
is difficult to measure the extent of damage caused on the Internet by these bots, but it
is widely accepted that the damage done is significant. In future, most of the fraudulent
activities will be carried out by these bots because they are less expensive to develop or buy
and easy to maintain. Therefore, future cliek fraud detection systems must incorporate
robust detection techniques to protect their customers from these sophisticated click bot
attacks.
On the other hand, users of a practical click fraud detection solutions expect these
duplicate detection mechanisms to run in realtime. In order to provide real time results,
solution providers should utilize data structures that can be updated in real time. In
addition, If the actual volume of clicks (per unit time) is high, space requirements per
click should be the lowest possible thus data structures with constant space requirements
or sublinear space requirements such as O(log(n)) or O(log(log(n))) are desirable (n is
the number of clements processed).
Most of the click fraud solution providers, including search engines and third party
solution providers, claim their rule-based expert system is the best among the others
taking the advantage of keeping rules as a secret weapon. They do not disclose information
about the set of rules due to fear of competition.

This situation even led to multi-

million dollar settlements in the recent years. Due to the lack of verifiability of click
fraud solutions, it is inevitable that the trust between service providers and advertisers
is degraded.

Since real-world click fraud solutions are usually kept secret for fear of
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competition, it is practically impossible to study many of them in a single context.
In the "new CCFDP", that we have developed in phase 3, we have addressed the above
Issues. In section 7.1 we discuss the naive Bayesian classifier that we have developed to
detect Smart ClickI30t type clicks. In section 7.2 we elaborate on the proposed space
efficient Bloom filter based data structure to process clicks. In section 7.3 we discuss the
modeling of knowledge and validation (KV) model for rule based expert systems used in
click fraud detection.

7.1

Extended analysis of click hots

Click bots represent one of the fastest growing threats on the Internet advertising, given
that they adapt perfectly to the new malware dynamic in which threat creators are no
longer searching for notoriety, but for financial returns. With this in mind, they try to
ensure their creations are installed without arousing the suspicions of users or security
compames.
The current situation reqUIres the use of proactive technologies, which can detect
unknown threats by examining their behavior. A click bot does not necessarily click on
an ad to issue a click. It is programmed to generate "fake" clicks that mimics actual
clicks. Most of the time it is an HTTP request that is artificially generated. Therefore it
is important to verify whether the click is originated from an authentic browser such as
Internet Explorer, Mozilla, etc.
A number of challenges make this task difficult. First, the amount of data to process
is often huge, on the order of terabytes per day. Thus any method that mines the data
for identifying bot traffic has to be both efficient and scalable. Secondly, most of these
data are not disclosed due to privacy, security and business policy issues. Furthermore,
with many bot-net hosts available, attacks are getting increasingly stealthy with each host
submitting only a few clicks to evade detection. Therefore, click bot detection methods
cannot just focus on aggressive patterns, such as in Bahama bot, but also need to examine
the low rate patterns that are mixed with normal traffic. Third, attackers can constantly
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craft new attacks to make them appear different and legitimate; thus we cannot use the
training-based approaches that derive patterns from historical attacks. Finally, with the
lack of ground truth, evaluating detection results is non trivial and requires different
met hodology and metrics than the detection methods.
In the new CCFDP it was one of our goals to achieve the target of developing a robust
detection mechanism against these low noise click bot. Vve have developed a novel classifier
that for this purpose. It was successfully tested to detect the clicks from SmartClick Bot,
an advanced and intelligent click bot. Before detailing the machine learning techniques
that we have used, the following section gives a brief introduction to the Smart Click Bot.

7.1.1

An Overview of the Smart ClickBot

The Smart ClickBot is a software Web robot that clicks on ads (by issuing HTTP requests
for advertiser web pages) to help an attacker conduct click fraud 1. It was first detected and
reported by the Netl\Iosaics click fraud detection system in 2010 [Kantardzic et al., 2008,
Kantardzic et al., 2010a, Kantardzic et al., 2010bj. Smart ClickBot is a for-sale click bot
and it can be purchased[Walgampaya and Kantardzic, 2010j. Once installed and configured the Smart ClickBot is able to act by itself. It uses anonymous proxies to generate
traffic with IP diversity. It also has a random user-agent generator that generates useragents registered to well known HTTP browsers. By doing so, it can mimic a request
originated from a valid browser because click fraud detection solutions usually suspect
clicks without a valid user-agent field [Tan and Kumar, 2002j. To make it look more realistic it can even attach a rcferrer field. Referrer in pay-per-click system is a website that
helps a web user to reach another website. Therefore if the referrer field carries values
correspond to famous search engines or other popular websites it will be least suspicious
to anybody observing the server logs.
Operator of the Smart ClickBot can set the time interval between successive clicks,
known as the Click-Through-mte(CTR)2 and configure to run multiple click campaigns
lthe act of generating illegitimate clicks to make profit or deplete competitor advertisement budget.
2CTR is a way of measuring the success of an online advertising campaign. A CTR is obtained by
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simultaneously. The Smart ClickBot has 3 distinct campaign modes. They are: single
hit, list-like, and banner-like, which are especially designed to suit different webpage
structures. Once the bot loads the webpage that has the advertisements the user can
specify where to click.
In the next section, we discuss in detail the systematic approach taken by the NetMosaics system to detect click patterns generated by the Smart ClickBot.

7.1.2

Methodology for Smart Clickbot detection

1. Data Collection, Pre-processing and Session identification
Interactions with a Web server, either by humans or software. are recorded in the
server access logs. To characterize the behavior of bots statistically, we need to be
able to isolate the behavior of robots from that of the general population of (human)
"reb users.
:vIost of the existing bot detection systems uses only the server side data in their
analysis and therefore entirely depends on these server log data to identify robot

sessions.

A session is the duration that a user (either human or software bot)

maintains an active HTTP connection with the server. But, because of the stateless
nature of HTTP traffic, incoming requests are considered and logged as independent
events.

Therefore, access logs do not contain any information that could relate

together requests issued during a single "visit" of one user to the Web-pages of a
Web server [Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009].
Furthermore, in [Tan and Kumar, 2002] Tan and Kumar stated that "Without clientside tracking, cookies or embedded session identifiers, it is extremely difficult to
identify the individual sessions in the Web server logs reliably". Even though there
were some alternative attempts[Pirolli et al., 1996] to group server logs into sessions,
dividing the "number of users who clicked on an ad" on a web page by the "number of times the ad was
delivered" (impressions). For example, if a banner ad was delivered 100 times (impressions delivered)
and 1 person clicked on it (clicks recorded), then the resulting CTR would be 1 percent.
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none of them showed promising results.
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Figure 7.1: The NetMosaics data collection process.
Therefore, we developed a click fr aud detection system, NetMosaics, that uses both
server side data and client side data to better understand the context of the click,
while providing an easy platform to generate user sessions. Figure 7.1 shows the
high-level processing flow of the Net Mosaics system. In this system user sessions
are easily matched with a unique tracking number that is shared by both server
side and client side data. Robot generated traffic usually do not have client side
entries. Therefore, none of the bot traffic will be merged , and they will be left in the
server side log. The matched traffic is further analyzed by the

etMosaics system

for more suspicious activities to improve the quality of the incoming traffic. Only
t he improved matched traffic will be delivered to the Net Mosaics clients. What is
left in the server side is separately analyzed, which is the scope of this section, for
potential bot networks.
Our system has been collecting and analyzing click data continuously since it was
launched in 2004. While delivering higher quality traffic to our clients we periodically
analyze what is left in server side, which are mostly bot data, collectively to identify
unknown bots and their behavioral patterns.

Discovery of Smart ClickBot is a

result of such an attempt. One of our honeypot 3 servers was infected with the
3honeypot is a trap set to detect, deflect, or in some manner counteract attempts at una uthorized use
of information systems. Generally it consists of a computer , data, or a network site that appears to be
part of a network, but is actually isolated and monitored, and which seems to contain information or a
resource of value to attackers.
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Smart ClickBot. After the detection of the bot we were able to reverse engineer it
to obtain a copy.
Multiple copies of the isolated click bot is then installed and used to carry out
attacks in a controlled environment . Bot clicks are collected for a period of 7 days
from 3/3/2011 to 3/9/2011. 1000s of different IP addresses are generated through
proxy servers. Also, another 100s of referrer sites are used. Time between clicks
is varied randomly between 0 - 1000 seconds. They are configured to issue HTTP
clicks at www.thebestmusicsites.org, a Web site that we have designed, that has
both text and banner advertisement links. A bot is set to issues clicks between 0-5
in a given session. During the experiment, bot configurations are randomly changed
to maximize the diversity. This data set will be available publicly to researchers who
wants to test their click fraud detection systems against this new type of click bot.
Since Smart ClickBot has been developed with utmost care to not to be detected,
the techniques that we have developed may help to detect even other types of click
bots.

Client side
(Tracking
10)

Unmatched

Server side +
Client side

NetMosaics
Robot detection
and analysis
module

NetMosaics real
time click fraud
analysis system

Figure 7.2: Robot data collection process.

Figure 7.2 shows the high level view of the flow diagram for bot traffic isolation.
These isolated potential bot traffic is pre-processed to remove known bots. These
include search engine crawlers such as Coogle's googlebot, Yahoo!'s Yahoo slurp,
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and Bing's bingbot, known click bots such as Clickbot.A and Bahamabot. link
crawlers and news bots etc. For this purpose, we have used the data available at
[Database, 2011]. Top 10 of those filtered bots are shown in Table 7.1 with their
user agent and frequencies. Data what is left after filtering is then divided into
sessions based on the techniques explained in [Tan and Kumar, 2002].
Once the bot data is grouped into sessions, our main idea in the experiment is to
classify server side data into two classes: Class 1, and Class 2, where Class 1 will
have "clicks" originated from Smart ClickBot and everything else will belong to
the Class 2. For example, Class 2 may contain human clicks that do not accept
cookies or javascript in their devices or they may be clicks that has only server side
information due to an error in HTTP communication between server and client or it
may be even new software bots that are not discovered yet. Therefore the next step
is to experimentally derive the properties of each session that will distinguish clicks
in Class 1 from that of Class 2. Table 7.2 presents a summary of attributes that
can be derived from the sever sessions. Some of these features are temporal, while
some are binary. Extraction process of these features is discussed in the following
section.
2. Context Feature Extraction
~etMosaics

explores the distributed nature of stealthy attacks. Since click bots are

pre-configured, the generated traffic by them is usually similar in nature. NetMosaics leverages this property and aims to identify groups with similar activities.
(a) Periodicity of Smart ClickBot
\\leb robots, especially click bots, usually exhibit periodic behavior because
they are preset to activate after a certain time interval. At this point they
randomly select a (IP, referrer, user agent) combination from the predefined
lists and issue clicks in the form of HTTP requests. By observing the collected
data we have seen these lists are updated daily. Therefore we can assume the
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Table 7.1: Filtered UserAgents

I User

I Requests I

Agent

google.com

244

search.msn.com

149

Mozilla/5.0 (compatible YandexBot/3.0 http://yandex.com/bots)

120

yahoo.com

105

Sogou web spider/4.0( http://www.sogou.com/docs/)

79

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows

U

Windows NT 5.1

en

rv:1.9.0.13)

Gecko/2009073022
Firefox/3.5.2 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729) SurveyBot/2.3 (DomainTools)

55

Mozilla/5.0

42

(compatible

bingbot/2.0

http://www.bing.com/bingbot.htm)
Netcraft

32

whois.sc

21

values in the lists to be the same for at least 24 hour period. Previous studies of
Web robots also support the 24 hours threshold time[Tan and Kumar, 2002].
For each IP we extracted all requests originated within the past 24 hours. I3y
plotting the time activity (i.e. the active and inactive periods of time) of bot
processes issuing requests, we observed that several of them seem to exhibit,
at least partially, a periodic pattern. We investigated further this observation
and verified the periodicity for several IP addresses used by the Smart ClickBot
and estimated their time cycles.
For this task. we used the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The FFT maps a
function in the time fielel to a, complex in general, function in the frequency
field [Dikaiakos et al., 2005]. The idea is that by observing peaks of magnitude
in the frequency field we can easily conclude that time activity has periodicity.
The frequency coordinate of each possible peak is inversely proportional to the
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Table 7.2: Summary of attributes derived from the Server sessions.
Id I Attribute

~ arne

I

Remark

I Purpose

1

Periodicity

Periodicity of the attack

Feature

2

trackingIDs

Tracking IDs per IP

Feature

3

multiAgents

Unique user agents recorded per single IP

Feature

4

referrer Pattern

Referrer and IP distribution

Feature

5

HEAD

Page requests made with HEAD method

Classify

6

GET

Page requests made with GET method

Feature

7

POST

Page requests made with POST method

Feature

8

clickRate

Maximum clicks per session

Feature

9

Duration

Duration of session

Feature

10

imageRequests

Percentage of image requests

Feature

11

pdfjps

Percentage of pdfjps requests

Feature

12

4xx

Percentage of 4xx error responses

Feature

13

Robot.txt

Whether Robot.txt file accessed during the session

Classify

14

% proxy

Percentage of proxy servers used

Feature

time cycle of the periodicity. Since we are not interested in the phase of the
frequency plot, we illustrate the spectral density function, which is the square
of the magnitude of the FFT.
Before implementing the FFT, time is assumed to be sliced; we used a 30
second time interval (granularity). Ideally, the granularity should be as small
as possible, but we tried to keep the number of resulting points relatively small
for a faster FFT computation.
We count the requests issued from an IP address of interest in each time interval. Because our focus of interest at this stage is on the presence of some
periodic action, we assign the value of one to the intervals that have at least one
hit and the value of zero to the ones with zero hits. Consequently, we produce
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an ON-OFF signal that represents the Smart ClickBot's time activity for the
selected granularity. This signal is passed as input to the FFT function. The
resulting diagrams reveal a periodicity in the requests issued by IP addresses
belonging to the click bot; in some cases this phenomenon is rather intense.
Figure 7.3 presents the ON-OFF signal of an IP address. In Figure 7.4,
we plot the power spectral density function. FFT specifies the main periods
observed on that signal. For example, in Figure 7.3, we observe a periodic
behavior between 05: 15 - 08: 15, which corresponds to the peak of around 0.15
in the Figure 7.4.
Similar results arc observecl for couple of other IP addresses. We have not
seen similar patterns from IP addresses that do not belong to Smart ClickBot,
which were left in the server logs. We can therefore conclude that periodic
activity can be expected from the Smart ClickBot. Hence this feature will be
binary and for IPs that shows periodicity we assign a value 1, while the rest,
including some of Smart ClickBot IP addresses that does not show the same
behavior, are assigned O.
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Figure 7.3: ON-OFF Signal for an IP used by Smart ClickBot.

(b) Tracking ID per IP
The Net Mosaics system generates a 128bit unique tracking id (in the form of
a cookie) for every server side request. This tracking id is installed in the
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Figure 7.4: Power spectral density for an IP used by Smart ClickBot.
client's computer and will be incorporated with every revisit request to the
same website by the client in the next 24 hours. Usually software bots do
not accept these cookies. Therefore, they generate new tracking id for every
visit to the same website. Smart ClickBot is no different. It generated multiple
tracking IDs for the same IP and almost all of these IP addresses belong to free
proxy servers. Table 7.3 shows the summary of average number of tracking
IDs generated for a 24 hour period by the top 10 IP addresses used by the
Smart ClickBot. If the IP address does not belong to a proxy server we usually
treat it as a non software bot. For example it may be a human clicker, which
does not allow cookies to be installed or who deletes cookies every time the
sessIon

IS

over.

We also discovered a secondary property of these IP addresses, which has large
number of tracking IDs. We have seen that almost 90% of the time the same
set of IPs contain in all the lists of 24 hours. Even though we assumed they are
randomly picked, it seems that the bot has some preference to certain proxy
servers may be based on the level of animosity of the proxy.
We have also observed a unique pattern in the wagon wheel for visitor distribution. For example, in Table 7.3, day 1 corresponds to 24 hours while day 2
corresponds to visitors for 12 hour period. But the contribution from each IP
129

Table 7.3: Tracking ID per IP

IP Address

I day 1 II IP Address I day 2 I

200.29.216.146

88

115.248.202.21

49

187.4.128.12

85

208.253.158.6

40

190.203.69.69

81

187.11.201.164

39

221. 7.145.42

72

200.29.216.146

36

203.153.25.218

59

222.255.28.33

34

115.78.227.155

46

190.203.69.69

33

115.78.224.215

45

203.153.25.218

31

222.255.28.33

43

187.4.128.12

28

125.162.92.233

42

221. 7.145.42

26

190.128.218.90

40

89.187.142.113

21

looks alike, immaterial of the day or the number of hours observed. Figure 7.5
shows the wagon wheel distribution of visitors for those two days (day 1(left),
day 2(right)).

Figure 7.5: Frequency of TrackingID generation.
(c) User Agent per IP
User Agent identifies the type of browser someone is using to surf the Internet.
There is a favorite browser for all of us and at least we stick with it for a
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while. \Ve mark our favorites, bookmark certain websites, maintain history
etc. and it will be inconvenient for us to switch browsers. Therefore for a given
non-shared IP address variation of the user agent is minimal. User Agent is
not defined only for browsers. Even for all the legitimate software bots there
are unique user agents. They identify themselves as bots whenever visiting
websites if they are cooperative. Bots that are created to carryout fraudulent
activities use these user agents to mimic themselves as valid user agents. Smart
ClickBot seems to pick a user agent randomly from a pre defined list and does
not care about the history of user agents assigned to a particular IP. Therefore,
we have seen a large number of user agent values assigned for any given IP.
Sometimes the variation exceeds 50, and it is highly unlikely that somebody
who is legitimately browsing Internet has over 50 user agents.
Among this list, we have also found some outdated user agents. With normal
traffic these type of user agents are rarely reported but a higher percentage can
be seen with the traffic generated from the Smart ClickBot. Table 7.4 lists
few of these outdated user agents with its average request per 24 hours.
Table 7.4: Frequency of Outdated UserAgents
User Agent

I Frequency I

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 4.01: Windows 95)

39

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.01; Windows 95)

36

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 95)

33

l\Iozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; AOL 5.0; Windows 95; DigExt)

30

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 95; DigExt)

27

(d) Referrer and IP distribution
The referrer field is provided by HTTP protocol to allow a Web client (particularly. a Web browser) to specify the address of the Web page that contains
the link the client followed in order to reach the current requested page. Unas131

signed referrer field is often considered one of the most apparent characteristics
of Web robots [Lu and Yu, 2006]. As typical Web robots parse a page and build
up the list of pages to be visited, referrer field is frequently left blank. In interactive Web surfing environment, the field would contain the URL that led to
the current request. Our analysis reveals that such observation is generally, but
not always, true. Especially with the Smart ClickBot to avert the detection
they have randomly assign a referrer value. But since this list is concise we
have seen a pattern that pretty much every referring site is recorded the same
amount of referrals. This does not happen with human clicks and the variation
of referrals is usually high. Table 7.5 shows an example for a referral traffic
for the www.thebestmusicsites.org website within a 24 hour period.
Table 7.5: Frequency of top rcferrer sites
Referrer

I IP frequency I

http:/ /www.rcferrerl.edu/

30

http:/ /www.rcferrer2.com/

29

http://www.rcferrer3.com/

28

http:/ / www.rcferrer4.com/

27

http:/ /www.cecs.referrer5.edu/

27

http) /www.rcferrer6.com/

26

http) /www.referrer7.com/

26

http:/ /www.rcferrer8.C'om/

26

http:/ /www.rcferrer9.org/

23

http:/ /www.rcferrcrlO.com/

23

(e) Percentage of HEAD and GET Requests
Many suggest sessions containing a large number of HEAD requests as those
generated by web robots [Tan and Kumar, 2002, Dikaiakos et al., 2005]. For
example, if all the requests are made using the HEAD method, then the session
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is most likely created by a Web robot. Guidelines issued to web robot designers
strongly recommend that only HEAD method be used to minimize performance
impact on web servers. However. [Dikaiakos et al., 2005] reported that many
Web bots used HEAD method in less than half (e.g., 10 to 50%) of their
requests.

In our data, almost all (e.g., over 99.9%) the requests made by

Smart ClickBot used GET method. Therefore when the HEAD/GET request
percentage is high, we use this feature as a strong feature to separate non Smart
ClickBot requests from the server logs.
(f) Percentage of POST Requests
A POST request is used to send data to the server to be processed in some
way, like by a CGI script. It is highly unlikely that a Web bot sends POST
request to a Web server. Therefore, we can use this feature to isolate human
issued requests that are left in the server logs.
(g) 1Iaximum clicks in a session
A click is a request for an HTML file in a Web server. The "Maximum clicks
in a session" is a feature corresponds to the maximum number of such HTML
requests received within a certain time-window inside a session. The intuition
behind this feature is two fold:
1.

To isolate human clicks from bot clicks: there is an upper bound on the
maximum number of clicks that a human can issue within some specific
time-frame t, which is dictated by human factors. To capture this feature,
we first set the time-frame value of t and then use a sliding window of time

t over a given session in order to measure the maximum sustained click
rate in that session. For example, if we set t to 10 seconds and find that
the maximum number of clicks within some 10-second time-window inside
that session is 40, we conclude that the maximum sustained click rate is
4 clicks per second. This indicates a robot-like rather than a human-like
behavior. The sliding window approach starts from the first HTML request
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of a session and keeps a record of the maximum number of clicks within
each window, sliding the window by one HTML request until we reach the
last one of the given session. The maximum of all the clicks per window
gives the value of this feature.
ll.

To isolate Smart ClickBots from other software bots: Smart ClickBot can
issue 0 - n number of clicks during a session. But we have seen that for
every such click Smart ClickBot changes its IP address, tracking id, referrer, and the user agent. Therefore, there is no way to recognize all the
clicks belong to a one session. In the server logs all the clicks generated in
a session appears as several single click sessions. We can use this implementation drawback to recognize and isolate Smart ClickI30t clicks from
other type of software bots.

(h) Duration of session

Duration of session is the number of seconds that have elapsed between the
first and the last request. Crawler-induced sessions tend to have a much longer
duration than human sessions. Smart ClickBot can issue any number of clicks
during a session. But we have seen that for every such click it changes its IP
address, tracking id, referrer, and the user agent values. Therefore, there is
no way to recognize all the clicks belong to one session. In the server logs, all
clicks belong to one session, appear as multiple single click sessions. Therefore
for this feature, which is binary, sessions having only a single click caries value
0, while the rest carries value 1.

(i) Percentage of image requests
This feature denotes the percentage of requests to image files (e.g. jpg, gif).
An earlier study showed that crawler requests for image resources are negligible [Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009]. In contrast, human generated traffic
will have access records to images in a website, because all images are loaded
within the user session. Therefore, we can use this feature to differentiate 11U134

man generated traffic, that for some reason did not have client side activities,
from bot generated traffic. The percentage of requests seeking postscript(ps)
and pdf files is also a possible feature to use. But in our experiment we did
not consider this feature. Previous studies show that, in contrast to image
requests, some crawlers, tend to have a higher percentage of pdfjps requests
than humans[Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009].

(j) HTTP response codes
Web bots such as link validators and email harvestors may havc a higher proportion of 4xx error codes in their requests, as they arc blindly traversing the
web infrastructure. But, clicks from the Smart ClickBot should be very precise because these links are previously checked by humans before launching the
attacks, hence we expect fewer 4xx error codes. Human clickers may stand
between these two extreme ends because human users are able to recognize,
memorize and avoid erroneous links, unavailable resources and servers. Table
7.6 shows the percentages of response codes received from bot and non-bot
traffic for a 7 days period. We can clearly see that bot traffic has lesser 404
errors compared to non-bot traffic.
We can also expect lesser 304 response codes with Smart ClickBot traffic.
HTTP 304 response code is for "not modified". \Vith this message the web
server is basically telling the browser "this file has not changed since the last
time you requested it." If a client gets a 304 Not Modified message, then it
is the client's responsibility to display the resource in question from its own
cache. Since Smart ClickBot does not cache any information it usually gets only
HTTP 200 response codc. HTTP 200 is telling the browser "here is a successful
response," which should be returned when it is either the first time your browser
is accessing the file or the first time a modified copy is being accessed. Table
7.6 shows the differences in HTTP 200 and HTTP 304 response percentages.
(k) Robots.txt file request
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Table 7.6: Percentage of Bot vs. non-Bot HTTP response codes
Response code

Percentage

m

Bot

Percentage in non-Bot

traffic

traffic

200 - OK

97.0%

10.3%

304 - Not Modified

1.7%

80%

307 - l\Iovcd Temporarily

0%

2.9%

404 - Not Found

1.2%

6.7%

500 - Internal Server Error

0.1%

0.2%

The Robot Exclusion Standard, also known as the Robots Exclusion Protocol
or robots.txt protocol, is a convention to prevent cooperating web crawlers
and other web robots from accessing all or part of a website which is otherwise
publicly viewable. If a site owner wishes to give instructions to web robots they
must place a text file called robots. txt in the root of the web site hierarchy
such as www.thebestmusicsites.org/robots.txt. Robots that choose to follow
the instructions try to fetch this file and read the instructions before fetching
any other file from the web site. If this file does not exist web robots assume
that the web owner wishes to provide no specific instructions.
We made available the robot. txt file for the experimented website. If a request
to the robots. txt file was made during a session, we consider it as a strong
evidence to believe that the session belongs to a bot. However because compliance to the Robot Exclusion standard is voluntary, and many robots simply
do not follow the proposed standard, we can not totally rely on this criteria to
detect \Veb robots.
(1) Distribution of countries
Table 7.7 lists the top 20 countries that Smart ClickBot uses to generate IP
diversity. Even though highest number of proxy IPs are from the US, there is
a large amount proxy IPs recorded from Indonesia, Brazil, China, and India.
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Collectively their traffic is larger than the US alone. Since we have used an
experimental website to collect data, at this time we do not have enough traffic
to find out its actual (non-Robot ) country distribution. Therefore, we did not
include this as a feature, even though we will use it as soon as the information
is available.

.. Distribution of countries
Table 77'
Country

Requests

Visitors

Country

Requests

Visitors

United States

4249

824

Korea. Republic of.

423

81

Indonesia

3105

822

Spain

407

94

Brazil

2224

409

Austria

363

36

China

2148

367

South Africa

287

35

India

1121

85

Puerto Rico

271

35

Chile

912

63

Kenya

267

108

Vietnam

865

133

Croatia

262

36

Thailand

841

162

Singapore

256

48

Venezuela

618

106

Turkey

255

69

Russian Federation

429

216

Czech Republic

250

40

7.1.3

Classification of Bot traffic

After deriving the session features, classification models are built using the Bayesian Networks. We adopted the Bayesian approach due to many successful similar research that are
reported in the literature [Strayer et al., 2006, Strayer et al., 2008, Kondo and Sato, 2007J.

Figure 7.6: Bayesian Network as a classifier.
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Bayesian Networks [Friedman et al., 1997, Pearl, 1988] are directed acyclic graphs in
which the nodes represent multi-valued variables, comprising a collection of mutually
exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses. The arcs signify direct dependencies between the
linked variables and the direction of the arcs is from causes to effects. The strengths
of these dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities. More specifically, each
node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(XiIParents(Xi )) that quantifies the
effect of the parents on the node, where Parents(Xi ) denotes the parent variables of Xi.
This conditional probability distribution, which defines the conditional probability table
of the variable, describes the probability distribution of the variable for each configuration
of its parents. The graph encodes that each node is conditionally independent of its nondescendants, given its parents [Friedman et al., 1997].
Naive Bayes is a special case of a Bayesian network, where a single cause (the class)
directly influences a number of effects (the features) and the cause variable has no parents.
This network structure is shown in Figure 7.6. Again, the independence assumption
encoded by this model is that each feature is conditionally independent given the class
value.
Considering Figure 7.6, assume that Fl , F2 , ",}'n are n features and fi represents the
value of feature F i . Assume also that C is the class variable and let c represent a possible
value (label) of C. Using Bayes rule and the conditional independence assumption, we
can derive the posterior probability of each class label c E C, i.e. the probability of the
class label given the features observed, to be given by the formula:

P(clh, 12, "., fn) = P(c) rr~=l P(Jil c )
P(J1, f2, "., fn)

(7.1 )

The class variable C is assigned the label that gives the maximum posterior probability
given the features observed. More specifically:
n

class = argmaxcEcP(c)

II P(Jil c)

(7.2)

i=l

For Smart ClickBot detection we used one, similar to Bayesian Network structure
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shown in Figure 7.6. Each child node corresponds to one of the features we presented
earlier in section 7.1.2(2). The root node represents the class variable.

In the following section we present the experiments performed in order to apply our
methodology and evaluate the performance of the Smart ClickI30t detection system.

7.1.4

Experimental Results and Discussion

There are two main objectives in this experiment:(a) to use features described in section
7.1.2(2) to identify as many Smart ClickBot sessions as possible, (b) to find a good model

for predicting Smart ClickBot sessions based upon their access features.
We have collected 22991 server side clicks during the period from 3/3/2011 to 3/9/2011.
A human expert has labelled the entire data set so that it can be used for model evaluation. To build the classification model we have used the first 5000 samples. In this
training data set there were 4501 Smart ClickBot (Class 1) clicks and 499 non-Smart
ClickI30t (Class 2) clicks. Since class representation is not balanced, training the model
was a challenging ta!:lk. If a model is built using an imbalanced dataset, its characteristics
tend to be biased towards the majority class. Especially with the Naive Bayes classifier,
the prior probability in the majority class overshadows the differences that exist in the
conditional probability entries that quantify the relationship between feature and class
variables [Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos, 2009].
There are a few ways to compensate the imbalanced class distribution. We can use
techniques such as bagging and boosting or resampling. We used res amp ling as it was
used successfully in a similar study discussed in [Stassopoulou and Dikaiakos. 2009]. Resampling modifies the prior probabilities of the majority and minority class by changing
the records on each of the two classes. For this purpose we have used both random over
sampling and random under sampling. Over sampling is used with the minority class
(Class 2), while Under sampling is used with majority class (Class 1). Table 7.8 shows
the resampled data that we have used to build the classifiers (C 1 , C2 , C3 , C4 , and C5 ) along
with the new prior probability distributions. C1 is built with the original data set without
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resampling. Both

C2 and C3 are built with oversampling Class 2, while C4 and C5 are

built with under sampling Class l.
Tablc 7X Training data sct configuration
Data Set

Classifier

Class 1 Class 2 Prior Probabilities

1

C1

4501

499

(0.90, 0.10)

2

C2

4501

4501

(0.50, 0.50)

3

C3

4501

899

(0.83,0.17)

4

C4

2436

499

(0.83, 0.17)

5

C5

499

499

(0.50, 0.50)

We have tested the five Bayesian classifiers with the rest of the 17991 records. For the
evaluation purposes "Accuracy" is a reasonable metric but it has the underline assumption
that the data set remains evenly distributed i.e. between Class 1(Smart ClickBot), and
Class 2(non-Smart ClickBot). When equal class distribution is not present we can use

Precision and Recall to compare the models.

.. ()
no. of SmartClickBot sessions found correctly
P reczswn p = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - total no. of predicted SmartClickBot sessions

r
R eca ll()

no. of SmartClickBot sessions found correctly
total no. of actual SmartClickBot sessions

= -------------------

(7.3)

(7.4)

A classifier that assigns the value 1 to every session will have perfect recall but poor
precision. In practice, the two metrics are often summarized into a single value, called
the F 1-measure [Tan and Kumar, 2002].
The Fl scorc can bc intcrpreted as a weighted average of thc precision and recall. It
summarizcs thc two mctrics into a single valuc, in a way that both mctrics are given equal
importance. Recall and precision should therefore be close to each other, otherwise the
}l-measure yields a value closer to the smaller of the two. Fl score reaches its best value
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Table 7.9: Training data set configuration
Classifier

Precision

Recall

FImeasure

CI

0.921

0.824

0.869

C2

0.889

0.943

0.915

C3

0.939

0.827

0.879

C4

0.964

0.834

0.894

C5

0.834

0.953

0.889

~

Precision

~

Recall

~

F-Measure

1
,
0.95 1

""~"m~'Om,~'''"~

0.9
0.85
0.8

"

~

0.75
C1

C2

C3

C4

C5

Figure 7.7: Comparison of Bayesian Classifiers.
at 1 and worst score at O. Table 7.9 and Figure 7.7 show the Precision, Recall, and FI
measure obtained by the five classifiers.
All the Bayesian classifiers that we have tested achieved a precision of above 83%
and a recall of above 82%. Minimum FI measure of 87% was reported by CI , where the
training is done with the original data set without resampling. The obvious reason for
a low FI measure is the class imbalance, where the prior probability of a session to be
Smart ClickBot is as high as 0.90. A model trained with such a training data set is biased
towards Class 1.
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By over sampling Class 2 records for 0 3 , and by under sampling Class 1 records for
0 4 we have achieved a higher F 1-measure than that of 0 1 . In both of these cases we have
tried to increase the class representation of Class 2 records.
The best F1 measure is achieved by O2 which was trained using oversampling of Class
2 so that samples reach the number of Class 1 in the original set, hence leaving balanced
representation of classes.
In this experiment we have two cases where the class representation is equal. That is
with classifiers O2 and 0 5 . Training data for O2 is created by oversampling Class 2 records,
while training data for 0 5 is created by under sampling Class 1 records. A similar recall
values are reported by both O2 and 0 5 . However, there is a significant difference between
the precision values. Precision of 0 5 is 83%, while that of O2 is 89%. This means we have
an increase in the number offalse positives in 0 5 , i.e. Class 1 incorrectly classified as Class
2. The significant decrease in precision of 0 5 , is not surprising since, with random under
sampling there is no control over which examples are eliminated from the original set.
Therefore significant information about the decision boundary between the two classes
may be lost. This is always a risk with random oversampling where it would do overfitting due to placing exact duplicates of minority examples from the original set and thus
making the classifier biased by "remembering" examples that were seen many times.

7.2

Fast Detection of Duplicates

An important issue in defending click fraud is how to deal with duplicate clicks. If we
simply consider all identical clicks as fraudulent clicks, it is unfair to advertisers in some
scenarios such as that an interested client visits the same ad link several times a day.
On the other hand, if the advertisers are charged for any identical clicks, then it is very
easy for an attacker to make money by continuously clicking the same ad link. However,
it is very difficult to identify which scenario the identical clicks belong to. A reasonable
countermeasure is to prescribe that identical clicks will not count if they are within short
time interval, and will count if they happen sparsely. Therefore, a feasible duplicate
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detecting algorithm should have a mechanism that is able to eliminate unrelated (or
expired) information.
On the other hand. users of a practical click fraud detection solution expect these
duplicate detection mechanisms to run in realtime. In order to provide real time results,
solution providers should utilize a data structure that can be updated in real time. In
addition, If the actual volume of clicks (per unit time) is high, space requirements per
click should be the lowest possible thus data structures with constant space requirements
or sublinear space requirements such as O(log(n)) or O(log(log(n))) are desirable (n is the
number of elements processed).
In this section, we consider the problem of detecting duplicates in click data streams.
Our solution uses a modified version of the Counting Bloom Filter. The Temporal Stateful
Bloom Filter (TSBF) extends the standard Counting Bloom Filter by replacing the bitvector with an array of counters of states. These counters are dynamic and decay with
time.

7.2.1

Data Stream Model

We consider a data stream, including click stream, as a sequence of numbers, denoted
by C N

=

Xl, X2, X3, ... , XN:

where N can be infinite, which means that the stream is not

bounded. In general, a stream can be a sequence of records, but it is not hard to transform
each record to a number and use this stream model.
Our problem can be stated as follows: given a click data stream CN and a certain amount of memory space, !'vI, estimate whether each element
Xl, X2, X3, ... , XN

Xi

in SN appears in

or not. Since our assumption is that M is not large enough to store all

distinct elements in

Xl, X2, X3, ... , XN,

there is no way to solve the problem precisely. Our

goal is to approximate the answer and

minimi~e

the false positives, where false positive

is a distinct element wrongly reported as a duplicate.
To address this problem we examine two techniques that have been previously used
in different contexts, namely the Buffering method and Bloom filters [Song et al., 2005,
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Talbot and Osborne, 2007, Cuenca-Acuna and Xguyen, 2010].

7.2.2

Buffering Methods for duplicate detection

A straightforward solution, to detect duplicates, is to allocate a buffer and fill the buffer
with enough elements of the stream. For each new element, the buffer can be checked,
and the element may be identified as a distinct if it is not found in the buffer, and as a
duplicate otherwise. I3uffer can be implemented in many different ways including hash
table approaches. Traditional approaches for duplicate detection using hash table based
solutions are discussed in [Elmagarmid et al., 2007].
A hash table is made up of two arrays. First, the actual table where the data to be
searched is stored, and second, a set of mapping functions known as hash functions is
stored. The hash function is a mapping from the input space to the integer space that
defines the indices of the array. In other words, the hash function provides a way for
assigning numbers to the input data such that the data can then be stored at the array
index corresponding to the assigned number. We will explain this further with an example
related to Figure
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Figure 7.8: Storage of IP addresses in a Hash table.

First, we start with a hash table array of strings (we'll use strings as the data being
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stored and searched in this example). Let's say the hash table size is 9. In order to insert
the IP address "98.34.12.112·· we run "98.34.12.112" through the hash function, and find
that hash("98.34.12.112", 9) yields 5. We insert IP "98.34.12.112" into the 5th index
of the hash table. If the same IP address is visited again, since the hash table already
contains the IP. then a signal for a duplicate will be returned.
Since the indices of the output range is a predefined number (in this case 9), different
IP addresses will be rnapped to the same index. In order to hold more than one item in
one location the strings are stored as a linked list. This is often called chaining. Chained
hash tables have the disadvantages of linked lists. It can be wasteful on rnernory, as
many of array positions might contain empty linked lists. \\Then storing small keys and
values, the space overhead of the next pointer in each entry record can be significant.
An additional disadvantage is that traversing a linked list has poor cache performance,
making the processor cache ineffective. The biggest disadvantage is the cost of the linked
list manipulation when strings are associated with expiring information. For example
update of IP addresses which are older than two minutes.
In this method, each distinct elernent will be mapped to a new location and it is
inevitable that size grows tremendously if the stream carries too many distinct elements.
Therefore this approach can be directly applied only to applications where there are a
few distinct elements. For series with rnore duplicates, such as IP number strearn, a
proper replacernent mechanism should be utilized. This mechanism will evict the least
important element frorn the buffer and replace with the new element. When the buffer
is full, a newly arrived elernent may replace another element out of the buffer before it is
stored. Broder et al. [Broder et al., 2003] discussed 5 different replacernent policies which
are briefly discussed here.
(a) Clairvoyant (MIN): This method was introduced by Belady et al. [Belady, 2010].
They showed that if the entire sequence of requests is known in advance, then the
best strategy is to evict the item, which is the one whose next request is farthest
away in time.

145

(b) Least Recently Used (LRU): The LRU algorithm evicts the item that has not been
requested for the longest time. The intuition for the LRU is that an item that has
not been needed for a long time in the past will likely not be needed for a long time
in the future.
(c) CLOCK: CLOCK is a popular approximation ofLRU. It was invented by Cobato et
al.[Corbato, 1968]. An array of mark bits Mo, M l , ... , Mk corresponds to the items
currently in the buffer of size k. The array is viewed as a circle, that is, the first
location follows the last. A clock handle points to one item in the buffer. When
a request X arrives, if the item X is in the buffer, then its mark bit is turned on.
Otherwise, the handle moves sequentially through the array, turning the mark bits
off, until an unmarked location is evicted and replaced by X.
(d) Random Replacement: Random replacement completely ignores the past. If the
item requested is not in the buffer, then a random item from the buffer is evicted
and replaced.
(e) Static: In this method, it is assumed that each item has a certain fixed probability of
being requested. This probability is independent of the previous history of requests.
An item is evicted, at any point in time to maximize the probability of an item
found in the buffer.
·We chose LRU mechanism as the replacement policy for Buffer implementation due
to the fact that newly arrived clicks have least impact on oldest clicks. We will use this
method in our experiments and compare its performance with the Bloom Filter based
methods introduced in Section 7.2.4 and the proposed method which will be introduced
in Section 7.2.5.

7.2.3

Bloom Filters for Duplicate Detection

Even with a replacement mechanism Buffering method requires enormous space because
each element has to be stored. Therefore it is not suitable for applications with stream
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data. To overcome this drawback, we have researched a closely associated data structure
known as Bloom Filters [Bloom, 1970]. Bloom filters have been used extensively in networking applications (see [Reynolds and Vahdat, 2003, Broder and Mitzenmacher, 2004,
Li et al., 2000, Kumar et al., 2006, Ilowstron and Druschel, 2001, Fan ct aL 2000], and
[Est an and Varghese, 2003]) because they enable both high speed and low cost implementation of various hardware algorithms. A Bloom filter is essentially a compact representation of a set. Standard exact representations of sets such as hash tables and binary
trees requires at least L bits per element to be stored, where L is the size of the element,
and often requires additional space for pointers. By contrast, a Bloom filter is an inexact
representation of a set that allows a few "false positives" when queried. In return, it allows
very compact storage: roughly 10 bits per element for a 1% false positive probability. It
also has a constant space requirement, which is independent of the size of the element in
the set or the size of the set itself [I3onomi et al., 2006].
Inspired by these properties, we have developed a solution to detect duplicates in
a click stream, based on modified Bloom filters and it is now a part of our real time
click fraud detection and prevention solution available at http://www.netmosaics.com.
Implementation details of the system are discussed in [Kantardzic et al., 2010b], and
[Walgampaya et al., 2010]. This work is primarily motivated by the tradeoff between
space usage and accuracy of the existing duplicate detection systems. In section 7.2.4 we
start with a brief discussion about the Bloom filter and its variants including Counting
Bloom Filters and Temporal Stateful Bloom Filters. Experimental results are given in
section 7.2.G, while rdated work are discussed in section 7.2.6.

7.2.4

Bloom Filter and Its Variants

(a) Classical Bloom Filter Bloom filter (BF) was proposed by Burton Bloom in 1970 and
used for space-efficient data structures that maintain a very compact inventory of the
underlying data, supporting membership queries over a given data set [Bloom. 1970].
The space requirements of Bloom Filters fall significantly below the information
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theoretic lower bounds for error-free data structures. This efficiency is at the cost
of a small false positive rate (items not in the set have a small probability of being
recognized as in the set), but have no false negative (items in the set are always
recognized as being in the set). BFs are widely used in practice when storage is at
a premium and an occasional false positive is tolerable [Cheng et al., 2005].
A BF is a bit array, v of size m, and all of which are initially set to 0 (See Figure
l(a)). For each element(key 1, key 2, etc.), k bits in BF are set to 1 by a set
of hash functions {h1(x), h2 (x), h3(X), ... ,hk(x)}, all for which are assumed to be
independently uniform. It is possible that one bit in BF is set multiple times, while
only the first setting operation changes 0 into 1, and the rest have no effect on that
bit (Figure l(b) and l(c)). To know whether a newly arrived element Xi has seen
before, we can check the bits {h1(Xi), h2 (Xi), h3(Xi), ... ,hk(Xi)}. If anyone of these
bits is zero, with 100% confidence we know Xi is a distinct element. Otherwise, it
is regarded as a duplicate with a certain probability of error. An error may occur
because it is possible that the cells {h1(Xi), h2 (Xi), h3(Xi), ... ,hk(Xi)} are set before
by elements other than Xi [Deng and Rafiei, 2006].
Vector v
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(b)

(c)

Figure 7.9: A Classical Bloom Filter

The salient feature of BFs is that there is a elear tradeoff between m and the
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probability of a false positive,

Perror'

Observe that after inserting n keys into a table

of size m, with k number of hash functions, the probability that a particular bit is
still 0 is exactly

(7.5)
Hence the probability of a false positive,
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in which case it becomes
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Some example theoretical values for

Perror

for combination of min and

k

given in Table 7.10 and Figure 7.10 shows the graph for variation of

min

Perror

with

and k.

Obviously,

min

values are

Perror

is at a minimum when

min

~

20 for any value of

k.

But higher

yields sparse Bloom filter, which indeed waste a lot of memory. Therefore,

now it becomes a tradeoff between
configuration.

~That

min,

really means by

cells in the Bloom filter. When

and k, when selecting the best possible

min?

It actually indicates number of vacant

min is high the bloom filter has more slots to occupy

and chance of a false positive will be low. When

min

decreases it indicates that

the bloom filter is reaching its full capacity, and chance of a false positives in this
case will be high. On the other hand, if the number of hash functions, k is low,
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Table 7.10: Variation of P error

and if

min is

case when

I min I

k

I

4

1

0.2212

4

2

0.1548

6

4

0.0560

8

6

0.0216

12

8

0.0031

16

10

0.0004

16

11

0.0004

P error

I

low then there is a high chance for a false positive. But in the same

min

increases then

PerrOT

decreases. Since

n,

which is the number of

clements present in the Bloom filter at a given time depends on the application, if
we want a bigger

min,

the only possibility is to increase the size of the Bloom filter

(m). But then this will lead to unnecessary memory wastage. Therefore it is at
utmost importance to define the ideal Bloom filter configuration for any practical
application. In section 7.2.6, we discus in detail the procedure of selecting an ideal
values for m and k for our application.

0.8

0.6
0.4
0.2

Figure 7.10: Variation of P error with
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min and

k.

Although BF is simple and space efficient, it does not allow deletions. Deleting elements from a BF cannot be done simply by changing them back to zeros, as a single
bit may correspond to multiple elements. Therefore, in the data stream environment, if we apply I3F for detecting duplicates, when more and more new clements
arrive, the fractions of zeros in BF will decrease continuously, and the false positive
rate will increase accordingly, and finally reach the limit one. At this time every
distinct element will be reported as duplicate, indicating that BF fails completely.
'We call such a state of the BF as "full" [Shen and Zhang, 2008]. For the purpose of
allowing deletion of stale elements, Counting Bloom Filter (CBF) was proposed by
Fan et. al.[Fan et al., 2000]. Following section describes the functionality of CBF
that enables deletion of elements.
(b) Counting Bloom Filter
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Key

o
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3

(b)

(c)

Figure 7.11: Counting Bloom Filter

A CI3F uses an array of m counters, C, which replaces the bit vector v in the I3F
(see Figure 7.11(b)). The counters in C represent multiplicities of elements; all the
counters in C are initially set to O. When inserting an item, we increase the counters
by 1 as shown in Figure 7.11 (c). Also, deletion can now be safely performed with
decrementing the counters by 1. A BF can be derived from a CBF by setting all
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non-zero counters to one. Size of the counters must be chosen large enough to avoid
overflow although from the following proof we can safely limit the size of counters
to 4 bits [Gonnet and Baeza-Yates, 1991].
The asymptotic expected maximum count after inserting n keys with k hash functions into a bit array of size m is:

(7.9)
and the probability that any count, c, is greater or equal to i is:

Pr(max(c)

~

nk) 1
enk .
i):S: m ( . -i:S: m(_._)l
~
m
~m

(7.10)

From equation (7.10), the optimum value for k is ln2~, assuming k <ln2~, we
have,

Pr(max(c)

~

i)

eln2 .

:s: m(-. )l

(7.11)

~

Table 7.11 shows some sample values for the variation of probability that a counter
is greater than i bits.
Table 7.11: Variation of Perror

I Bits Per Count I Pr(max(c»i)
10- 15 x m

4

1.368

3

9.468 x 10- 06 x m

2

4.923 x 10- 02 x m

1

1.884 x m

X

Therefore, for any practical value of m, with 4 bits per counter the chances of
overflow will be very small [Fan et al., 2000].
Selecting the deletion mechanism for CBF sometimes depends on the practical application. Because the definition of expired data in one application may not be
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suitable for another application. For example, in a click duplicate detection application, two clicks are considered duplicates if they occur within a threshold time
interval. If not, they are considered distinct. Therefore, at the end of the threshold
interval counters should be adjusted. If x is the threshold time to decide if two dicks
from the same IP arc duplicates, at every x minutes counters can be decremented
by 1. In this case the deletion mechanism can be represented as a step function.
There are numerous other decaying functions discussed in the literature. Following
section discusses few other popular decaying functions and their properties.
(a) Time Decaying Counters Time sensitivity of data is important in many traditional and emerging applications. For example in medical applications current
data may have much weight to the decisions taken while in web tracking and
personalization applications recommendations are generated considering the
recent history. However, in many of these applications, older data items are
less significant than more recent ones, and thus should contribute less or not
at all to current decisions. This is because the characteristics or "state" of the
data generator may change over time, and, for an application such as prediction of future behavior or resource allocation, the most recent behavior should
be given a larger weight [Cohen and Strauss, 2006].
Time sensitivity can be formalized in a variety of ways. We may only consider
elements that fall within a sliding window of recent time (last one hour), and
ignore (assign zero weight) any that are older; or, more generally, use some
arbitrary function

f

that assigns a weight to each element as a function of its

age [Zhang et al., 2009]. In this research we have adapted the later method
where counters in the CBF are defined using a time decaying function.
The manner of how a counter decays with time is determined by a special
non-increasing, non-negative function, called the time decaying function (tdf).
Any tdf should satisfy the following conditions:
i. 4>(0)

=1
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11.

111.

¢(t) is non-increasing

o:s: <p (t) :s: 1 for all t 2

0

Figure 7.12 shows three different tdfs, exponential, linear, and step. Since
our application investigates whether a new click is a duplicate or not (nothing
in between) the counters should not keep residues over time. Therefore our
counters are implemented using the step time decaying function. It decrements
every non zero counter by 1 at every predefined time interval( to). to is defined
as the time threshold where two clicks from the same IP are not considered as
duplicates if they occur closely.
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Figure 7.12: Decay functions.

Even though CBF provides a very simple approach to count the duplicates in
a stream, we cannot directly use it because of the following reason. Consider
the five scenarios shown in Figure 7.13. Horizontal axis corresponds to time
and indicators on top of the time axis corresponds to deletions from the CnF,
while indicators in the bottom of the time axis corresponds to insertions into
the CBF. For simplicity we assume deletions occur at regular time intervals.
This is shown with equal gaps between deletion indicators in Figure 7.13. On
the other hand insertions occur randomly, which is the usual case in practical
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applications. If two clicks land between two deletions, we consider them to be
duplicates. Therefore case 1, and case 2 are not considered duplicates but case
3, and case 5 are considered duplicates. If we strictly follow this rule case 4
will be considered as non-duplicates, while case 5 will be considered duplicates,
even though both should be considered as duplicates because the time interval
between clicks in case 4, and case 5 are miniscule. This scenario occurs due
to small time interval 6t between consecutive insertions. This situation can be
expected more often in click stream data because clicks can occur very close
to each other. For example the time between a double click from the same IP
address may be very small. We want our system to consider both case 4 and
case 5 to be duplicates. Therefore we have slightly modified the ordinary CBF,
where it's counters C will contain status information instead of counters.
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Figure 7.13: Real time Insertions and deletions in a click stream.

(b) Status information We represent the status information as an array with the
values in the range S : [1, V], where V represents the maximum number of
states.

This is depicted in Figure

7.14(a). The value V depends on the

requirements of the application. Following is an example for the status vector
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S, when V = 3, in a duplicate clicks detection system, and the unique situations
define by each state.
1.

1: Partially deleted, indicates that it is possible the same click has seen
prior to two deletions. (It is only probable because the state can be changed
by a different click, if it is mapped to the same location)

11.

2: Recently seen, indicates that the click may have occurred between the
new click and the last deletion.

iii. 3: Never seen

4,

indicates that either the clicks is never seen or it has

expired.

o
Status
Vector (S)

o
o
o

o

o
1
Key 1

2

o
o

3

1

2

3

o
Key 2

2

3

o

1

2

(a)

(c)

hk

1

Figure 7.14: Modified Counting Bloom Filter with status information.

(c) Temporal Statcful Bloom Filter In this section, we describe our Temporal Statcful
Bloom Filter (TSBF). Again the underline structure is similar to CBF, where counters are decayed with time. TSBF cells are neither bits nor counters but instead a
value corresponding to the state. A TSBF consists of,
(a) An array of m counters, {GI , G2 , G3 , ... , Gm }, where each counter Gi is replaced
with the status vector, S.
4There is no difference between having 0 and having 3 in the bloom filter except that when it is 0, we
know that cell is never touched.
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(b) A set of independent k hash functions {hI, h2' h3, ... , hd defined for the range

[1..m]
(c) A time decaying step function </J( t)
The TSBF carries out the following insertion, lookup and modify tasks.
( a) Ins ertion: If the cell counter is 0, set the count to 2. If the cell value equals 1,
set the count to 2 (Figure 7.14(b)).
(b) Lookup: Check all cells associated with the insertion. If all cell values are either
1 or 2, then it is a duplicate.
(c) Modify: When decaying function </J(t) decreased to the threshold level adjust
the cells accordingly. If the current status value is 2, change the cell value to
1. If the current status value is 1, change the cell value to 3. This is illustrated
in Figure 7.14( c).
We call the first and second operations the duplicate detection process, and the
third operation the update process.

7.2.5

Experimental Results and Discussion

In order to evaluate the proposed methodology for duplicate detection in dick streams,
we ran a comprehensive set of experiments, especially because it is now a part of a
commercial system.www.NetMosaics.com. that provides solutions for click fraud. The
experiments used both synthetic and actual data. Actual click stream data are collected
in the servers at the www.NetMosaics.com. Each click record contains several server side
and client side parameters, as well as user activities during the each session.
The integrated structure of a click record which includes all context information is
shown in Figure 7.15. There are two unique identifiers available for each click. The IP
and the TrackingID. IP is the IP address of the origin of the click. TrackingID is an 128
bit long globally unique identifier generated by the Net Mosaics servers. We have used IP
as the identifier for each dick, but the 128 bit tracking number can also be used instead.
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Figure 7.15: Structure of the click record.

When a new click is arrived we first calculate the corresponding hash value of the IP
address. The hash functions are developed by first calculating the MD5 signature 5 of the
IP address [Menezes et al., 1997], which yields 128 bits, then dividing the 128 bits into

m/k number of groups, and taking the modulus of each m/k bit word by the table size
m.
Initially, all counters in the TSBF are set to zero.

When usmg TSBF to detect

duplicate clicks, for each newly arrived click, we execute the following three operations in
order.
(a) The IP is mapped to k counters by some uniform and independent hash functions.
(b) Change the status value in the hashed locations by according to the Insertion function defined above. If the IP is a duplicate, it can be determined by probing whether
all the k counters, hashed to are all 18 or 28.

(c) At a predefined time interval to change the status of all the non-zero cells according
to the Modify function defined above.

7.2.6

Accuracy of the Bloom Filter

Ordinary Bloom filters are discussed in literature for duplicate detection m streaming
data [Shen and Zhang, 2008, Deng and Rafiei, 2006, Metwally et al., 2005bj. Since the
5 a lso

called as MD5 hash. It is a 128 bits long number. It is calculated from the contents of the string

being read. Once the entire string is read, the bytes combined numerically via a special algorithm and
the result is the MD5 hash. The algorithm for the calculation of that number is designed to be relatively
quick to compute, and, perhaps more importantly, very unique.
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architecture of the proposed TSBF is based on ordinary Bloom filter we have experimented
BF on a streaming data series. There are three parameters that define the performance
of a BF , i.e. m, n , and k.
The streaming data series is a set of unique IP addresses that are generated randomly.
This will enable to find out the variation of true positives in a BF, which is the only type
of error found in BF. True positives are always created by unique elements, where it is
reported as a duplicate. We have selected m = 4096 , and varied both sample size (n)
and number of hash functions used (k). We have varied n from 100 to 3000. Figure 7.16
shows the variation of false positives. Legend shows the variation of the number of hash
functions.
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Figure 7.16: False positives in BF with m = 4096.

All the bits in the BF are initially set to zero. As new elements arrive they are mapped
to proper indexes by k hash functions and the corresponding bit is turned to 1. Since I3F
does not have a deletion mechanism , as new elements arrived, the percentage of zeros will
decrease. This will cause false positive rates to increase. In Figure 7.16 , when the number
of samples reached about 1000, the false positives increases drastically. For example when

n = 1000, there are 70 false positives, with k = 8. i.e. an error rate of almost 7%. If
we use 3 hash functions instead of 8 the error rate reduced to 3% , which is the minimum
achievable at this settings. If somebody wants to operate at this level then a deletion
mechanism should be executed at this level in order to maintain the percentage of Os in
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the BF. Otherwise, for smaller error rates, a BF with different set of parameters should
be chosen. Figure 7.17 shows BF configurations with lesser error rates. Legend shows
the variation of the number of hash functions.
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Figure 7.17: BF configurations with at most 10% False positives.

In Figure 7.17 despite the value of k, false positives increase when number of incoming
samples goes beyond 500. In this region except k = 1, and k = 2 false positive rate is less
than 1%. Therefore, for the rest of the experiments whenever we configure a BF k is set
to 4.
If only four states(i.e. v

= 4) are used in the TSBF , only 2 bits are required to present

all the information. In this case, four states can be one in the set 00 , 01,10 , 11. Compare
to the ordinary BF this requires as twice as much memory. But ordinary BF does not
support deletions , and TSBF is able to support deletions with an addition of one extra
bit in each cell. When compared with standard CBF, TSBF requires only half the space
or less with the same false positive probability, and it appears as simple or even simpler
to put into practice. (In Table 7.11, we have showed that optimum requirement of bits
per cell for CBF is 4).
Next set of experiments are conducted using the proposed TSBF approach to compare
the performance when detecting duplicates. First , We conducted experiments on streams
of synthetic data to illustrate how the theoretical and practical error rates vary with the
number of hash functions. Error rate introduced in equation 7.6 is used as an approx-
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imation for t he t heoretical error rate in TSBF. We used a synthetic stream of 100,000
clicks without any duplicates. Since all clicks are distinct, any duplicates detected by the
TSBF will be erroneous. We have calculat ed the error rat e as the percentage of duplicates
detected per total clicks encountered. We have simulated the incoming clicks stream by
randomly allowing 100

*n

(where 1 ::; n ::; 1000) records to be processed between any

deletion period (i. e. before any click expired in the batch). Figure 7.18 shows the results
when n

= 1000 (i. e. 1000 clicks are processed before deleting any record). We have seen

similar results for all n values of the data sets.
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= 1000.

The graphs in Figure 7.18 shows how the error rate decreases as the number of hash
functions increases for the same BF configuration (i.e. for same m). The theoretical
error rate of BF shown in equation 7.6 is only an approximation. Therefore, we have
experimentally found out whether the assumption is safe to continue the experiments.
We have seen that t he actual error rate is always less than the theoretical error rate, and
it is almost negligeable when we use 4 or more hash functions.
From equation 7. 6, we have Perror ::::; (1 - e -::.n)k. Figure 7.19 shows the variation of
Perror with t he exponent ( -!n). It is required that for better performance of the TSBF

either kn ::; m or k ::; min. This shows clearly the t radeoff between space and error rate
in the TSBF. The more hash functions used in TSBF , the larger the required space and
t he smaller the probability of producing errors. However , since the space usage of TSBF
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is a constant , the number of hash functions should be chosen adequately to satisfy the
above requirement.
In the next experiment we have looked at the variation of error rate with the space
usagc(i.c. min), which gives us the flexibility to select a better size for m of our TSBF.
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Figure 7.20: min vs. False Positive Rate for n=1000 .

Figure 7.20 shows the variation of false positive rate with the ratio min for the
data set size n = 1000. When t he min ratio is less than 5, false positive rate decreases
drastically. In this region it is important to see that higher the number of hash functions
used , higher the false positive rate is. Even though we expect the error to go down with
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number of hash functions, due to the compactness of the array, the probability that a
counter , in the BF in this area, is 1 is high. Therefore false positive rate increases. This
phenomena gradually decreases after min is 5. It is almost negligeable when the min
ratio is greater than 10.
When the TSBF is launched in an actual situation, the si:te of the BF (m) will be fixed .

n which is the approximate number of clicks per unit time is also almost a constant,
which varies predictably. For example in a given web server average number of clicks
per unit time is usually known , which we refer to as baselines in our previous papers
[Walgampaya et al., 2010 , Kantardzic et al., 2010b].

Therefore the only parameter we

can vary is the number of hash functions. When the value of n is found based on practical
experiences, we have to carry out sample runs with different values for m, and k to find
the best possible configuration for TSBF. For example Figure 7.21 shows the variation of
number of false positives with the number of hash functions , for an approximate incoming
click rate of 300 per unit time.
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We have varied m with the values 512,1024, 2048 , and 4096 (these numbers are selected
only for experimental purposes) in this experiment. In Figure 7.21 , when m

= 512, and

n = 300, as the number of hash functions(k) increases the number of false positives also
increases after k ~ 3. But when the BF size(m) grows, the compactness (min) of the BF
reduces, so does the false positives with increasing number of hash functions .
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7.2.7

Experiments with real world data

The data which will be used for the experiments to follow comes from the paid traffic
of two very different websites. All of our experiments use click data from Hosting.coms
website. Hosting.com is a global company which provides hosting solutions to "business
critical data assets" as explained on their website. We also created thebestmusicsites.org,
a single webpage only displaying advertisements. It was created to attract fraudulent
traffic. Currently we have data for Aug. 2007 to June 2008 for Hosting.com and Jan.
2007 to Aug. 2007 for thebestmusicsites.org. Traffic was filtered before being run through
the outlier detection module. First, only paid traffic is being monitored. This includes
ads run on search results and network partners of Google, Yahoo, and Bing. Next, we
removed all known robots from the traffic. A known robot is a robot that declares itself
in the user agent field. Known robots are generally removed from paid traffic before an
account is charged.
Duplicate detection is first tested with an ordinary buffering implementation as discussed in Section 7.2.4. We have used a linked list to implement the buffer because of
its simplicity. In this experiment we considered two clicks are duplicates if they occurred
within a two minute time interval. Accordingly the buffering approach compares the time
stamps between IPs for two minute threshold, if an incoming IP is already recorded in
the buffer. This threshold time interval is chosen only for experimental purposes, and
duplicates detected in more finer intervals are discussed later in the experiments.
Buffering techniques are popular in applications where there are less number of distinct
elements in the data. For example if we expect data from only w (for example 5) data
sources, then for each incoming record there will be w comparisons in the worst case. Since
the number of elements to store are small, the size of the Buffer does not grow beyond w.
Therefore, we do not have to delete old elements to make space for new incoming elements.
In such situations implementing the duplicate detection using I3uffering mechanism may
be an easy option. We also tested the I3uffering without any deletion or replacement
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mechanism. We have done this to investigate 6 whether the requests are reaching from
the same set of IPs. If the requests always come from a manageable set of IPs our work
will be much easier. But we have realized that the size of the buffer grows exponentially
immediately after deployment.
Table 7.12 shows the duplicates detected by the buffering mechanism along with the
approximate size of the buffer. It also shows the duplicates detected by the proposed
method, TSBF, and its constant space requirement over time.
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Figure 7.22: Comparison of Memory Usage.

Since we do not lose any information in the buffering mechanism (in the case without
replacements) we can safely assume that there are no errors in the duplicate detection.
So that we can compare the accuracy and the memory usage of TSBF with the same data
set, which had more than 50,000 dicks. For the TSI3F we have used m = 256, k = 4 with
ueletion cycle executing every 120 seconus.
As shown in Table 7.12, number of duplicates detected by the both Buffering and
TSBF are almost the same even though there are few discrepancies in the later rows of
the table. In the rows where there are mismatches, TSBF always reported more duplicate
clicks. This is mostly due to the False Positives in our method and buffering do not have
GThe reason for our hypothesis is that we had several software filters that filters obvious invalid
requests. For example since the advertisements in these websites are shown only to the US customers
these filters do not allow requests from other IPs except those inside the US.
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Table 7.12: Comparison of different methodologies for duplicate detection in a click stream
Clicks

Pro-

Duplicates Detected

ex: Memory Used

TSBF Accuracy (%)

cessed
Buffering

TSBF

Buffering

TSBF

10

5

5

20

256

100

50

27

28

68

256

96.3

75

40

41

108

256

97.5

100

53

54

144

256

98.1

200

105

107

292

256

98.1

300

168

170

408

256

98.8

400

247

249

464

256

99.2

500

303

305

604

256

99.3

750

444

448

904

256

99.1

lOOO

590

594

1164

256

99.3

2000

1251

1261

2020

256

99.2

3000

1881

1890

2996

256

99.5

4000

2569

2584

3828

256

99.4

5000

3115

3134

4872

256

99.4

10000

5939

5976

10124

256

99.4

20000

11168

11222

14320

256

99.5

30000

16385

16445

17540

256

99.6

40000

21449

21523

21524

256

99.6

50000

22332

22428

28500

256

99.6
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false positives. False positives occur when an distinct element is wrongly reported as a
duplicate. In the Bloom Filter approach this error is inherited and we can minimize it
with utilizing a bigger size Bloom Filter. But, since the error rate is under 1% on average,
we allow that to occur to enjoy the other benefits from using a BF.
With the use of the status vector in the TSBF approach it is possible to

minimi~ed

the

false negative errors. False negatives occur when duplicate element are wrongly identified
as distinct. In order to identify a duplicate as a distinct, if an ordinary bloom filter is
used, at least one of the mapped bit positions of the vector must have a zero. Those bit
positions may have been changed by an operation associated with the another deletion,
because same bit position can be shared by few other elements. In contrast, if the TSBF
is used, the deletion in the shared bit position will be changed from "recently seen" to
"partially seen" to "unseen". Therefore, when the new element arrives, instead of a 0,
it will have "partially seen'· status, which will help to correctly identify the new clement
as a duplicate. The ability of TSBF to keep this history information will eliminate the
possibility for a false negative. If more values for the status vector are used it is possible to
totally eliminate the false negatives. Therefore, in this experiment we assume that there
are no false negatives present in the TSBF. The Buffering without replacement does not
have either false negatives or false positives. So, the difference in the duplicates detected
are solely due to the false positives in the TSBF. The average false positive rate from the
experiment is less than 1% but we consider 1% false positive rate for TSBF that will be
used in the experiments to follow.
After this results we have reached to two conclusions. First, for our application if
one wishes to use a buffering technique then he/she must utilize a replacement method.
Second, we can use a TSBF for duplicate detection in click stream, if we allow a very
little error rate to occur.
Based on the first conclusion we have modified the buffering mechanism to utilize the
LRU replacement technique. which now replaces the Least Recently Used item with the
new item, when the buffer is full. But, with this modification, other than costly linked
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lists deletions we will now have False Negatives(FN) in the buffering. FN is the occasion
where a duplicate element is wrongly interpreted as a distinct. FN occurs due to a gap
in the data stream, which is the number of elements between a duplicate and its nearest
predecessor. Since LRU get rid of least recently used item, it may be the item that is
newly arrived. But since its predecessor is already deleted, buffer will treat it as a distinct
clement. Table 7.13 shows the false negatives which we have seen in the iluffering with
LRU replacement.

Compare to TSBF the error rate high.

Therefore, even with the

replacement mechanism Buffering mechanism is not suitable for detecting duplicates in
the pay-per-click streaming data.
FN are the main reason for us to develop TSBF, comparing to its predecessor Counting
Bloom Filter (CBF). In the next section we discuss effect of

F~

in the CBF in duplicate

detection.

7.2.8

False Negatives in CBF

A false negative(FN) is an error when duplicate element is wrongly reported as distinct.

It is generated only by duplicate elements, and is related to the input data distribution,
especially the distribution of gaps. A gap is the number of elements between a duplicate
and its nearest predecessor. Suppose a duplicate element
xi-dxi
Xi

= Xi -

Xi

whose nearest predecessor is

6i) is hashed into k cells is decremented to 0 within the (\ iterations when

arrives, then there will be FN. If there are no duplicates in the data stream, there are

no predecessors and therefore FN will be zero.
How FN are possible with CBF? In the CBF when its deletion cycle is executed the
counters are decremented by 1. For example, let us assume we are using a CBF with

k

=4

and that there are two clicks (click i, and click j) from the same IP, which are close

enough to consider as duplicates. After click i is inserted the corresponding counters are
(2,3,2, and 1). By this time if the deletion is executed the counters become (1,2,1, and
0). And now when click j comes, since one of the counters is zero, it will not be detected
as a duplicate.
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Table 7.13: False Negatives in Buffering with LRU Replacement
Clicks Processed

Buffering with-

Buffering with LRU

out Replacement

Replacement

10

5

5

0

50

28

27

1

75

41

40

1

100

54

51

3

200

107

100

7

300

170

158

12

400

249

234

15

500

305

286

19

750

448

411

37

1000

594

547

47

2000

1261

1162

99

3000

1893

1759

134

4000

2586

2409

177

5000

3136

2924

212

10000

5980

5601

379

20000

11231

10531

700

30000

16456

15471

985

40000

21535

20222

1313

50000

22442

20998

1444
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Error

Counting Bloom Filters have both false positives and false negatives. \Ve can conduct
experiments to find out the total error, but it is difficult to separate them as false positives
and false negatives experimentally. In one of the previous experiments we have shown
that on average TSI3F have 1% false positive error. The architecture of the TSI3F and
CBF are almost the same except that the TSBF uses 2 bits to represent the status and
CBF uses 4 bits to represent the count. Therefore, we assume that CBF also has a 1%
false positive rate, and whatever remains from the total error will be false negatives.
\Ve have conducted several rounds of experiments to see the effect of the false positive
and negative errors of the CBF. Table 7.14 shows the results. In Figure 7.23 we have
plot the error with the stream size and the variation is linear. In the CBF compare to
false positive rate, false negative rate is high. What does this mean in the pay-per-click
model? If false negatives are high, that means duplicate clicks are wrongly detected as
distinct. In this case, advertisers will be charged for the click. On the other hand, if false
positives are high, distinct clicks are wrongly identified as duplicate and publishers will
not get paid for unique clicks.
To reduce the FN either we have to reduce the frequency of the deletion cycle or completely change the structure of the CBF. The deletion cycle depends on the application
and. in a system like pay-per-click, it is rather impossible to adjust the deletion cycle because the time period where two clicks are considered duplicate is almost fixed. Therefore
the approach is to change the structure of the CBF to leave some residue when counters
are decremented. For example a counter does not turn on and turn off immediately, during an insertion or dcletion(i.e. to switch from 1 to 0), but it goes through several states
before turns to 0, For example state 1: recently seen, 2: partially deleted, and 3: never
seen. Therefore in the previous example when the first click arrives counter will be (2, 2,
2, and 2), and after the deletion cycle, they will be (1, 1, 1, and 1). When the second
click arrives counters will be at state 1, which will now correct the error and identify the
duplicate.
This modification

1Il

TSBF eliminates the chances for FNs, but there
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IS

a little

Table 7.14: False Negatives
Clicks Processed Duplicates detected Total Error False
rate(%)
HT

CBF

10

5

5

0

0.00

50

28

27

1

2.57

75

41

40

1

1.43

100

54

51

3

4.55

200

107

100

7

5.54

300

170

158

12

6.05

400

249

234

15

5.02

500

305

286

19

5.23

750

448

411

37

7.26

1000

594

547

47

6.91

2000

1261

1162

99

6.85

3000

1893

1759

134

6.08

4000

2586

2409

177

5.84

5000

3136

2924

212

5.76

10000

5980

5601

379

5.34

20000

11231

10531

700

5.23

30000

16456

15471

985

4.98

40000

21535

20222

1313

5.09

50000

22442

20998

1444

5.43
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Figure 7.23: False Negatives.

chance (about 1%) for FP with TSBF. Since buffering does not have FP, to compare
our results fairly and effectively, we used a variation of buffering called FPbuffering
[Deng and Rafiei , 2006] introduced by Deng et al.

In FPbuffering, the buffer is searched when a new element arnves. If found , it is
reported as a duplicate. Otherwise report it as a duplicate with probability q and as a
distinct with probability (1 - q). In the original buffering, if an element is not found in
the buffer , it is always reported as a distinct. This variation can increase the overall error
rates of buffering when there are more distincts in the stream, but can decrease the error
rates when there are more duplicat es in the stream. Clearly, FPbuffering has both FPs
and FNs. In fact, as Deng et al. suggested q is the FP rate since a distinct element will
be reported as duplicate with a probability q.

In the following experiment we compared the error rates between TSBF (m = 256,k =
4) , FPbuffering with LRU replacement on the real data by varying the allowable FP rate
(i. e. q) and stream sizes. For the results in Table 7.15 , we calculated the Error rate as
(number of FPs/ number of distincts) with the assumption that with Buffering without
replacement gives correct number of duplicates. As the result shows TSBF error rate is
almost always less than 1% except for the first five data sets. Even though the error rate
is high , the actual difference is maximum of 2 clicks. For the FPbuffering we have changed
the FP rate, which is the variable q, between 0.01 , 0.1 , 0.2, and 0.5. FPbuffering gives its
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best performance when the allowable FP rate is 1%. The results are almost similar to
TSBF. When the q value is O.l,(or allowable FP rate is 10%) the maximum error rate
is slightly less than 10%, which may be acceptable in some applications but not in ours.
But when the allowable FP rate higher than 10% FPbuffering has its worst performance.
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5

0
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3.7

28

3.7

29

7.4

30

11.1

37

37.0

75

40

41

2.5

41

2.5

43

2.5

45

12.5

47

17.5

100

53

54

1.8

54

1.9

57

7.5

61

15.1

69

30.2

200

105

107

1.9

107

1.9

112

6.7

120

14.3

141

34.2

300

168

170

1.2

169

0.6

184

9.5

192

14.3

210

25.0

400

247

249

0.8

249

0.8

254

2.8

270

9.3

299

21.1

500

303

305

0.6

305

0.6

314

3.6

330

8.9

378

24.7

750

444

448

0.9

445

0.2

469

5.6

475

6.9

543

22.3

1000

590

594

0.7

597

1.1

620

5.1

643

8.9

744

26.1

2000

1251

1261

0.8

1255

0.3

1314

5.0

1343 7.4

1491 19.2

3000

1881

1890

0.4

1895

0.7

1948

3.6

2042 8.6

2252 19.7

4000

2569

2584

0.5

2580

0.4

2660

3.5

2745 6.9

3048 18.5
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3115

3134

0.6

3125

0.3

3238

3.9

3372 8.3

10000 5939

5976

0.6

5968

0.5

6188

4.2

6439

8.4

7197 21.2

20000 11168

11222 0.5

11198 0.3
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7.2.9

Double clicks Vs. Multiple clicks

Are multiple clicks on the same ad (usually known as impressions), always considered
duplicates? For example, consider the case of a double click, i.e., two clicks occur on
the same ad, where the second click follows the first one within a time period p. Is the
second click a double click always? Unfortunately, in most of these cases it is hard or
even impossible to determine the true intent of a click. Therefore in such cases we adapt
a simple measure, which is the time difference between the two clicks. If p is really small,
e.g. "fraction of a second", this click is considered invalid but not fraudulent because
the person who made the click may be accustomed to Windows ™ default method of
invoking options in an application. Therefore, we have to disregard such clicks when
duplicate clicks are detected. It can be easily done with Buffering approach, since it is
merely a comparison of two time stamps. In order to distinguish these double clicks with
TSBF, we have to increase the resolution of the status vector S. This can be done by
increasing the maximum number of states in V. Figure 7.24 depicts this extended status
vector with V = 5 along with the original TSBF. With the new configuration, states in

S change frequently than that of with V = 3. We have performed experiments to detect
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such double clicks with the new status vector and results are shown in Table 7.16 and
Figure 7.25 show the break down of double clicks in one minute time intervals. For
example, in the dataset with 20,000 records 95 .6% of t he duplicates are recorded within
the first minute and 3.3%,0.7%, and 0.4% duplicates are recorded in the second , third,
and fourth minute respectively.
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Figure 7.24: Extended status vector for duplicate detection.
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Time Complexity Comparison for Duplicate Detection

Since our goal is to minimize the error rates given a fixed amount of space and acceptable
FP rate, we focus only on time complexity. There are several parameters to be set in our

176

method. For each newly arrived element (click) we probe m cells to detect duplicates.
After that we pick k cells and update the states of them. Last we update all non-zero
cells « m) when the decaying function is invoked. Therefore time required for TSBF,
CBF, and BF to process one element is 0(1), however, the exact time depends on the
parameter settings.
For buffering and FPbuffering processing time is depends on two processes: clement
searching and clement evicting. Searching can be quite expensive without an index structure. Vie used a hash table to accelerate the search process. The extra space that is
needed for a hash table to keep the search time constant is linear in the number of elements stored. The process of maintaining the LRU replacement policy (finding the least
recently used element) is also costly, and extra space is needed to make it faster. This
extra space can be quite large for LRU.

7.2.11

Comparison with similar work for duplicate detection in Streaming
data

In [Metwally et al., 2005b], the authors proposed to maintain a CBF for each sub-window,
and a main BF which is a combination of all CBF and represents the entire jumping window. When a new sub-window is generated, the eldest window is expired and subtracted
from the main Bloom filter. Combining two CBFs is performed by adding the corresponding counters, deleting an old CBF is performed by subtracting its counters from the main
Bloom filter.
However, this scheme has two potential drawbacks. One is that subtracting an expired
Bloom filter from the main Bloom filter needs O( m) operations, and false positives increase
if new clements are inserted into the main Bloom filter before subtracting operation
completes. The other drawback is that this scheme may have high false positive rate,
especially when the number of sub-windows is large.

There are two reasons for this

drawback. First, with the same limited available memory space, expanding bits in Bloom
filters to counters make the size of Bloom filter smaller. In worst case, the maximum value
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in the counters of counting Bloom filters is N /Q, and the maximum value in the counters
of the main Bloom filter is N. Therefore, each counter must ave enough bits to avoid
saturation, which will generate both false negatives and false positives. Consequently, the
size of the Bloom filters in their algorithm is much smaller than the size of Bloom filters
in our TSBF algorithm, and the false positive rate will be much higher than that of TSBF
algorithm. Sccond, checking the prcsence of an clement in the main I3loom filters which
is the result of combination of all CBFs will generate very high false positive rate, since
it is as if all N elements are inserted into the single main Bloom filter( any entry with
non-zero value in any CBF will set the corresponding entry in the main Bloom filter to
non-zero).

7.3

Modeling of Knowledge and Validation

Most service providers currently approach the problem of click fraud by attempting to
automatically recogni)l;e fraudulent clicks and discount them. Fraudulent clicks arc recognized by machine learning algorithms, which use information regarding the navigational behavior of users to try and distinguish between human and robot generated clicks
[Immorlica et a1., 2005]. Such algorithms are mainly built using rule based techniques
and most of them are classification systems [Metwally et a1., 2005a], even though a few
score based systems are also reported [Ge and Kantardzic, 2006, Kantardzic et al., 2008,
Kantardzic et a1., 2009]. Most of the click fraud solution providers, including search engines and third party solution providers, claim their rule-based expert system is the best
among the others taking the advantage of keeping "rules" as a secret weapon. They do
not clisclose information about the set of rules due to fear of competition. This situation
even led to multi-million dollar settlements [Hadjinian et al., 2006, Thzhilin, 2006] in the
recent years.
Due to the lack of verifiability of click fraud solutions, it is inevitable that the trust between service providers and advertisers is degraded. Since real-world click fraud solutions
are usually kept secret for fear of competition, it is practically impossible to study many
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of them in a single context. In this research we discuss the modeling of knowledge and
validation (KV) model for rule based expert systems used in click fraud detection. We
have considered the case studies of one real-world click fraud detection rule-based expert
system [Kantardzic et al., 2009] for validation. In future, solution providers will be able
to use our tool to test their systems without revealing the implementation details of the
rule base.

7.3.1

Rules in Knowledge-based Systems

Knowledge-based systems have received great attention and have become an essential tool
in business, science, engineering, manufacturing, and many other fields. Because of the
natural representation and the powerful inference ability of production rules, knowledgebased systems are usually implemented in the form of rule-based system (RBS). Usually a rule in an RBS describes an IF-THEN relationship of the form: "LHS

'* RES,"

where LHS is a collection of conditions, and RHS is a collection of actions or conclusions
[Wu and Lee, 2002]. If the conditions are met a certain value is assigned and if not another threshold value is assigned. Rule-based expert systems have been in use for a couple
of decades, and their usefulness has been demonstrated in many domains. However, they
also draw a lot of criticism [Ben-David, 2008]. In particular, deriving the "right" rules
proved a very difficult task. Another issue has been the need to adjust rule-based systems
to cope with changing conditions. Although rule-based systems provide the major advantage of being interpretable, as rule-based systems grow larger, it becomes increasingly
impractical to manually check each rule for consistency, redundancy etc. This topic. thus.
drew the attention of the research community, and algorithmic tools began to emerge
[Ayel and Laurent, 1991, Ben-David, 2008, Gupta et al., 1991].

7.3.2

Proposed Validation Framework

Despite the enormous capabilities of modern machine learning and data mining techniques
in modeling complicated problems, most of the available click fraud detection systems are
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rule-based. This is mainly due to the fact that advertisement click streams are very hard
to be labeled as fraudulent because of the infinite situations in which a person could click
on an advertisement without getting through with the purchase. However, scenarios where
an advertisement is clicked 100 times in 1 second is definitely fraudulent. Therefore, rules
invented by experts to detect such fraudulent clicks arc manageable and their output is
clear. As the characteristics of a fraudulent click become more subtle, the output score
of a rule-based system becomes harder to interpret. This raises two questions a) are the
derived rules enough to model the fraudulent behavior? and b) what is the value of a
score threshold to announce a click fraudulent. Question (a) is about the validation of
the rule-based scores. In other words are we using the right rules/model.
The idea behind the proposed validation framework is basically to acquire another
model of the clicks data that is not rule dependent, a model that learns the inherent
statistical regularities of the data. Then the output of both models is compared. If both
models are consistent, then the rules are reflective of the actual inherent knowledge in the
data and therefore they provide a good interpretation of the structure of the problem in
hand. On the other hand, a discrepancy between the models indicates a lack of knowledge
about the system and thus it might be helpful to extract extra rules from the machine
learning model so as to be added to the rule-based system. Needless to say that the choice
of a proper machine learning technique is of utmost importance.
Rule-based click fraud detection systems are very reliable in extreme cases where a
dick is legitimate if a purchase is made while a dick is fraudulent if. for example. there
was no window opened to make the click (i.e. click bots). In the proposed validation
framework we train a classification algorithm to classify clicks as legitimate or fraudulent.
Using semi-supervised learning is natural as few samples (i.e. extreme cases clicks) have
verified labels while the scores for the rest of the clicks are not definitive and again the
threshold to classify them is not known. Due to the good generalization performance of
Support Vector :v1achines (SVM), we use Semi-supervised SVM (S3VM) [Joachims, 1999]
to model the inherent regularities of the click fraud data.
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The validation process consists of following related steps.
(a) Select a subset of clicks with confident labels (legitimate/fraudulent) as described
earlier. The rest of the clicks are considered unlabeled samples and they are used
for their internal structure.
(b) Train S3YM on both labeled and unlabeled clicks. After training, each unlabeled
click will be assigned a label (legitimate/fraudulent).
(c) As click fraud systems produce scores rather than classifications, we transform the
S3YM classifications of unlabeled clicks into posterior probabilities using [Platt, 1999].
(d) Both scoring techniques are compared.

7.3.3

Results of validation model

We used a data set of 17,558 clicks produced using our CCFDP system (www.netmosaics.
com) [Kantardzic et al.. 2008, Kantardzic et al., 2009]. These data are from an actual ad

campaign conducted in 2008. The CCFDP system produced a score between 0 and 1 for
each click in the data set, where 0 is legitimate and 1 is fraudulent. To generate training
data set for the S3YM some of these clicks should be relabelled for the classifier. We
selected clicks with the scores in the range 0 and 0.1 as legitimate clicks. These clicks are
labelled as 0 for the S3YM data set. Similarly, we selected clicks with the scores in the
range 0.9 and 1.0 as fraudulent clicks. These clicks are labelled as class 1 for the S3YM
data set. The remaining data, with the scores between 0.1 and 0.9, are assigned to be
unlabeled.
Labelled data set is used to train the S3YM, and Figure 7.26 shows the scores obtained
from S3VM modeling compared with the original scores from the CCFDP system. It is
clear that the two sets of scores highly match. The Pearson correlation coefficient between
two series is 0.973. This indicates that the rules used in the CCFDP system are greatly
consistent with the structure of the click data. Does this give us the chance to get rid of
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Figure 7.26: Comparison of scores produced using the CCFDP system and S3VM algorithm.
the rules in the CCFDP? Yes, not only can it replace the rules but it can also eliminate
the controversy due to many rule based solutions offered in the market.

We have seen that due to the lack of verifiability of click fraud solutions, it is inevitable
that the trust between service providers and advertisers is degraded. Until today and
many more years ahead, real-world click fraud solutions will usually kept secret for fear
of competition. But, with the introduction of this validation model, click fraud solution
providers can validate their rule-based solutions without revealing the actual contents.
Currently we are applying the framework on several data sets. Also we are investigating the issue of using the output of S3VM to estimate a proper threshold on the scores
produced by the CCFDP system. In the near future, besides working on extracting rules
to model the differences between scoring methods. we will investigate semi-supervised
regression methods which might be more appropriate for continuous scoring purposes.
In the future work we will examine methods to modcl the differences between these
scoring methods and how to extract rules that will add to our understanding of the click
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fraud problem in the form of new click fraud patterns and schemes.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation presents new methodologies for click fraud detection and prevention
in real time. The proposed solution analyzes the detailed user activities on both, the
server side and client side collaboratively to better describe the intention of the click.
Data fusion techniques are developed to combine evidences from several data mining
models and to obtain a better estimation of the quality of the click traffic. Our ideas
arc experimented through the development of the Collaborative Click Fraud Detection
and Prevention (CCFDP) system. Experimental results show that the CCFDP system
is better than the existing commercial click fraud solution in three major aspects: 1)
detecting more click fraud especially clicks generated by software; 2) providing prevention
ability; 3) proposing the concept of click quality score for click quality estimation.
The existing commercial click fraud solutions cannot detect software clicks. which is
one of the major forms of click fraud. Also those solutions cannot prevent click fraud
beforehand. Our solution identifies click fraud by using both server side and client side
data. The server side differentiates our approach from existing commercial solutions, and
it allows detection of very frequent software click fraud. To improve the detection process,
we added extended parameters such as mouse movement, mouse click, key stroke etc. to
the client side data. Our analysis is extended with these parameters, and results show
that it improves the detection capabilities.
Due to the nature of inherent weakness of Googles solution (or any other search engine,
ISP based solution), which does not have enough data on post-click user activities, it is
hard or even impossible to determine the true intent of a click. There are even more
weaknesses in the Goolges online procedure: lack of deployment of data mining methods;
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lack of use of conversion data, and lack of more advanced types of filters. Our approach
collects both the server side click and post-click user activities making better infrastructure
than the server side only solutions.
In the CCFDP initial version, we analyzed the performances of the dick fraud detection
and prediction model by using a rule base algorithm, which is similar to most of the
existing systems. We have assigned a quality score for each click instead of classifying the
click as fraud or genuine, because it is hard to get solid evidence of click fraud just based
on the data collected, and it is difficult to determine the real intention of users who make
the clicks.
The diversity of CF attack types makes it hard for a single counter measure to prevent
click fraud. Therefore, it is important to be able to combine multiple measures capable
of effective protection from click fraud. Therefore, in the CCFDP improved version, we
provide the traffic quality score as a combination of evidence from several data mining
algorithms.

We have tested the system with a data from an actual ad campaign in 2007 and 2008.
We have compared the results with Google Adwords reports for the same campaign.
Results show that a higher percentage of click fraud present even with the most popular
search engine.

The multiple model based CCFDP always estimated less valid traffic

compare to Google. Sometimes the difference is as high as 53%.
Detection of duplicates, fast and efficient, is one of the most important requirement in
any click fraud solution. Usually duplicate detection algorithms run in real time. In order
to provide real time results, solution providers should

utili~e

data structures that can be

updated in real time. In addition, space requirement to hold data should be minimum.
In this dissertation, we also address the problem of detecting duplicate clicks in payper-click streams. We proposed a simple data structure, Temporal Stateful Bloom Filter
(TSBF), an extension to the regular Bloom Filter and Counting Bloom Filter. The bit
vector in the Bloom Filter was replaced with a status vector. Depending on the insertions
and deletions these states take different values.
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By introducing the status vector we

have eliminated the false negatives occur in the Counting Bloom Filter. Therefore, our
experiments were focused on minimizing false positives that occur in TSBF. We have
carried out experiments both with synthetic and real world data sets. Results of TSBF
method is compared with I3uffering, FPBuffering, and CI3F methods. False positive rate
of TSBF is less than 1% and it does not have false negatives. Space requirement of
TSBF is minimal among other solutions. Even though Buffering does not have either
false positives or false negatives its space requirement increases exponentially with the
size of the stream data size. When the false positive rate of the FPBuffering is set to 1%
its false negative rate jumps to around 5%, which will not be tolerated by most of the
streaming data applications. We also compared the TSBF results with CBF. TSBF uses
only half the space or less than standard CBF with the same false positive probability.
CBF also suffer from false negatives. while TSBF does not have false negatives. Due to
these advantages TSI3F technique has replaced the I3uffering based duplicate detection
mechanism used in the NetMosaics click fraud detection system.
One of the biggest success with CCFDP is the discovery of new mercantile click bot,
the Smart ClickBot. We presented a Bayesian approach for detecting the Smart ClickBot
type clicks. The system combines evidence extracted from web server sessions to determine
the final class of each click. Some of this evidence can be used alone, while some can be
used in combination with other features for the click bot detection. During training and
testing we also addressed the class imbalance problem. Our best classifier shows recall of
94%, and precision of 89%, with Fl measure calculated as 92%. The high accuracy of our
system proves the effectiveness of the proposed methodology. Since the Smart ClickI30t
is a sophisticated click bot that manipulate every possible parameters to go undetected,
the techniques that we discussed here can lead to detection of other types of software bots
too.
Despite the enormous capabilities of modern machine learning and data mining techniques in modeling complicated problems, most of the available click fraud detection
systems are rule-based. This is mainly due to the fact that advertisement click streams

186

are very hard to be labeled as fraudulent because of the infinite situations in which a
person could click on an advertisement without getting through with the purchase. This
raises two questions a) are the derived rules enough to model the fraudulent behavior?
and b) what is the value of a score threshold to announce a click fraudulent. Question
(a) is about the validation of the rule-based scores. In other words are we using the right
rules / model.
·We proposed validation framework to acquire another model of the clicks data that
IS

not rule dependent, a model that learns the inherent statistical regularities of the

data. Then the output of both models is compared. If both models are consistent, then
the rules are reflective of the actual inherent knowledge in the data and therefore they
provide a good interpretation of the structure of the problem in hand. On the other hand,
a discrepancy between the models indicates a lack of knowledge about the system and
thus it might be helpful to extract extra rules from the machine learning model so as to
be added to the rule-based system. Needless to say that the choice of a proper machine
learning technique is of utmost importance.
Due to the uniqueness of the CCFDP system architecture, it shows better click fraud
detection than current commercial solution and search engine/ISP solution. The system
will protect Pay-Per-Click advertisers from click fraud and improve their Return on Investment (ROI). The system can also provide an arbitration system for advertiser and
PPC publisher whenever the click fraud argument arises. Advertisers can gain their confidence on PPC advertisement by having a channel to argue the traffic quality with big
search engine publishers. General consumer will gain their confidence on internet business
model by reducing fraudulent activities which are numerous in current virtual internet
world.
vVe have been carrying out click fraud related research studies since 2004, for the
benefit of the Internet community. It is worth mentioning that, we have to accept the
fact that well-undercover bots will not be spotted and we have to reach a sustainable
tradeoff for the detection model. Any attempt to identify deep undercover bots is likely
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to produce high false positive rates. A high false positive rate will mean that we are
labeling many regular traverses as bot activities. Although we wish to detect as many
bots as possible, it is far worse to tag regular users as bots than to skip some detection,
because misclassifying regular users as bots may have unpredictable consequences. For
instance, blocking a proxy IP by mistake will represent the loss of many users that may
no longer visit the site.
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CHAPTER 9
FUTURE WORK
The success of the CCFDP opens the door to some new areas of research in the click
fraud detection and prevention. We have provided the likely characteristics of future
click bots after dissecting an intelligent click bot. Since fraudsters always find ways to go
undetected, while committing click fraud, no solution will provide the ultimate protection
against click fraud. Therefore, continuous research should be a prime importance to detect
future click fraud attacks. In this chapter we provide more ideas that can be used towards
strengthening click fraud solutions.
l\Iost of the solutions including our CCFDP depends on how well a user is identified
and tracked during each of his Iher visits to a website. For example, CCFDP system
requires a user to allow third party cookies and run javaScript in his browser. In some
situations a user may disable cookies intentionally or may not allow javaScript to run on
his browser. In such cases it is difficult for CCFDP to track a user successfully. Some
of the ideas explained here are proposed by Shat et. [Shah, 2005J for different context. In
the following section we list few ideas that can be used towards user verification.

9.1

Browser Verification

User agent is an unique identifier of a browser. Click bots try to mimic the user agents
of known browsers to go undetected. They are programmed to generate "fake" clicks
that mimics actual clicks. Most of the time it is an HTTP request that is artificially
generated. Therefore it is important to verify whether the click is originated from an
authentic browser such as Internet Explorer, Mozilla, etc.
Two experiments are proposed to identify browser requests and they are explain below.
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(a) Using extended context of the User Agent Header
(b) Using recently visited social network websites

9.1.1

Using extended context of the UserAgent Header

9.1.1.1

User Agent Header

\Vhen a browser requests a page from a Web server, the browser sends information about
itself along with the request. These value strings are called headers. Typically, this information includes the browser type (Internet Explorer, Opera, ::vlozilla, etc.), the browser
version, and the underlying platform (Windows XP, Linux,

~Iac

OS X, etc.). The server

then uses this information to select an appropriate page format for the browser, since
different browsers (and even different versions of the same browser) have varying incompatibilities in their support for HTML and JavaScript.
For example if Internet Explorer is to fetch the URL
http://www.amazon.com/index.html.this is what the browser might send to Amazon's
server:
GET /index.html HTTP/l.l
Host: www.amazon.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)

Figure 9.1: The User-Agent Header
The last four lines of this request are headers. Each header consists of a name and
a value, separated by a colon. All possible headers are defined by the HTTP protocol
specification. A browser identifies itself using the User-Agent header as shown in Figure
9.2.

(User agent is a generic term for an application, like a browser, that is acting

as an Ftgent for the user). The header value consists of a series of product identifiers
and/ or comments. A product identifier is a string like "~Iollilla/ 4.0" or "Opera/7.02" that
identifies the product by name and (optionally) by version. Additional attributes about
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the product, referred to as comments, are enclosed in parentheses, such as "(compatible;
MSIE 6.0; Windows XT 5.0)". The product identifiers and comments can come in any
order, but in general the most significant values are listed first.
The Figure 9.2 shows a sample user-agent string reported by Internet Explorer that
highlights its tokens.

Application Name

r----------I Application Version I
~_l ]...------1\ Compatibility Flag I

I

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible: MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)

~~_S_ion_T_~OO~I----~J
Platform T~en

-

Figure 9.2: User-Agent String
For historical reasons, Internet Explorer identifies itself as a MOllilla 4.0 browser. The
sample user-agent string contains three tokens.
(a) The Compatibility flag ("compatible") is used by most modern browsers. It indicates
that Internet Explorer is compatible with a common set of features.
(b) The Version token identifies the browser and contains the version number. The
version token in the example ("MSIE 7.0") identifies Internet Explorer 7.
(c) The Platform token identifies your operating system and contains the version number. The platform token in the example ("Windows NT 6.0") indicates Windows
Vista.
In the example. Internet Explorer is the user agent. However. other programs also
provide user-agent strings when contacting servers over the Internet. For example, the
Windows RSS Platform provides the following user-agent header when requesting RSS
data [:"Iicrosoft, 2010].
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Windows-RSS-Platform/l.0 (MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
The header shown in Figure 9.1 defines a signature for each known browser. If a
click bot has to generate a fake click it should identify itself as one of those legitimate
browsers. But experiments have shown that it is difficult to break all signatures of browsers
completely. Some of the experiments are listed below but more theoretical understanding
and more complex implementations are necessary for successful detection of larger bot
population.
Figures 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 show HTTP GET requests made to a common server from
different browsers.
Accept *r
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent Mozillaf40 (compatible; MSIE 80; Windows NT 60; Trident/40; SLCC1 .NET CLR
20.50727 InfoPath2;NET CLR 3521022; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding gzip deflate
Host kluge.in-chemnltz.de
Connection. Keep-Alive

Figure 9.3: HTTP GET request generated by Internet Explorer

Host Kluge m-chemnitLde
User-Agent r.,lozilla150 (Windows. U Windows NT 60; en-US; rv191.8) GecKo/20100202
Firefoxl3 5 8 (NET CLR 3.5 30729)
Accept textlhtmLapplication/xhtml+xmLapplication/xml;q=O.9.*I*:q=0.8
Accept-Language en-us.enq=O 5
Accept-Encoding gzip.deflate
Accept-Cnarset ISO-B859-1utf-B.q=07".q=07
Keep-Alive 300
Connection keep-alive

Figure 9.4: HTTP GET request generated by Firefox

9.1.1.2

Observations

• In each request the order of appearance of the HTTP fields is different. For example
"Host" is placed. as the one before last in Internet Explorer while it appears first in
Firefox.
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Host klugejn-chemnitz.de
Connection keep-alive
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows: U; Windows NT 6.0; en-US) AppleWebKit/532.5 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chromef41249 1036 Safari1532.5
Accept applicationlxml..applicationfxhtml+xml,textlhtmLq=0.9,textlplain;q=0.8,imageJpng.*!*;q=05
Accept-Encoding gzip,defiate.sdch
Accept-Language en-US,en:q=08
Accept-Charset ISO-8859-1 ,utf-8:q=O
7,
...c ..... ___

._~

__ ._. ____.....___. __.•__. ______ ._.._. ___. ___ . __. _________ • ______. __ _

Figure 9.5: HTTP GET request generated by Chrome
• Values in the "Accept" field are completely different.
Figure 9.7, 9.8, and 9.9 show the changes in headers when cookies are used. We use
cookies in CCFDP but never pay attention to how differently they are handled by the
browsers. The figures show different browsers respond to two cookies (cook1 and cook2).
We can identify the browser on the basis of these results.
<HTML>
<HEAD>
< f,1ETi.. HTIP~ EClUI\l=uSet-I::.ookie" CI)r\J1Fr\JT='·(o()~··l=l 11 >
('lETA HTTp·Ec)UIV="·:;et-i::'ookie'· C(J(·1Ip·iT="cook2=Z"
<!HEAD>
.
< BODY> </B ODY>
</HTML>

Figure 9.6: HTML code to generate the cookies

GET / HTTP/l.l
Host: 192.168.7.60
User-Agent: MozillatS.O (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; 1"1:1.6)
Geci<o/20040113
Ao:ept:
text/xml ,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html; q=O. 9,text/plain; q=
o.8,image/png,image/jpeg,image/gifj q=O .2,*/* j q=O.l
Ao:ept-Language: en-us,enj q=O.5
Ao:ept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Ao:ept-Q-,arset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8j q=O. 7, *; q=O. 7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-al ive
took!e: .:00k2·'2: (ookl 1

Figure 9.7: HTTP request generated by Fircfox

9.1.2

User's frequently visited social websites

Most Internet users at least visits couple of social sites frequently. Examples for social
networking sites are FacebookTA!, Twitter™, Youtube™ etc. Globally, social networks
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GET / HTTP/l.l
AlXept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, *1*
AlXept-Language: en-us
AlXept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4,0 (compatible; MSIE 5,01; Windows NT 5,0)
Host: 192,168,7,60
Connection: Keep-Ali ve

( o"k!

I;, ook?

Figure 9,8: HTTP request generated by Chrome
GET ;test HTTP/1,1
User-Agent: Mozilia/4,0 (compatible; MSIE 6,0; MSIE 5,5; Windows 2000)
Opera 7,0 [en]
Host: 192,168,7,60
AlXept: text/html, image/png, image/jpeg, image/gif, image/x-xbitmap,

*1*;q=O.l
AlXept-Language: en
AlXept-Charset: windows-1252, utf-8, utf-16, iso-8859-1;q=0.6, *;q=O,l
AlXept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, x-gzip, identity, *; q=O
0010"; 'noi< I

1; (ook;>-?

Cookie2: $Version="l"
Connection: Keep-Alive, TE
TE: deflate, gzip, chunked, identity, trailers

Figure 9.9: HTTP request generated by Chrome
and blogs are the most popular online categories when ranked by average time spent,
followed by online games and instant messaging.
According to The Nielsen Company, global consumers spent more than five and half
hours on social networking sites like Facebook™ and TwitterTM in the month of December 2009, an 82% increase from the same time last year when users were spending just
over three hours on social networking sites (see Figure 9.10). In addition, the overall
traffic to social networking sites has grown over the last three years [nielsenwire, 2010].
With 206.9 million unique visitors. Facebook™ was the No. 1 global social networking
destinat.ion in December 2009 and 67% of global social media users visit.ed t.he sit.e during
the month. Time on site for Facebook™ has also been on the rise, wit.h global users
spending nearly six hours per month on the site.
Based on this study we can safely assume t.hat almost all the Internet users today at
least. visit a couple of those websites in any single day. If we know a user visits these
websites, can we believe that it is not a robot in the other end?
The simplest way to access visited websites of a user's machine is to use the informa-
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Figure 9.10: Global Web Traffic to Social Networking Sites
tion leak introduced by CSS (Cascading Style Sheets). The browser colors visited links
different ly than non- visited links. Our javaScript will have URLs of most popular social
networking sites in an iframe. Then we can look at which of t hose links are blue and
which are purple wit h t he help of javaScript . We can even extend this idea t o track what
other pages user frequently visits. Probably to track competitors clicking on their rivals
websites.

9.1.2.1

history.js

T he complcte source codc of history. js, can be found in the Appendix B. It was originally
published by Aza Raskin at www . azarask.in. history.js code enables anyone to detect
which social bookmarking sites your visitors use. The following javaScript will be added
to t he webpage t hat is being t racked. This will force t o t he client computer to release
websites t hat t he user has recent ly visited.
1 < s c r ip t s r c = " http: // 65. 1 8 2.2 01 .98 / his t 0 l ' Y . j s "> < / seT' i p t >

195

<script>
3

user = history () ;
var visitsDigg

5

= user. doesVisit (" Digg' ');

var visitsSlashdot

= user. doesVisit (" Slashdot");

var list Of Visited Sites = user. visited Sites ();
7 </script>

history.js has a list of the most popular social bookmarking sites which it checks
against. history.js can also check other sites. For instance, if we want to see if your visitor
has visited any of the competitors website:
1 moreSites

{
3

' , competitor' ':

[" http://competitorl.com/'',

" http://cornpetitor2 . com

I")
};
5 user

history ( moreSites );

alert ( user. doesVisit (" competitor' ') );

CCFDP system installs a javaScript in each web site that it tracks. Therefore the
infrastructure required for this experiment is already setup. We can add the additional
functionality (i.e.

history.js) to the existing javaScript.

There will be an additional

"attribute" in the table that we install client activities, which we called "social sites
visited". We can either implement it as a boolean variable with values (0/1) or as a
String array that stores all the websites the user has visited.
When a user clicks on a website that has CCFDP javaSciprt, it will execute on the
user's browser and tell the CCFDP if the browser has any visited social networking sites.
A bot, which is trying to mimic a browser will not have any value for this variable, because
its browsers are implemented to serve only a simple purpose such as generating an HTTP
request.
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9.2

Improve User Tracking

User tracking is a very important feature for CCFDP because some functionalities of its
rule based and the outlier modules arc depend on user profiles. When a user visits a client
site CCFDP system wants to know how long his visit lasted, which contents he visitcd,
what navigation path was followed and so on. Tracking of users is done with cookies. But
what if the user does not allow cookies to stored in its computer?
Two experiments are proposed to track users who do not allow to install cookies in
their computers.
(a) Using browser finger printing
(b) Using Super Cookies

9.2.1

Browser finger printing

Until recently, database tables, in which each row of information related to a person, were
shared somewhat freely provided none of the columns included explicit identifiers, such as
name, address. or Social Security number. This kind of "de-identified" data can often be
linked to other tables that do include explicit identifiers ("identified data") to re-identify
people by name. Fields appearing in both dc-identified and identified tables link the two,
thereby relating names to the subjects of the dc-identified data. For example, date of
birth, gender, ZIP, which commonly appeared in both de-identified and identified data,
uniquely identified 87% of the U.S. population [Sweeney, 2002].
The authors are interpreting the information from each individual parameter in (Birthday, sex, and zip) as entropy, [092(Prx = X), measure in bits. Where Pr(x = X) is
simply the probability that the fact would be true for a random person. So, if we assume there are 337 million people in the USA, to identify someone we require around
[092 (1 /337million)

= 28.9 bits.
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Example
Let us consider a person John living in area 40217.
In 2009, 40217 population is 13600.

If somebody knows John's zipcode, he has l092(13600/337million) = 28.7 bits
If he knows John's DOB, he has l092(1/365) = 8.51 bits
If he knows John is male. he has l092(1/2) = 1 bit
Altogether he has total = (28.7 + 8.51 + 1)

= 38.4, More than enough information.

In the CCFDP system, the current javaScript collects nearly 60 attributes of the server
client communication. But we use less than 15. If we combine, for example (UserAgent
+ Browser Pluggins + Screen size+ Color depth + System fonts + geo location + etc)
information for each client based on the above formalization we can generate a unique
identification for each client. For example see Figure 9.11 and Figure 9.12. They show
data collected through the javaScript in two different computers. We can easily see that
UserAgent combined with Fonts will easily make a unique identity for a computer. We
call this technique as browser finger printing.

9.2.2

1

Use of Super Cookies to track users instead of HTTP cookies

One of the disadvantages in the CCFDP system is the difficulty of tracking users if they
do not allow or delete cookies. The "cookie" we used in CCFDP system is an HTTP type
traditional cookie. These cookies are stored inside the browser control. For example, in
Internet Explorer you can manage the cookies by going to Tools and then to Preferences.
So that a user can easily either delete or block HTTP cookies. The only solution to
overcome this problem is to store cookies somewhere outside the browser control.

A

solution to this problem is use of "super cookies". A super cookie is also known as "Flash
cookie" or "Shared Objects", a kind of cookie maintained by the Adobe Flash plug-in on
behalf of Flash applications embedded in web pages. Flash cookies can track users in all
1 Panopticlick

inc. has conducted a similar research and you can find it at https: / /panopticlick.

eff.org/
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i

the ways traditionally HTTP cookies do.
Flash cookies offer several advantages that lead to more persistence than standard
HTTP cookies. Flash cookies can contain up to lOOKB of information by default (HTTP
cookies only store 4KI3). Flash cookies do not have expiration dates by default, whereas
HTTP cookies expire at the end of a session unless programmed to live longer by the
domain setting the cookie. Flash cookies are stored in a different location than HTTP
cookies, thus users may not know what files to delete in order to eliminate them. Additionally, they are stored so that different browsers and stand-alone Flash widgets installed
on a given computer access the same persistent Flash cookies. \\1eb browsers do not directly allow users to view or delete the cookies stored by a flash application. Users are not
notified when such cookies are set. Flash cookies are not controlled by the browser. Thus
erasing HTTP cookies, clearing history, erasing the cache, or choosing a delete private
data option within the browser docs not affect Flash cookies. Even the "Private I3rowsing" mode recently added to most browsers such as Internet Explorer 8 and Fircfox 3 still
allows Flash cookies to operate fully and track the user. These differences make Flash
cookies a more resilient technology for tracking than HTTP cookies [Soltani et a1., 2009].
The following example shows how to set a super cookie and how to retrieve it.

9.2.3

Creating the Flash Cookie

(i) Create a Flash Cookie with the getLocal method of Shared Object..
The sample movie sets a variable (myLocalSO) and assigns a Shared Object with
the name of "flashcookie" with the following ActionScript:
myLocalso

= sharedobject. getLocal (" flashcookie");

If a Shared Object with the name "flashcookie" does not already exist, then the
~lacromedia

Flash Player will create a Shared Object with that name.

(ii) Create a Flash Cookie with the 10calPath option.
An optional parameter called localPath can also be specified for the Shared Object.
This 10calPath parameter allows some control over where the Shared Object is stored
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on the client machine. This path match or be contained within the URL that the
SWF came from. Therefore, if the sample movie that creates the Shared Object on
the client machine is at
1 lit tp : Ilunmv. mydomain. comlmovieslmymovie. sUlf

t hen the localPath parameter can be set to
1 http://11I11I11I.mydomain.com/movies/mymovie . sUlf';'; movies,

or Imoviesl

mymovie. sUlf.

The code would look like this:
1 myLocalso

= sharedobject. getLocal (" flashcookie" ," /movies/mymovie. swf")

This is useful when more than one Flash Cookies are used on a site.

9.2.3.1

Setting the value of the Flash Cookie

Information is stored in the Shared Object by assigning attributes to the data property
of the Shared Object. In this example, the user name entered in the text field is stored in
the Shared Object by assigning a name attribute to the data property of the local shared
object and setting it equal to the contents of the text field as follows:
1 118et the

variable

Ilof the

textfield

"name"

equal to the

text property

"userName"

3 myLocaLso. data. name

= userName. text;

511increa8e the variable

counter by one for each visit

myLocaLso. data. counter++;

The data is written to the Shared Object when the movie is removed from the Macromedia Flash Player. To write the data immediately the method flush can be used as
follows:
myLocaLso. flush ();
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9.2.3.2

Return the value of the Flash Cookie

When a user returns to the page the Shared Object is read and its values are displayed.
1 userName.text
num Visits. text

= myLocaLso.data.name;
= "You have been here"

+

rnyLocaLso. data. counter

+"

times.

Because the Shared Object "fiashcookie" has already been created on the client machinc,my LocalSO = sharedobjcct.get Local( "fiashcookie" ) ;will get the data from the Shared
Object, which can be used to display the user name and number of visits. More information can be found at [Adobe, 2010j.
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APPENDIX A
ISAPI filter design
As the client computer sends the request to the web server, e. g. Internet Information
Service (lIS), the server generates the requested page and sends back the to the client
computer. In this step, we create an ISAPI filter to qualify the request as displayed
in Figure

A.I. As displayed in Figure

A.l, we only concern about the successfully

generated page, which is the code 200. At the same time, we only qualify pages with
text/html response. Other contents, such as image, css, video clip etc are supplementary
contents and will be sent back to client computer directly. If the major text/html page
is blocked, there should have no following image, css, and video clip etc. request. The
system logs to Global Fraudulent Database (GFD), and query for fraud score before the
response is sent back to client computer. If the fraud score is higher than the threshold, a
warning page will be sent to client computer instead. Otherwise, a unique 128-bit number,
Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) will be added to the tracking javascript code as long
as the page.

215

Client web
request

Query
GFD

,,
Global
fraudulent
patabase (GFO)

,,
GFD return
fraud score

,,

y

,L _____________ _

Send

"4...,:.;R~es::!p:..:o:.:.:n~se=-_ _ 1 Send Response page to
Client Computer

Figure A.l: IS API filter design
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APPENDIX B
History.js

/*
*

Social Limit -

Only the social you care about.
3

*

*

Enables your site to know which social bookmarking badges
to

*

display to your

visitors.
to,

*

It tells you all social sites the user has gone

or you can

query for a specific one.

*

*

For example:

*
*

var sl

*

alert( sl. doesVi8it("Digg") ); // Returns true/false, -1

=

8

History();

if unknown.

*

var listOfVisitedSites = sl. visitedSites ();

*

var checkedSites

*
*

= sl. checkedSites ();

If you want to add more sites to check,

13

you can pass that

l,n as a dictionary

*

to History:

*
*

var more

{ "Humanized": " http://humanized.com'' ,
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18

"Azarask. in":

*

i" http://azarask. in",

"http

:// azarask. in/blog "}

};

*

*
*

var s l

History (more);

alert( sl. does Visit ("Humanized") );

*

*

~

For a list

of built-in sites,

see the sites

variable below.

*

var History

function ( moreSites ) {

28

var sites = {
"Digg":

[''http://digg.com'', ''http://digg.com/login''],

" Reddi t":

[ " http://reddit.com'' , " http://red d it. com/ new /" ,

" http://reddit .com/ controversial /", "http:/ / reddit . com/
top /", " http://reddit.com/ r / red d it . com /", " http : / /
reddit .com/r /programming/"] ,
"StumbleUpon":
"Yahoo Buzz":
"Facebook":

[" http://stumbleupon . com" ] ,

33

[''http://buzz.yahoo.com''],

[''http://facebook.com/home.php'', ''http://

facebook . com" , "https:/ / login. facebook .com/login .php"] ,
"Del.icio.us":
: / / del. i c i 0
" MySpace":

["https://secure.del.icio.us/login", "http
.

us /" ] ,

[" http://www.myspace.com/ .. ] ,

" T e c h nor a t i ":
"Newsvine":

[ " http://www.technorati.com " ] ,

[" https:/ /www. newsvine. com", "https: / /www.

new s v i n e . com / _tools / use r / log in" ] ,
"Songza":

[" http://songza.com'' ] ,

" Slashdot":

[" http://slashdot.org/'' ] ,
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38

"rv1a. g n 0 1i a":

[" http://ma.gnolia.com/,, 1 ,

" B 1ink 1i s t ":

[" http://www.blinklist.com .. ] ,

"Furl":

43

[ " http://furl.net'',''h t t P : / / furl . net / mem bers / log i n

"] ,
"Mister Wong":
"Current":

[" http://www.mister-wong.com .. 1 ,

[" http://current.com'', " http://current .com/

login. html" 1 ,
" Menaeme" : [" http://meneame. net", " http://meneame. net/
login. php" ] ,
"Oknotizie":

[" http:/ / oknotizie . alice. it", ''http://

48

oknotizie . alice. it / login. html. php"] ,
"Diigo":

[" http://www.diigo.com/.. , "https:/ / secure. diigo.

com/ sign -in" ] ,
"Funp":

[" http://funp.com'' , " http://funp . com/ account /

loginpage . php" ] ,
"Blogmarks":

[" http://blogmarks.net'' 1 ,

"Yahoo Bookmarks":
"Xanga":

[" http://bookmarks . yahoo . com" ] ,

[" http://xanga.com''] ,

"Blogger":

[" http://blogger.com'' ] ,

" Las t . fm":

[ " http://www.last.fm/,,,'' h t t P s : / / www.last.fm/
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login /" ] ,
"N4G":

[" http://www.n4g.com .. ] ,

" F a v e s":

[ " http://faves.com'' , " http://fa v e s . com/home", "

h t t p s : / / sec u r e . f a v e s . com / s i g n In" ] ,
"Simpy":

[" http://www. simpy. com", .. http://www.simpy.com/58

login"],
"Yigg":

[" http:j /www.yigg.de .. 1 ,

" K i r t s y":

[ " http://www.kirtsy.com'',''htt p : / / www.kirtsy.com

/ login. php" ] ,
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" Far k":

[ " http://www.fark. com", " http://cgi.fa r k . com / c g i /

fark/users. pI? self=l"] ,
"Mixx":

[" https : / /www. mixx. comjlogin / dual", ''http://www.

lnixx . COlll" ] ,
"Google Bookmarks":

[" http : / /www. google . com/bookmarks","

63

http://www.google.com/ig / add? moduleurl=bookmarks . xml&hl
=en"] ,
" Sub b mit t":

[ " http://subbmitt.com/ " ]

};

for( var site in moreSites) {

II

If we don't have the

if( typeof( sites[site]

site,
)

=

create the URL list.

68

"undefined" ) sites[site]

[] :

II

1ft h e val u e zsst r i n g,

jus t pus h t hat

0

n tot h e URL

lis t .

if( typeof( moreSites [site] )

=

"string"

sites[site].push( moreSites[site]

);
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else
sites[site]

sites[site].concat( moreSites[site]

);

}

var visited

{};

78

function get Style (el, scopeDoc, styleProp) {

if (cl. currentStyle)
var y = el. currentStyle [styleProp];
else if (window. getComputedStyle)
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var y

=

scopeDoc. default View . getComputedStyle (el ,null) .

getPropertyValue (styleProp) ;

return y;

}

88

function remove ( el ) {
el . parent Node . removeChild ( el );

}

II

Code inspired by:

II

bindzus. wordpress. com1200'l1121241 adding-dynamic-contents-

93

to-iframes
function createIframe () {
var iframe = document. createElement (" iframe" ) ;
iframe.style.position

= "absolute";

iframe. style. visibility = "hidden";
98

document. body. append Child (iframe) ;

II

Firefox,

Opera

if (iframe . contentDocument) iframe. doc

iframe.

content Document ;

II

Internet Explorer

103

else if (iframe. content Window ) iframe. doc

iframe.

content Window . document;

II

Magic: Force creation of the body (which

zs null by

default in IE).

II

Also force

the

styles of visitedlnot-visted links.

iframe . doc. open () ;

108
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iframe. doc. write ( '<style>') ;
iframe . doc. wri te (" a{ color: #000000; display: none;}" ) ;
iframe . doc. wri te (" a: visi ted {color: #FFOOOO;

display:

inline;}");
iframe. doc. write ( '</style>');
iframe. doc. close () ;

II

ll3

Return the iframe: iframe. doc contains the iframe.

return iframe;

}
ll8

var iframe

createIframe () ;

function embedLinklnIframe ( href, text ) {
var a

=

iframe. doc. createElement (" a") ;

a. href = href;

123

a.innerHTML = site;
iframe . doc. body. append Child ( a );

}

for( var site in sites) {

var urls

=

sites [site];

for ( var i =0; i<urls. length;

II

128

You h a vet 0

itt ) {

c rea tee l e men t sin the

s cop e

0

f the

iframe for IE.
embedLinklnIframe ( urls [ i ],

sit e );
133

II

Automatically try variations of the URLS with and
without the "WUJU)"

if( urIs [i]. match (jwww\.j)

){

222

var sansWWW = urIs [i]. replace
embedLinklnIframe( sansWWW,

(lwww\.I, "");

site);

} else {

II

2

138

1 for length of string

+ 1

var httpLen = urIs [i]. indexOf("

for

I I")

slice

offset

+ 2;

var withWWW = urls [i ]. substring (0, httpLen ) + "www."
+ urls[i].substring( httpLen );
embedLinklnIframe( withWWW,

site);

}

143

}
}

var links = iframe. doc. body. child Nodes ;
for( var i=O; i<links.lellgth;

II

148

i++) {

Handle both FirefoxlSafari,

and IE (respectively)

var displayValue = get Style (links [i], iframe. doc, "display

")

;

var did Visit

display Value != "none";
153

if(

didVisit

){

vis i ted [ lin k s [ i ] . inner HTML

true;

}
}
158

remove ( iframe );

return new (function () {

var usedSites =

[];

for( var site in visited ){

163
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usedSites.push( site );

}

II

Return an array of visited sites.
168

this.visitedSites = function() {
return usedSites;

}

II

Return truelfalse.

If we didn't check the site,

return

-1.

this. doesVisit = function ( site) {
if( typeof( sites[site]

)

=

173

"undefined"

return -1;
return typeof(

visited[site])!= "undefined";

}
178

var checkedSi tes =
for(

[];

var site in sites ){

checkedSites.push( site);

}

II

Return a list

of the

sites checked.

183

this. checked Sites = function () {
return checkedSites;

}
} ) () ;
}

188
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